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Abstract  
In this thesis, I agree with the notion that human natural languages are underpinned by 
an innate faculty of language which predisposes us to acquire the structural aspects of 
language. Theories pertaining to its primary function, however, are lacking as they are 
either out of touch with the bigger picture of human social life (Berwick and Chomsky 
2017) or, if they do embrace this, they are met with challenges from evolutionary and 
communication theory (Pinker and Bloom 1990; Jackendoff 2002). 
In order to give a more satisfactory evolutionary account of the faculty of language, I 
propose that we take inspiration from the alternative view that natural languages are 
social entities which are wholly learnt and exist to improve human cooperation and social 
living (Tomasello 2014; Sterelny 2012). An important aspect of this view is seeing that 
humans have an advanced form of social cognition—that is the ability to understand that 
other creatures also have minds—which underpins their cooperative and communicative 
capabilities. I suggest, instead, that we ask what the faculty of language brings to this 
viewpoint.  
My response is that an innate linguistic structure is able to bring to mind new thoughts, 
ideas, or explanations in human communicative discourse and in situations where it 
would not be possible with just standalone words or pointing and pantomime. In more 
technical terms ‘the primary function of the faculty of language is to make relevant what 
is not salient in communicative discourses’.  The faculty of language, thus, introduces a 
new paradigm to human communication and social living.  
In conclusion, we will appreciate that an approach which integrates valuable lessons from 
viewpoints that are usually diametrically opposed provides a picture of language 
evolution that is more holistic and streamlined. My theory, therefore, appreciates and 
combines our understanding of linguistic structure, social cognition, human 
communication, and evolution in a way that is not seen in either of the theories that 
precede it.  
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Chapter 1 – Language 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Language 
‘Natural language’ refers to a unique system that humans use to combine meaningful 
symbols into more complex phrases and sentences (Fitch, 2010). As it is shared by 
members of a community it enables us to speak to and communicate with one another 
about complex ideas and thoughts, and about things we have never encountered before. 
It appears to have endowed us with powers that far exceed the cognitive and cooperative 
capabilities of other minded animals found throughout the natural world. Such a system 
is able to yield an infinite number of distinct sentences and messages and create words 
and meanings as a society sees fit. It is one of the most fascinating and intensely studied 
topics in all areas of human interest. Scientists, artists, and theologians have all theorised 
about its underlying nature and purpose—that is, how and why it got here—and why only 
humans seem to use it. Still, these questions remain open and a matter of great 
philosophical interest (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Bickerton, 2007).  
In this thesis, I will support the claim most prominently made by Chomsky (1982) that 
language is dependent upon an innate system akin to an organ (so it is similar to our 
having hearts, as opposed to learning to play the piano) that underpins our ability to 
acquire and use linguistic structure.  Since such an approach to language counts it as part 
of the natural world, I argue that it is also deserving of a natural story which means 
postulating an evolutionary process unique to the human condition. In this thesis, I aim 
to not just explain the underlying nature of language, but also its reason for coming into 
existence at all. I will argue that this linguistic organ evolved for communicative reasons 
that helped to support and improve social living. Although this thought is discussed in the 
literature (Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Jackendoff, 2002) it has hitherto remained 
controversial for reasons that I shall reassess. The goal of this thesis is to approach the 
controversies from a new angle and ultimately to overcome them. As a result, my thesis 
re-introduces communicative function as a serious contender to deliver a cohesive theory 
of language evolution.  
It is worth pointing out that there is very little agreement on what language is.  The 
majority of thinkers interested in the function and nature of natural language agree it is 
partly dependent on biological factors (that which are genetically passed down through 
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the process of reproduction), and partly dependent on cultural factors (that which is 
passed down through the process of teaching and learning). Language must in part be a 
cultural phenomenon because every culture produces and uses its own brand of it. 
Nevertheless, language is also a biological phenomenon because it requires a body that 
can facilitate its acquisition and use—which is also a body that is unique in the animal 
kingdom as no other body seems capable of acquiring it. Controversies arise, however, 
where theories disagree on which parts of language are biological and which parts are 
cultural. 
This ‘pluralistic’ line, however, does mean that most thinkers sign up to a ‘multi-
component approach’ to language,  as opposed to treating it as a ‘monolithic whole’ 
(Fitch, 2010, p. 17). Though this means that there is a difference of opinion on what 
language is, there is a general agreement on the way in which language is broken down 
into parts or sub-fields: 
• Phonology – the study of how sounds are organised in language  
• Morphology – the study of words, how they are formed, and their relationship to 
other words 
• Syntax – how words are arranged or distributed into phrases and sentences 
• Semantics – the meaning of words and sentences 
• Pragmatics – how language is used in context 
Already, this list demonstrates that language is a complex phenomenon that would be 
hard for any project to discuss in its entirety; thus, a narrowing in on which aspects of 
language are more important for the questions at hand will be a helpful starting point.  
For me, the aspects of language that are obviously unique to humans hint toward this 
starting point. This is because I am interested in telling the story of a feature that has 
made humans so unique and different to the rest of the animal kingdom. When asked if 
these aspects are witnessed elsewhere, only one of them seems to stand out: syntax 
(Chomsky, 1957; Fitch, 2010). Where other animals have demonstrated even just minor 
or basic competency for acquiring and using meaningful words, an ability for acquiring 
and using meaningful phrases or sentences is practically non-existent except in humans. 
One might argue that syntax is found in other natural systems such as bird- and whale- 
song, but this syntax remains very different from that of linguistic syntax. Whereas bird- 
and whale-song are rigid and stimulus-dependent in their use, linguistic syntax is flexible 
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and autonomous. Furthermore, and as I mentioned in the opening paragraph, language 
allows humans to utter and understand sentences we have never come across before, 
and makes infinite use of finite means; it is creative. This fact, in itself, suggests that 
language must be underpinned by some sort of structure that can combine and 
recombine the units of language in ways that are meaningful, and does not create 
meaningless word-salads (I will come back to this discussion in 1.2.1). 
The thought is that there is something special about linguistic syntax that, if understood, 
will help us uncover the nature and functions of language in its entirety. A 
‘syntactocentric’ approach to language is not without its sceptics who argue this is a bad 
starting point as it risks overlooking other essential aspects (Tomasello, 2008; Everett, 
2012). Fortunately, for these sceptics, a focus on syntax is only a starting point or ‘spring-
board’ on which to ‘jump into’ the exploration of language. Since I am interested in a 
communicative function I am also interested in language in use, and therefore take the 
subfield of pragmatics seriously. Word-formation and word-meaning are also important 
aspects of my overall research question and therefore I also address morphology and 
semantics, although to a much lesser degree. My thesis, therefore, is about the function 
and nature of linguistic structure, with a particular focus on understanding how and why 
words are organised into phrases and sentences; but it is not so syntactocentric that 
other aspects are overlooked.   
As a side note, I should point out that ‘grammar’ is another important linguistic term that 
comes up in the literature and will be used throughout the thesis. Chomsky warns us 
(Chomsky, 1975) that ‘grammar’ is used to describe both the theory of language and the 
object of that theory. In this thesis, I will use ‘grammar’ in the latter sense and refer to 
the former sense with technical terminology such as ‘universal grammar’ (see 1.2.1) and 
‘generative grammar’ (see chapter 5).  ‘Grammar’ also bears a close resemblance to the 
term ‘syntax’ because they both tend to concern the rules and structures that underpin 
language: 
• Grammar: the whole system and structure of a language or of languages in 
general, usually taken as consisting of syntax and morphology (including 
inflections) and sometimes also phonology and semantics (‘define grammar’ 
google search 10/02/19) 
• Syntax: the arrangement of words and phrases to create well-formed sentences 
in a language (‘define syntax’ google search 10/02/19) 
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As these definitions suggest, ‘grammar’ tends to be used as a broader term which 
includes the definition of syntax. In this thesis I will use ‘grammar’ as a general term to 
refer to the set of rules a speaker adheres to when using their language, or the set of 
rules that reflect their knowledge of language (Radford, 2016; Smith and Allott, 2016). 
This not only includes syntax but also morphology and even the rules behind the 
semantical elements of language. Syntax, on the other hand, simply refers to the rules 
that underlie how words are distributed in a sentence. When I use the term ‘language’ I 
intend to mean all aspects of language I introduced above, but with a focus on syntax. In 
other words, language would not be ‘language’ if there is not a syntax.  
1.1.2 Function 
The function of language also remains a deeply controversial debate in philosophical 
circles. Anyone of a Wittgensteinian persuasion will be quick to point out that language 
has many uses. Humans use it to instruct others, make jokes, ask questions, create law, 
break law, describe a scene, criticise a scene, and so on and so forth (J. R. Searle, 1969; 
Wittgenstein, 2010). What I will argue in this thesis, however, is that language has an 
overarching ‘primary function’ that explains why it evolved in the first place. The many 
uses of language either somehow embody the primary function or are ‘secondary 
functions’ which depend on the factors that initially gave rise to its primary function (see 
2.1 for further discussion on primary and secondary function).  
Before going on, I should briefly make clear some terminology I will be using in this thesis. 
I use ‘power’ as a vague term to point to something language can do without making any 
direct commitments to if that something is useful, and use ‘function’ to refer to a power 
that is useful. What is more controversial for this particular field, however, is an argument 
for primary function that is entrenched in the nature and processes of evolution. Where 
humans make artefacts like water bottles and laptops that have obvious primary 
functions, the story is a little harder to tell for natural objects like hearts and language. A 
water bottle was designed by someone who intended it would work as a container for 
holding water, but no intentional being designed the heart. Instead, it is said that the 
heart was unintentionally ‘designed’ by natural selection.  
I will explore this in more detail in chapter 2, but this supports a view that the primary 
function of natural objects is down to understanding their evolutionary history (Wright, 
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1973; Millikan, 1989; Neander, 1991; Godfrey-Smith, 2009). That is, explaining how and 
why random genetic mutations are selected for and passed down the generations to 
create a certain phenotype. The mutations that are ‘selected for’, that is the ones that 
stick around, do so because they have some positive effect on the fitness of the 
phenotype. A neck, for example, that is longer than the usual length, may have a positive 
effect because it allows a creature to access more food sources than before. This 
increased fitness also increases the chances of mating, having children and the chances 
that those children will reproduce. The longer neck, therefore, exists because it gave 
access to a better food source, which gave the animal more energy for mating and caring 
for its offspring.  
In this thesis I make the claim that the innate system that underpins language evolves to 
enhance and improve human communication; and that it does this by allowing humans 
to refer and talk about things that exist outside of the current context of their 
communicative act. In more technical terms I argue that ‘the primary function of the 
faculty of language is to make relevant what is not salient’. I will show this by arguing that 
not only are humans ‘linguistic creatures’ (see 1.2.1) and ‘cultural creatures’ (see 1.2.2) 
but are ‘hybrid creatures’ (see 1.3). The hybrid creature view appreciates that we have 
evolved to use language and culture, but also that these aspects are ultimately 
intertwined in their primary function and evolutionary history. 
My argument for this lies in that the linguistic creature view is lacking when it comes to 
an account of language primary function and its evolutionary history (see 2.2 for a 
detailed review). To resolve this problem, I suggest we take inspiration from the ‘cultural 
creature’ approach to language which appreciates a larger and more cohesive picture of 
what makes humans unique and of their evolutionary history. Ultimately, I propose an 
integrated view of language where humans have evolved a specific faculty for language-
use in order to enhance and improve the human dependency on sociality and culture.  
1.1.3 Debate 
I stated above that I support the claim that language is an innate system and that its 
primary function is a communicative one that helps to support social living (this is a 
consequence of the deeper claim that language helps to ‘make relevant what is not 
salient’). This claim, however, is controversial because it does not sit well with either of 
the current and competing theories in the field. Where I argue that language, or more 
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specifically, syntax, is innate and dependent upon our biological makeup, others argue it 
is learnt and dependent upon our social and cultural makeup (Tomasello, 2003; Kirby, 
2011; Everett, 2012). And where I argue that the primary function of language is to 
improve social living through enhanced communication, others argue its function is to 
improve individual thinking or cognitive function (Carruthers, 2002; Reboul, 2017). These 
arguments and claims broadly point to two dominant views in the field which both 
oppose my proposal; those who argue language is innate (in agreement with me) tend to 
argue it has a cognitive function (in disagreement with me); and those who argue 
language is learnt (in disagreement with me), tend to argue it has a communicative 
function (in agreement with me). 
Even in just the four or five years in which this thesis was written several books have been 
released on this very topic, and all remain in line with the current status and splitting of 
the field as I have just discussed. In 2014 Scott-Phillips released his book Speaking our 
Minds: Why human communication is different, and how language evolved to make it 
special. He argues that language is learnt and performs a vitally important function that 
enhances the pre-existing communicative abilities of humans. In 2017 Reboul released 
her book Cognition and Communication in the Evolution of Language. She argues that 
language is innate and performs vitally important cognitive functions that help humans 
to navigate and deal with their environments. Also, in 2017, Chomsky released his latest 
book, co-authored with Berwick, Why only Us: language and evolution. They argue from 
the minimalist stance (see section 2.2.3) that language is innate, but the product of 
physical constraints as opposed to natural selection.  
Although these books consider the theory that language is innate and performs a 
communicative primary function, neither of them argue for it. So, at this first glance, the 
argument that language is innate and selected for communicative reasons has few friends 
in the field. I will come to argue, however, that this is not true; and that as a ‘hybrid’ 
approach which takes inspiration from both views, it has the potential to find many allies. 
The goal for the rest of this chapter is to explore in more detail the current and dominant 
theories in the field and to explain how and where my hybrid account sits between them. 
The rest of the thesis will be dedicated to defending this account. 
With all that said, a thesis about the primary function of language is not just about the 
evolution of language, but the evolution of the human species. In 2015 Chomsky also 
released another book called What Kind of Creatures are We? which exposes that 
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understanding the what’s, why’s, and how’s of language, will help us understand the 
what’s, whys, and how’s of being human. It is with this motivation that I would like to 
explore the state of the field and my proposed contribution to it in more detail.  
1.2 What Kind of Creatures are we? 
1.2.1 Linguistic Creatures 
A prominent view in linguistics suggests our linguistic abilities are underpinned by some 
domain-specific and innate system that predisposes us to acquire the structural aspects 
of language. The research refers to this innate system as the ‘faculty of language’ (or FL)1. 
What the FL actually consists of remains a matter of debate that I will come to discuss, 
but most will agree that it is an autonomous system, module, or some component of 
mind analogous to the parts of the mind-brain that also predispose us to sense the world 
in certain ways. Our visual system, for example, is set up to perceive a certain spectrum 
of light and to distinguish foreground objects from background objects. We are, for 
example, predisposed to recognise facial shapes and the meaning of certain facial 
expressions (e.g. sad, happy, disgusted etc). These are aspects of our knowledge that are 
not learnt from our environment because, to some degree, we already and 
fundamentally know them. This suggests that if linguistic structure is not learnt from the 
environment, it must be acquired from something within the individual, and therefore 
part of our biological or genetic makeup. Such a view on language suggests that some 
evolutionary progression built us to be ‘linguistic’ and have this ability as part of our very 
nature. Thus, I propose that this viewpoint sees humans as ‘linguistic creatures’. 
I am committed to the view that we are linguistic creatures, and this is largely because I 
argue we need to postulate something like the FL to explain our linguistic abilities. In this 
section, I will go into more detail about what the FL is and also explain these arguments. 
As I mentioned above, however, this understanding of natural languages is lacking when 
we consider why and how we became ‘linguistic creatures’ in the first place. Theories that 
attempt to describe the primary function of the FL are faced with problems from 
evolutionary theory and are not in-line with the larger picture of human sociality. I will go 
into these in some detail here but will reserve the larger discussion for chapter 2. It is for 
                                                        
1 In the literature the faculty of language is also often referred to as the ‘language acquisition 
device’ or LAD. 
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these reasons that I suggest we look for inspiration for an alternate view on language 
which I will explore in the next section—that is the idea that we are not (only) linguistic 
creatures, but (also) cultural creatures. 
The term ‘innate’ is often confused and sometimes it is simply used to mean something 
like ‘knowledge2 we are born with’. The term, however, deserves more explanation than 
this.  Especially, when it comes to something as complex as language. Let me explain: at 
first glance, it seems obvious that language is something that is learnt from our 
environment. It is not sufficient for a child to be exposed to a language in order to acquire 
it3, but language itself is as diverse as the world’s cultures. The number of languages 
recorded across the globe is around 6-7000 (Anderson, 2010), and in some parts of the 
world, such as tribal Africa, you only need to travel in a car for a few hours before coming 
across a tribe that has an entirely different language from the one before4. A deeper look 
at the structures of these languages, however, appears to reveal that there are common 
grammatical principles between them all: 
 . . . in their essential properties and even down to fine detail, languages are cast 
to the same mould. The Martian scientist might reasonably conclude that there is 
a single human language, with differences only at the margins (Chomsky, 2000, p. 
7). 
These principles are known as a ‘universal grammar’ (or UG) and support the thought 
that all human languages ultimately work on the same set of principles or constraints, 
and only diverge from one another in superficial ways. UG suggests that all language use, 
or at least most, dips into this pool of principles that include mostly structural rules and 
                                                        
2 Knowledge or ‘to know the rules’ here is not meant to mean gaining a belief about some 
truth, but merely the mental representation of something that can be used through 
interaction with the world. When a speaker produces or comprehends sentences, they 
do it based on the representation associated with the language inside their head. The 
knowledge of each language, thus, can vary from one head to the next, and what 
determines if they can understand the sentence of others is how similar that knowledge 
is—not if it adheres to some outside entity (Chomsky, 1965, p. 4; Radford, 2016, p. 3).  
3 Famous cases of ‘wild children’ demonstrate this in that those that miss a ‘window of 
opportunity’ when they are young also miss out on a chance to acquire a full language 
(Fromkin et al., 1974; Curtiss, 1988). 
4 I know this from my own experience of visiting the tribes in Southern Ethiopia where in 
one day I visited two tribes whose languages were entirely different.  
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constraints that concern syntax and grammar. The thought is that a commonality 
between languages means a commonality between all humans that acquire language—
and this is due to the work of FL. 
Notice that UG does not describe all aspects of language and leaves much open to the 
constraints of one’s environment rather than their apparent FL. This involves particularly 
things like vocabulary, word-meaning and perhaps even phonetics5. What this shows is 
that input from a linguistic environment is still an essential part of the process of not just 
acquiring language, but of what one’s linguistic knowledge becomes. As an English 
speaker, my linguistic knowledge might share structural commonalities with German and 
Japanese, but my vocabulary and word-meanings (that is the meaning or concept a word 
is paired with) are shaped by what I learn from English culture. FL, therefore, does not 
just provide linguistic knowledge; instead a linguistic environment ‘triggers’ FL into action 
and the FL guides that input in a certain way6. FL, thus, gives all humans the same ‘initial 
state’ on which they start their journey of language acquisition (Rey, 2014; Cain, 2016; 
Smith and Allott, 2016).  
This guidance, therefore, could have FL understood as an ‘innate learning mechanism’ 
because it informs our linguistic knowledge in correspondence with what we learn from 
our environment. It is a sort of a combination of innate knowledge and learnt knowledge. 
To help bring this idea to light we can compares with a another type of innate learning 
mechanism found in indigo buntings (Carey, 2000). Indigo buntings are birds who, during 
migration, navigate via the position of the North Star. In their infancy, however, the birds 
need to learn which star the North Star is in order to orientate themselves correctly. 
Thankfully, the reference point for this orientation is also the point at which the sky (from 
our point of view on earth) rotates on around a central point. Indigo buntings, therefore, 
have an innate mechanism that guides them to look out for this point of rotation whilst 
they observe the sky as chicks. Learning where north is, therefore, is dependent on the 
                                                        
5 Both these points have been disputed as both semantics (Pinker, 1994; Jackendoff, 2002) and 
phonetics (Borer, 2005) are said to be part of UG. I will, however, have to leave this part of the 
debate open and remain focused on the questions surrounding syntax.  
6 How this is the case will be explored when I come to look at ‘parameter settings’ in section 5.2. 
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innate mechanism (north is equal to the point of rotation in the night sky) and the 
experiential input (observing the night sky). 
Natural languages like English, German and Japanese exist because of this set up in the 
human mind, which is only an influence on our experience of the external environment 
rather than a reflection of the external environment in its entirety. 
”[T]he English language” is an idealization over the mental grammars of English 
speakers…Where is the English language, then? If anywhere, in the heads of its speakers  
(Jackendoff, 2012, p. 21). 
In other words, our minds are not blank slates, but entities predisposed to acquire and 
learn those things that will be most helpful with us as we interact with our world. The FL, 
therefore, informs our linguistic knowledge in correspondence with what we learn from 
our environment. Language is as much a ‘window into’ (Pinker, 1994) or ‘mirror of’ 
(Chomsky, 1975; Smith and Allott, 2016)  the human mind, as it is of the social 
environment humans find themselves in.  
The claim that there is a UG, however, is a controversial one and many argue that 
languages are too diverse to propose that there are commonalities between them (Evans 
and Levinson, 2009; Dąbrowska, 2015; Wolfe, 2016). Furthermore, if there are 
commonalities, they may exist for reasons other than an FL. For example, they could be 
rooted in a single language from our ancestry (Deutscher, 2006); a product of learning 
constraints (Kirby, Griffiths and Smith, 2014); or it is simply that such structures are a 
commonplace because they are good at providing a system of communication (Everett, 
2012). I will discuss some of these in coming sections, but here I will review some 
arguments that support the view that natural language syntax is underpinned by an FL. 
The first is the lesson from the cognitive revolution of the 1950s that showed us that a 
plain ‘behaviourist’ account of language (put forward by Skinner (1957)) was 
fundamentally flawed. The suggestion was that language was acquired as the 
consequence of conditioning and positive reinforcement. Whilst a child is growing up, he 
or she is normally surrounded by the spoken language of his or her culture. The constant 
association with language—through being spoken to, listening to others speak to each 
other, and trying to speak themselves—eventually has the child acquire language. This 
view, however, simply does not account for the structural properties of language, 
especially when we consider the creative aspect (Chomsky, 1965) of language. Language 
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is a system that is able to combine and recombine meaningful units into larger phrases 
and sentences: 
[t]he combination of unlimited specificity of meaning, combined with a free 
flexibility to use language in novel way… is the hallmark of language…its defining 
features are its scope and unbounded flexibility (Fitch, 2010, p. 26).  
[Language] takes a finite set of elements and yields a potentially infinite array of 
discrete expressions (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 2002, p. 1571). 
Such unbounded flexibility allows us to even utter phrases and sentences we have never 
experienced before—th\ise aspect seems impossible to explain on the behaviourist 
model of language.  
This challenge was initially made in Chomsky’s review of Skinner (1959) where he argued 
that language could not be explained through an input (one’s experience of language) to 
output (one’s behaviour of language) system. There had to be some intermediate 
mechanism involved. This mechanism receives information from experience, does 
something with it, and has that influence the output. This is comparable to how a 
computer processor works. If you input ‘2’, you might get ‘4’ as an output—this is because 
of an internal mechanism ‘+2’. Chomsky’s point was that one’s linguistic behaviour does 
not simply reflect their experience, and therefore some internal mechanism (the FL) must 
account for this. Although it is true that empirical theories of language acquisition have 
moved on and are far more sophisticated than they were before the 1950s7, it remains a 
matter of debate if an empirical account can, in fact, account for this creative aspect. 
Second is the case for the modularity of the mind8 (Carruthers, 2006, 2010). ‘Module’ 
here refers to that intermediate structure in the mind which operates between input and 
output. It is usually domain-specific in that it is targeted to work with a particular 
experiential input (e.g. faces in facial recognition or night skies in the orientation for 
north); and encapsulated, in that the inner workings of one module are isolated from the 
workings of another (Fodor, 1983). Although I used the term ‘faculty’ to describe the 
                                                        
7 Construction Grammar, for example, models linguistic structure on the idea that sentences are 
learnt constructions that can be applied creatively by changing units within the constructions 
(Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006) 
8 This is also a direct response to the idea that the mind is a ‘blank slate’, see above. 
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‘module’ of language9, I more or less mean the same thing here. The underpinning innate 
system that explains our acquisition and use of natural language syntax structure is 
specific and encapsulated to the domain of language. There is evidence and argument 
that backs up the existence of modules as a way of providing a solution to an evolutionary 
problem (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Mithen, 1999); as a phenomena found in minds 
across the animal kingdom (Carey, 2000); and in explaining human cognition (Spelke, 
2003; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). Since language is unique to humans, postulating a 
specific module (or faculty) fits in with the claims of this research.  
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, is the argument from the ‘poverty of the 
stimulus’. This argument exposes a gap between what a child appears to know about the 
language, against what they actually experience of it. In other words, the generalisations 
over the linguistic data one would expect are not the generalisations that children make. 
This suggests that linguistic knowledge comes from them, and not their environment. We 
should also keep in mind that a child’s linguistic data is often ‘unclean’ in that it is full of 
confusions and incorrect utterances—despite this, children are still able to pick up their 
target language free of such errors (Chomsky, 1975; Crain, 1991; Laurence and Margolis, 
2001; Lidz and Gagliardi, 2015; Cowie, 2017). 
We can also demonstrate this through a direct example when we consider certain 
sentences in language are syntactically related to one another in important ways  
(Chomsky, 1965). Sentences that contain a ‘Wh-word’, for example, are 
transformations10 of a more basic sentence: like with ‘Ethiopia is in Africa’ and ‘Where is 
Ethiopia?’. In English, this transformation is known as ‘Wh-Movement’ and simply states 
that the ‘Wh-word’ at the beginning of the sentences is related to a ‘gap’ later on in the 
sentence. In this case, the ‘gap’ in the second sentence corresponds with the placement 
of ‘Africa’ at the end of the first sentence. This exposes an important syntactic 
relationship, however, it is not obvious how children come to learn this rule from the 
linguistic data they receive.  
This rule seems to work with a sentence like ‘What did you claim Jack brought?’ where 
the ‘gap’ has a relationship with the phrase ‘a car’ in ‘Did you claim Jack brought a car?’. 
                                                        
9 Why this is will become more clear in chapter 5 where I use ‘module’ in a slightly different sense. 
10 I explore the notion of transformation and movement in far more detail in chapter 5 
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It does not work, however, with the sentence ‘Did you make the claim Jack brought a 
car?’ as *‘What did you make the claim that Jack bought?’ is ungrammatical (Rey et al., 
2017). The reason for this is related to a syntactical constraint (known as an ‘island 
constraint’) which prevents the movement or transformation happening across clauses 
(where ‘make the claim Jack brought a car’ is a clause, but ‘claim Jack brought a car’ is 
not)11. We can, perhaps, envision a situation where a child is able to learn the ‘wh-
movement’ rule, but it is not at all clear how they could learn the much subtler rule 
related to clauses. Despite this, we do not hear them make this grammatical mistake. The 
linguistic creature view claims this is because something internal to them ‘knows’ this 
subtle rule. 
Finally, the poverty of stimulus argument also accounts for the idiosyncratic nature of 
language. When one compares the linguistic knowledge of a child to their linguistic 
experience one wonders why language is this way and not that way  (Rey, 2014; Rey et 
al., 2017). Why is it grammatical to say, ‘What did you claim Jack brought?’ but not 
*‘What did you make the claim that Jack bought?’, when, on the surface, the meaning 
conveyed by the sentences could be the same. The thought here is that if language were 
wholly learnt from a child’s linguistic data then it would have a very different structural 
shape, and be made up of very different syntactical rules. The reason why it does not is 
because something innate, the FL, is constraining it in a way learning from linguistic data 
alone will not.  
The existence of the FL, however, is not the problem that this thesis sets out to explore. 
It is the explanation behind how and why it exists in the first place. The trouble with this 
view is that the FL is established in human biology, and therefore requires a story from 
evolutionary biology to describe how it came into existence. This means that linguistic 
structure is not passed down through teaching and learning, but through our genetics 
and the process of reproduction.  
The primary function of language will be linked to how and why change takes place in the 
genetic variances between one generation and the next. Understanding this requires 
comprehending the process of natural selection which is one of the main topics of 
chapter 2. What I will briefly mention here is that the genetic variations that are ‘selected 
                                                        
11 This more technical jargon will be made more clear throughout chapter 5. 
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for’ are the ones that enhance the fitness of the species and therefore more likely to get 
passed down into future generations. For example, the creature with a longer neck is able 
to reach leaves high in the trees and therefore has access to a food source that creatures 
with shorter necks do not. This promotes the survival of long-necked creatures and they 
are more likely to have children and pass those ‘long-neck’ genes on into the next 
generations. The long neck, therefore, can be said to have the primary function of 
reaching a more abundant source of food because that reason explains why the longer 
neck exists. 
Theories on the linguistic creature account of language evolution, however, all offer views 
on language evolution that are problematic. Again, I will go into far more detail in the 
next chapter (see 2.2), but here I will briefly mention that there are three overarching 
views: 
1)  The FL evolved because it gave humans better cognition 
2) The FL evolved because it helped humans to communicate more efficiently 
3) The FL is the product of physical constraints and/or other evolutionary processes 
and did not evolve for a particular function 
The main trouble with 1) and 3) is that they do not line up with other factors important 
to the human creature: that is that humans are social creatures who are highly dependent 
on group living and cooperation for their survival (see more in 1.2.2). The reason I think 
this is important to consider in a theory of language evolution is that both natural 
language and cooperation are very unique aspects to humans and treating them as 
unconnected consequences undermines a holistic picture which postulates that these 
aspects are intimately related. If we are going to take this point seriously, then 2) is the 
obvious option as communication between humans is obviously related to our being 
social creatures.  
Option 2), however, also has a variety of problems that prevent it from giving a 
satisfactory account of the primary function of FL. Most of these are evolutionary issues 
and will also be discussed in chapter 2, but one issue I can point out here and that is 
‘language is neither necessary or sufficient for communication’ (Collins, 2008).  This points 
to the fact that humans are capable of communicating without language. It is possible for 
humans to use pointing, showing, and pantomime to communicate. In a kitchen, for 
example, I could show you how to bake a cake without uttering a word. Language, 
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therefore, is certainly not necessary for communication (I will roughly refer to this kind 
of communication as ‘pointing and panto’).  
Furthermore, it is also not sufficient for communication. In other words, linguistic 
utterances, on their own, cannot amount to successful communicative acts. This is 
demonstrated through the observation that linguistic utterances ‘underdetermine’ the 
meaning conveyed by a speaker (Wilson and Sperber, 2004; Scott-Phillips, 2014; Smith 
and Allott, 2016). If I utter, for example, ‘it is raining outside’ I could mean anything from 
‘we should not go for a run’ to ‘make sure you pick up your wellies’. This will entirely 
depend upon the context and situation in which the sentence is uttered. 
 If the linguistic utterances severely underdetermine the overall meaning of a 
communicative act, it becomes very unclear what language or the FL is doing for 
communication. 2), then, is as unsatisfactory as 1) and 3). These theories, however, have 
developed from ‘syntactocentric’ theories that tend to overly focus on the nature of 
syntax and not the nature of the humans using the syntax. I, therefore, suggest that we 
at least look at a different perspective on language evolution and see if they can offer any 
inspiration on the functionality and powers of language.  
1.2.2 Cultural Creatures 
This alternative view on the human mind and the evolution of language is what I have 
termed the ‘cultural creature’ view. This view has an entirely different approach to 
explaining the existence of natural languages. Firstly, language is wholly acquired through 
learning, and not from domain-specific systems. However, despite the differences, I 
believe there is something to learn from the approach; something that should be applied 
to our overall understanding of the primary function and evolution of language—
something the linguistic creature view is lacking. This lesson, I believe, mainly lies in the 
fact that not only are humans unique in that they are the only creatures who possess 
languages, but they are also unique in their dependence on sociality and cooperation 
(Dunbar, 2014; Tomasello, 2014). This uniqueness becomes especially interesting when 
we consider that our cousins are social animals that live in groups, but that they do not 
cooperate or depend upon each other in the way that humans do. Where chimps are said 
to have Machiavellian intelligence geared toward manipulating others for their own 
needs, humans are far more likely to help one another, work together on projects, and 
split the rewards equally (Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2008). 
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 Furthermore, no matter which take on language one advocates, acquiring it requires a 
degree of social dependence in that one needs to understand that other minds want to 
interact and share something with you if they are ever to grasp or learn word-meaning: 
…it is only if a young child understands other persons as intentional agents that 
she can acquire and use linguistic symbols – because the learning and use of 
symbols requires an understanding that the partner can voluntarily direct actions 
and attention to outside entities. (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 675). 
This way of understanding the human creature has another sort of innate knowledge at 
its centre. That is what I roughly refer to as ‘social cognition’ (Lavelle, 2018). This also has 
an impact on how theorists are coming to understand human communication and the 
role that language has within it.  
What this view recognises is that, like the other primates in our evolutionary family, 
humans rely on groups and social living for survival.  Our cousins; the gorillas and chimps, 
and our ancestors; homo erectus and homo heidelbergensis, survived and thrived 
because they evolved to coexist in larger units that provide protection and defence 
against predators. Not only did bigger group sizes provide safety by preventing predators 
from attacking, but they also offered an opportunity for group members to look after one 
another and come to each other’s aid when needed (this would have been particularly 
valuable in care and protection of vulnerable infants) (Dunbar, 2014). 
Group living, however, comes with a unique set of challenges that puts its members and 
the group as a whole at risk. Intergroup competition for food, mates, and space is a great 
cause of stress and tension that, if not handled in a way that benefits all, could end up in 
the death of a member or tear a group apart. The success of the primate species, 
however, suggests that they have found ways of dealing with these problems over the 
last 6 to 8 million years of evolution (Dunbar, 2014, p. 7). Methods include a group 
structure that depends on individuals taking dominant or submissive roles, grooming, and 
other methods that build and secure strong bonds between group members. Humans, 
however, seem to have taken another step forward by evolving to rely on cooperative 
behaviour for their survival. These are behaviours where humans have to share their 
intentions—that is to somehow see and understand each other’s mental states or 
thoughts—in order to achieve some goal or activity by working together achieving it 
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(Tomasello et al., 2005). Such behaviours were allowed by the evolution of advanced 
social cognition.  
I will go into more detail about the importance of social cognition in chapter 2, but for 
now, it is worth simply describing it as an ability for, what I like to call, ‘mind-guessing’12. 
Put simply, mind-guessing is the ability to apply intentions and beliefs to the minds of 
others. Such an ability gives us the opportunity to predict the behaviours of other animals 
not just through their habitual patterns or through mechanistic cause and effect, but on 
account of them having minds that can think for themselves. For example, a submissive 
primate may never risk stealing food from a dominant primate because that always ends 
badly; but if they can ‘guess’ correctly that the mind of a dominant primate has their 
attention elsewhere, they may also see it is safe to steal some food. Or else a mother may 
normally leave her child to play around the personal space of other primates because in 
the past it has always been safe, but if she can correctly ‘guess’ that the mind of one 
primate is particularly irritated she can act to move her child out of a potentially 
dangerous situation.  
Humans appear to have a particularly high level of social cognition and mind-guessing, 
and this underpins their ability to cooperate and communicate with one another. This is 
demonstrated in the comic below where Jen has made a shrugging gesture at Mike (this 
is a part of a longer comic strip that I will discuss in more detail in section 2.3.2). Here, 
she is expressing her annoyance with the situation they have found themselves in. They 
are on a train together, and the passenger opposite, who turns out to be a very loud 
snorer, has fallen asleep.  
                                                        
12This is better known as ‘mindreading’ or ‘theory of mind’ (Ravenscroft, 2019). I have, however, opted to 
use the term ‘mind-guessing’ as a simple nickname for the ability offered by social cognition as it avoids 
postulating all the complex theory and, also, to not confuse it with actual mindreading. Further, I think 
‘mind-guess’ better describes what we are actually trying to do, we are making an attempt to guess what 
others are thinking to the best of our knowledge, but have no way of actually knowing. 
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FIGURE 1: COMIC 5 
This success in communicating with a mild shrugging gesture is not down to any direct 
meaning with that gesture, but to the fact that Jen and Mike have done a good job of 
‘mind-guessing’. Jen has guessed correctly that Mike is annoyed by the snoring; but also 
that Mike has correctly guessed that she also has these thoughts; thus this act of 
communication—which is about recognition of the situation they are in—has been made 
possible because of social cognition.  In other words, animals without high degrees of 
social cognition would not be able to communicate like this.  
What the example reveals is of high importance to human communication: mind-
guessing, and not merely ‘decoding’ an act (the shrug in this case) is absolutely essential 
to human communication. It seems uncontroversial to claim that communication is 
simply the ‘impart or exchange of information’ or a ‘means of sending and/or receiving 
information’ (quotes adapted from a google search: define communication). What 
‘information’ it is that is being communicated, however, is a question which concerns a 
separate field of debate that I will avoid getting into here. I will simply stick to a basic idea 
that what is communicated is a certain ‘state’. This state could broadly be referred to as 
‘information’ to be shared with or passed onto another or, even more vaguely, ‘meaning’ 
to be shared with or passed onto another. The proteins of a cell inform the immune 
system that the cell is in a certain state that the immune system can act upon. The 
huntsman that is waving manically and pointing towards prey is informing his hunting 
partner of his state of mind: ‘I can see that you can shoot that deer!’ – a state on which 
his partner can act. There are, however, two known models of communication which 
describe how information is exchanged: code and ostensive-inferential models 
respectively: (quotes in Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 607): 
• Code Model: ’According to the code model, a communicator encodes her intended 
message into a signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the 
code’  
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• Ostensive-Inferential Model: ‘According to the inferential model, a communicator 
provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the 
audience on the basis of the evidence provided’  
My example above is an example of the ostensive-inferential model of communication. 
Jen is using ‘ostension’ to ‘point’ or ‘direct’ Mike’s attention in a certain direction, and 
Mike is ‘inferring’ Jen’s intended meaning from her action to the best of his knowledge. 
It expresses how humans communicate overall when they look to convey and interpret 
the intentions of individuals, and not just the meaning behind any encoded message 
(Grice, 1957; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Tomasello, 2008).  Our communicative actions 
are all about trying to get a listener or receiver to understand or grasp an intended 
message, and we do this by utilising the current context and things we already know 
about the person we are communicating with.  
The recognition that ostensive-inferential communication was vital to understanding 
human and linguistic communication was central to Grice’s revolutionary approach to 
meaning (Grice, 1957). His argument was that our communicative acts, including 
linguistic utterances, are used to point to a ‘communicative intention’ or ‘speaker 
meaning’ as opposed to their direct or literal meaning (‘literal meaning’ is the static 
meaning of a word that a dictionary would clarify). His argument was that the act of 
uttering ‘it is raining outside’ did not mean to inform you it is raining outside, but to point 
to my intention to inform you of something. That we cannot go on that planned run, or 
we must put our wellies on. 
This approach to communication, however, clashes with our more stereotypical 
understanding of language as a system of communication based on the code-model. This 
is not surprising because language seems to ‘code’ our thoughts into a sentence of a 
chosen language, which is then ‘decoded’ by a receiver who also understands that 
language. This is also a way of thinking about language that has tended to dominate the 
way communication has been thought about in the linguistic creature view on 
communication. This is a discussion I will return to when I explore the ‘hybrid creature’ 
view below (1.3). First, I want to explain how this ‘cultural creature’ approach 
understands the emergence and evolution of language and of linguistic structure, as well 
as other cultural behaviours (I will come to a definition of culture shortly).  
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Here, it helps to understand the concept of a ‘social convention’, which not only explains 
the emergence and evolution of language but the emergence and evolution of cultural 
behaviour overall (Lewis, 1969). Here is a simple definition:  
A social convention is a regularity widely observed by some group of agents. But 
not every regularity is a convention. We all eat, sleep, and breathe, yet these are 
not conventions. In contrast, the fact that everyone in the United States drives on 
the right side of the road rather than the left is a convention. We also abide by 
conventions of etiquette, dress, eating, and so on (Rescorla, 2019). 
A social convention often arises to perform some sort of function that is useful for 
everyone who will abide by it. The agreement that Americans should always drive on the 
right obviously has a function in that it makes the roads safer. Without this convention, 
Americans could just decide to drive on the left, right, or straight down the middle and 
thus make road-use a chaotic mess and the chance of accident much higher. An 
agreement between all road users to follow such a rule is therefore mutually beneficial. 
Unlike behaviours that are underpinned by some biological system (e.g. eating, sleeping, 
and breathing), social conventions are arbitrary, which means it could have been 
different, or that they did not have to come about in that way. English road-users follow 
the same rationality as Americans but have chosen to drive on the left instead. This 
agreement, however, works to the same effect.  
Notice, also, how the ability for mind-guessing is essential for the creation and 
maintenance of social conventions. Jen and Mike need to be able to ‘mind-guess’ that 
they are both aware of and sharing knowledge with regards to the social conventions on 
the train. Why did Jen only gesture to Mike on the train? Why not wake the man up, and 
why does Mike simply agree with her? It is because they are both aware of and are 
following a social convention that it is rude to disturb people on the train. Another way 
of describing that they both knowingly share and agree to this social convention is to say 
they own ‘mutual-knowledge’ with regards to the correct way to behave on a train, and 
it is because of mutuality over a convention that Mike is able to instantly see that Jen is 
sharing a recognition of annoyance, and not asking him to wake the guy up.  
For the creation of social convention, mind-guessing is also required so that a social group 
can come to agree that some practice or procedure be established in the first place. This 
requires mutual-knowledge of what the needs of a group are, and also the possible 
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solutions for meeting those needs. If, for example, a group are going to establish a 
convention with regards to berry picking, they need to be aware that some intervention 
will improve the berry-picking process, or that there is some problem that will not be 
resolved unless all berry-pickers do the same thing. Furthermore, the effort required to 
improve the situation through some intervention needs to benefit all involved. It is 
through these means that berry-pickers can agree to work together by following some 
agreeable convention. They could, for example, establish a practice whereby if they go 
out in pairs one can jump and pull down the branches of a berry-tree, whilst the other 
gather the (previously unreachable) berries.  These agreements do not have to be fully 
conscious in the sense that all berry pickers directly think ‘there is a problem we all need 
to pay attention to and resolve in an agreeable way’, but they do need to be safe in the 
knowledge that the other berry pickers experience the same problems and motivations 
as they do. Without this mutuality, there is no way they can establish forms of agreement. 
In other words, no social cognition, no mutual-knowledge, no social convention.  
Of course, not all social conventions are obviously useful; nor do they obviously point to 
an original function that has since dissolved, but the convention has carried on anyway. 
This requires an appreciation for how complicated social conventions can become. Why, 
for example, would one follow the social convention to not disturb people on the train, 
when it would obviously be more beneficial to everyone to wake up a snorer? What is 
really at play when Jen and Mike share their frustration at their noisy co-passenger comes 
down to them both observing a huge and interacting web of conventions established by 
their culture. The reason why they won’t wake up the man could be mixed up with 
conventions to do with minding your own business; embarrassing the sleeper; the idea 
that it is rude to put your needs over someone else; or that it is expected that a member 
of staff should wake him up. Furthermore, a subtle change to the context may also affect 
their action; like if there were far more people on the train they might wake him up due 
to some convention related to a weigh-up of how many people are suffering. This 
highlights how far-reaching and complex mutual-knowledge between humans can 
become. The scope of which I will revisit in upcoming chapters. 
It is here that we also start to understand what ‘culture’ means. It is the collection of ways 
of behaving and believing—acquired though social norms, conventions, and institutions 
(Tomasello, 2014). What is essential is the existence of a social and cohesive group that is 
able to, and is interested in, creating and maintaining these behaviours and beliefs. I will 
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come to explore this definition of culture, as well as of ‘cultural evolution’ in more detail 
in section 2.3.1, but for now, it is enough to contrast it to the behaviours and knowledge 
that are genetic or biological. The behaviours and knowledge that we acquire through our 
genetic heritage is universal and inevitable, whereas the behaviours and knowledge we 
acquire through social cooperation are particular to a group and arbitrary.  
Social cognition and social convention mean that humans are not only set up to overcome 
challenges together but to teach these ways of overcoming challenges to the next 
generation. The process of cultural transmission, therefore, is another important aspect 
of culture. The advantage of this is two-fold. First, learning means that each generation 
need not ‘reinvent the wheel’ each time they come across a problem—they simply use 
the solutions they learnt from their parent’s generation. Second, those things that are 
passed down through cultural transmission are not rigid in the same way genetic 
transmission is. If they need to change within the lifetime of the learner, they can.  This 
also allows for new ideas to build upon and improve upon old ideas, opening humans up 
to a form of progression which is far more flexible and changeable than that of biological 
evolution.  
A grandfather, for instance, will teach his son to fish, and the son will also pass on this 
knowledge to his children, but what the grandfather and his grandchildren know about 
fishing may vary because the intermediate generation adapted the fishing style. The 
grandfather may have fished in a deep lake without worrying about water flow, but a 
change in the environment meant his son had to move and fish in a river which meant 
adapting the fishing technique to deal with flowing water. Thus, a change in fishing style 
takes place and the grandchildren acquire an evolved version of the knowledge that their 
grandfather acquired. Cultural practices and behaviours change and move with the 
environment and needs that human groups find themselves with and so, naturally, 
culture also varies between groups. Cultural behaviours and practices may be as minor 
as the differences between you and your neighbours, or as major as the differences 
between English living and Japanese living. This means those behaviours that are learnt 
can adapt to a changing environment far quicker than behaviours that are genetic. The 
relevance of this will become more clear in chapter 4, but it is worth pointing out that 
this nature of change has allowed humans to move to and master living in many different 
environments across the globe (Sterelny, 2012; Laland, 2018).  
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For advocates of the cultural creature view, language is simply a set of social conventions 
that are mutually beneficial to all who have agreed to adhere to them. Language-users 
have come to agree upon word-sounds and their meanings, and how they can combine 
those words to create larger phrases and sentences13. In keeping with the argument that 
humans have evolved to be cultural creatures, it is typically argued that the reasons why 
these conventions came into existence are to further aid social living. For a  group to 
survive, individuals need to be implemented into group life and working efficiently 
alongside others; language helps this process by providing a quick, easy, and cheap form 
of communication (Deutscher, 2006; Everett, 2012), that also allows individuals to share 
information that is also clearly and precisely expressed (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999; 
Tomasello, 2003; Scott-Phillips, 2014).   
What does this say, then, about the emergence and evolution of linguistic structures—
that is of syntax and grammar? First, its existence depends upon a group of minds that 
are able to interact with one another; both in order to create and use linguistic structure 
in communication, and to learn it in the first place. On this view, language is dependent 
on many minds for its existence, and since all minds who use it need to benefit from it, 
they sure serve a social function. This is very different from the linguistic creature view 
which takes a much more individualistic approach to language because, in a sense, 
language is dependent on a single mind. This is because any one mind ‘knows’ language 
due to the FL which provides the ‘initial state’ of all possible linguistic structures (this 
putting to one side the need for a linguistic input to get it started). Second, the evolution 
and changes of linguistic structures for the cultural creature are down to the movements 
of cultural evolution and not biological evolution like in the linguistic creature view (see 
more 2.3.1). 
The thought that linguistic structure is the product of an agreement between many 
minds, and that it evolves and changes through cultural evolution means that language 
is part of a neat package where it does not need to be distinguished from other 
behaviours that provide a social function (like law and religion) or of cultural evolution 
(like cooking techniques and tool-making). On this view, neither of these other unique 
                                                        
13 The theory from construction grammar best makes sense of this view. Please see footnote 7 
for more information (Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006). 
 37 
behaviours require a specific and biological faculty, and neither does the rise of linguistic 
structure.  
In section 1.2.1, I explained where I disagreed with this view that linguistic structure is a 
cultural phenomenon and argue that I am committed to a view in which language is 
underpinned by some domain specific structure—such as FL. This explains how it is that 
language is creative, idiosyncratic, and also closes the gap between a child’s knowledge 
and experience of language. In 1.1.1, I also argued that there was something vital to learn 
from this view that we are cultural creatures—that humans are unique in their 
dependence on social life. These lessons—the importance of social cognition, ostensive-
inferential communication, and cultural evolution—are the ones that I think theories of 
language evolution should not take for granted if one wishes to establish an integrated 
and holistic account of language evolution. This has prompted me to revisit the 
approaches of the linguistic creature as I propose we consider what the FL might bring to 
human living if we start from these lessons. This has led me to build another view of 
language evolution, that is the idea that humans are hybrid creatures, combining parts of 
both preceding views.  
1.3 Hybrid Creatures  
1.3.1 Primary Function of Language in Hybrid Creatures  
In section 1.2.1 I mentioned that previous theories had argued that the FL had evolved 
to perform a communicative function which, it is assumed, fulfilled the sort of primary 
function that promotes social living. Although this theory would appear to be in line with 
the sort of thinking and lessons of the social creature view—and therefore in line with 
the larger picture of human evolution—this view was problematic. One of the main 
reasons was because linguistic utterances underdetermine the overall communicative act 
and are, therefore, neither ‘necessary or sufficient for communication’ (Collins, 2008). 
Other reasons will be explored in more detail in chapter 2. 
This problem, however, dissolves when we seriously consider that humans are primarily 
ostensive-inferential communicators.  Here, underdetermination is just a matter of fact 
about how language operates within the larger picture of human communication. The 
ostensive-inferential model has it that all acts of communication underdetermine the 
communicative intention itself because it all works within a larger context. 
Communicative acts are instances of ‘pointing towards’ a speaker meaning, and not the 
speaker meaning in and of itself—this includes linguistic utterances (Grice, 1957; Wilson 
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and Sperber, 2012). This means that a linguistic utterance cannot be correctly interpreted 
through simply knowing a linguistic ‘code’. A hearer also needs to know how and why the 
linguistic code is being used in that moment of communication and within that particular 
context. This requires an awareness or understanding about the sort of knowledge that 
the speaker and hearer share with one another: whether it is about the current state of 
affairs (e.g. that when it is raining it gets muddy at the park where the dog is walked, so 
that wellies will be required), or about the speaker (e.g. that the speaker gets cold easily, 
and so will opt out of running if it is raining).  
My thought, therefore, is to consider what the function of language or the FL might be in 
this act of ‘pointing to’ speaker intentions. Does it bring anything new to human 
communication? Does it work to solve any particular problems or open up any particular 
opportunities?  I think it does, and I will lay out the basics of my argument here: the FL 
has evolved to enhance and complement the social capabilities that I explored in 1.2.2. I, 
therefore, argue that humans are hybrid creatures that combine elements of the 
linguistic and cultural creature viewpoints that I introduced above.   
This approach makes a suggestion about the order in which things happen: that the social 
cognitive mechanisms that underpin our ability to ‘mind-guess’ precede the evolution of 
FL that underpins linguistic structure. This also means that our ability to communicate on 
the ostensive-inferential model of communication precedes our ability to use language. 
In other words, there is a form of communication that pre-exists linguistic 
communication: what I will term ‘pointing and panto’. Pre-linguistic communication 
involves the ability to use gestures, pointing, pantomime, showing, and even basic 
symbolic-use to communicate (Tomasello, 2008).  
This order of evolutionary events is justified by two things. First, it is not clear if it makes 
sense to postulate language before social cognition. Is it possible to use language without 
the ability to mind-guess?14 The response is ‘of course not’, as in order to create and use 
words—in order for sentences to be useful—we need to understand what and why our 
speakers are doing with them in the first place. This requires the ability to mind-guess 
and to have mutual-knowledge (Sperber, 2000; Tomasello et al., 2005). Secondly, if one 
                                                        
14 There are arguments that the FL may pre-exist social cognition if the FL has evolved for non-
social reasons, but in this section I focus on the views that argue the FL evolved for social reasons. 
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did claim that language emerged prior to other forms of human communication, then 
one also raises questions about the basis on which such a move is made. Not only does it 
not make sense for language to exist without mind-guessing (remember, language always 
underdetermines), but it is not clear what the motivation for this evolutionary change is. 
The words and structures that make up language would somehow have to exist in the 
mind of all language-users before pointing and panto, but the mutations that change the 
FL start from an individual, and an individual cannot communicate with themselves. 
Further, even if a mutation could start in more than one person, what would be the use 
of it? What is there for humans to communicate prior to mind-guessing? Such an 
approach would have to commit to the thought that language is fully a form of code 
communication that behaves more like computer languages or animal alarm calls. I will 
discuss the evolutionary problems in further detail in section 2.2 but will revisit the nature 
of language communication as code in 1.3.2. With this in mind, we can ask what does 
human communication look like before the rise of FL, and then what does it look like after 
the rise of FL? What are the differences and does the FL bring anything new to human 
communication? This is central to the discussion in chapter 3, but here I will briefly review 
my theory and explain why I think the FL evolved in the first place.  
This involves asking: what does the FL actually do? I have mentioned several times that it 
provides the basis on which we build our knowledge of phrases and sentences, but what 
is this? What is a sentence? Sentences are collections of structured words that express 
‘complete thoughts’, in that there is always a subject and a predicate15. The subject 
indicates what the sentence is about, and the predicate says something about that 
subject. This simplified formula allows sentences to express a variety of things.  In 
‘declarative sentences’—sentences that make a statement—this can involve describing 
how some subject is involved in some activity (e.g. Bill hit Bob, or Blackbirds nest next 
season) or giving some detail about a subject (e.g. Bill is angry, Polly is a bird).  In 
‘interrogative sentences’ a speaker can use the same formula, but to ask a question (e.g. 
who hit Bill? When do Blackbirds nest?).  There are also ‘imperative sentences’ that make 
                                                        
15 The thought that there are sentences in language is subject to some controversy in the field of 
linguistics, and whether or not it is part of UG. I will, however, be revisiting these issues in chapter 
5. 
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commands (e.g. help me pick berries) and exclamative sentences that make exclamations 
(that’s great). 
As the simplest form, I will focus on the use of declarative sentences throughout this 
thesis, but it will be important to keep in mind that all sentence types follow this formula 
even at the simplified level: they all have a subject and related predicate. As a side note, 
I should mention that this does not mean to say that linguistic utterances have to be 
sentences. It is entirely possible for us to utter a single phrase that could be the part of a 
sentence (e.g. ‘Can’t help’, instead of‘I can’t help’), or separate words that do not appear 
to be joined by a syntax at all (e.g ‘one, two, three’). Sentences, however, are an essential 
part of understanding the nature of natural language syntax as it is supported by our 
intuitions following what we intuit as grammatical. This will also be explored in chapter 
5. 
Sentences, thus, are capable of expressing a variety of things, but they always involve 
some main topic (the subject), and something about that topic (the predicate).  If we take 
this point into the field of human social life and our renewed understanding of the social 
creature, we can ask what does language and sentence-use do for us?  The usual 
response to this question is that sentences allow humans to more clearly and precisely 
express their thoughts about the things they want to share (Pinker, 1994; Jackendoff, 
2012; Scott-Phillips, 2014). This is certainly something that sentences give us the power 
to do. If I want to explain to someone what I want for dinner, I can do that through use 
of a sentence and clearly express my thought that: ‘I want roast vegetables and rice 
smothered in soy sauce’.  
This claim, however, does not necessarily point to a new or improved version of human 
communication and therefore does not necessarily point to a primary function of 
language that gives a satisfactory evolutionary story. This is because to express thoughts 
more ‘clearly and precisely’ is something that human communication was already 
capable of doing. I could express this very same thought by pointing to some uncooked 
vegetables and rice, and then to the oven and the pot. As long as the hearer has some 
basic cooking knowledge (e.g. that rice must be cooked in a pot, and not in the oven) I 
can get the same detailed message across through pointing. This is because human 
communication is all about choosing the sort of action that points the hearer towards the 
speaker intention, and this does not imply that the use of a precise and clear sentence is 
equal to sharing a precise and clear thought. 
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The process of evolution, however, suggests that the emergence of a new trait or 
behaviour brings with it some new power or function. New traits or behaviours emerge—
are prompted into existence—because something about the old body or ‘phenotype’ 
could not deal with a new problem or improve a situation. Overall, new traits evolve 
because they are likely to promote the survival of that body or phenotype and, 
subsequently, the chances of reproduction and the survival and reproduction of their 
offspring. The ability to more clearly and precisely express a thought does not reflect the 
primary function of the FL because the body pre-existing it was already capable of doing 
this. In other words, humans do not need sentences to clearly and precisely express their 
thoughts. 
For example, it is possible for me to use a very simple action, like a grin, to convey the 
same clear and precise dinner message to my hearer. What allows me to do this is the 
mutual-knowledge I share with the hearer. Perhaps the hearer has cooked me roast 
vegetables and rice every time I have asked in the past, or it is common knowledge that 
they cook this dish very well - so it is obvious what I would like. Further, we could be so 
well acquainted that a certain grin between us is understood as ‘take your best guess’. In 
this context if I grin when asked ‘What do you want for dinner?’ my hearer receives a 
precise and clear answer: I want roasted vegetable and rice with soy sauce.   
This point can be taken further, as it is possible for individuals who do not even know 
each other to communicate in a clear and precise way providing they have been brought 
up in a similar culture. I may be able to quite clearly, through a gesture at the breakfast 
table, communicate my frustration about the lack of tea and fresh milk at hotels on the 
European continent, provided I am communicating with someone who was also brought 
up on the British Isles. The point is that the details exist in the mutual-knowledge between 
people who know each other, or even in the collective knowledge of a shared culture. All 
that is required to get the message across is a well-placed act of communication that 
guides the hearer to the speaker’s intention. This does not have to be linguistic.  
What, then, is the point of linguistic communication? To answer this, it helps to explore 
the limitations of pre-linguistic communication and ask what it cannot do. The answer: it 
cannot bring to mind the sorts of things that do not exist in the current context—where 
‘current context’ refers to all things in the cultural collective, mutual knowledge, and 
immediate environment. Linguistic utterances, on the other hand, can. If my hearer is not 
well acquainted with me, and I am not in a kitchen where I can point out my desired meal 
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then the utterance ‘I want roast vegetables and rice’ gets my thought across by referring 
to something that is not in the current context. Linguistic utterances, of course, will 
always work on the basis of contextual considerations—as one would always need 
mutual-knowledge on the meaning of words, and of the cultural practices around dinner 
and cooking—but they are able to get across a message that was impossible for pointing 
and panto. The main thing to notice is that it is not about the detail, precision, or clarity 
of a message, but about what is and is not contextual, i.e. what is immediately apparent 
within the communicative situation.  
Since this is what linguistic utterances can do over and above pre-linguistic 
communication, this is what I argue the FL has evolved for. The subject and predicate 
formula that makes up sentences, therefore, reflects a structure that helps humans refer 
to and bring to mind things that are not in context, or, at least, are not obviously in 
context. This not only represents the power language brings to human communication, 
but a way of improving the chances of human survival and of reproduction (see 4.3.1 for 
more details). Therefore, its biological evolution was motivated by this power and 
evolved for this reason. I call this the primary function of the FL. 
In technical terminology, I argue that ‘the primary function of FL is to make relevant what 
is not salient’. Where ‘to make relevant’ refers to the use of the heuristics of relevance 
that both hearer and speaker utilise in acts of communication; and ‘not salient’ refers to 
subjects, ideas, or matters that will not be obvious to the hearer in the context of the 
communicative act. This approach will become clearer in chapter 3 when I introduce the 
relevance theory (see 3.2.1) and explore the powers of communication in more detail.  
There is, however, a technical issue I should explore. That is not ‘what does language do 
for human communication?’ but ‘what model of communication is language acting on?’. 
I claim that linguistic utterances bring a certain power to communication because of the 
way they ‘point to’ speaker intentions. This makes it sound like language works on the 
ostensive-inferential model of communication, but it also seems necessary to see it as 
working on the ‘code-model’. This is because to understand the meaning behind ‘I want 
roasted vegetable and rice’ requires knowing how to decode word-meanings and rules. 
This also raises important questions about the relationship between language and 
meaning (or the field of ‘semantics’ I introduced in 1.1). I shall address these in turn.   
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1.3.2 Meaning of Language in Hybrid Creatures 
No question involving language is complete without addressing meaning, and my account 
of the hybrid creature combines intuitions from theories that are usually diametrically 
opposed (that is the account of the linguistic creature and the account of the cultural 
creature). My account of linguistic meaning also has a similar ‘hybrid flavour’ which, again, 
conflicts with the traditional approaches to this question. On the one hand, linguistic 
meaning is direct and rigid, where a word-sound is paired with some direct word-
meaning. This follows the code-model of communication where to understand the 
meaning of a sentence is to understand the linguistic code. On the other hand, linguistic 
meaning is interpreted freely within the context that it is used in. This follows the 
ostensive-inferential model of communication where to understand the meaning of a 
sentence is to understand the context in its entirety.  
To highlight my hybrid understanding of linguistic meaning and communication, I will start 
by briefly explaining these traditional approaches. First, those who take the cultural 
creature view typically follow a ‘language in use’ approach to linguistic meaning. Under 
this theory, it is acts of social communication, cooperation, and interaction that create 
and maintain the meaning of a word or linguistic utterance. Word-meanings, therefore, 
can be called upon again and again because of a set of expectations and associations 
related to how society predictably and consistently moves with and reacts to a linguistic 
utterance (J. Searle, 1969; Dummett, 1996; Wittgenstein, 2010). 
Here is a possible example of this with the word ‘hold’.  A group of humans who regularly 
work together to gather roots and berries to feed themselves find a way to collect more 
berries than they could do alone. If person A jumps up and pulls a branch down, person 
B can collect all the berries on that branch, which allows them to collect far more berries 
than they could have collected alone. The community of berry collectors develop the 
signal ‘hold’ to associate with this act. A berry picker can use this to signal in a 
communicative act towards the ‘holder’ when they are ready to collect the berries. The 
meaning of ‘hold’ therefore is its use. When ‘hold’ is used within a communicative act, 
hearers are not ‘looking’ to connect it with any sort of direct meaning, but to work out its 
overall meaning ‘off the hoof’ which involves a consideration of their previous 
experiences with the word as well as the context of the experience they are having in that 
moment. 
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Second, those who hold language as underpinned by the FL (see ‘linguistic creatures’ 
above) will typically follow a ‘meaning is representation’ approach. This is the thought 
that word-meanings are connected to representations in the mind of the individual. This 
suggests that the mind of the individual is full of meaningful representations which they 
can call upon whenever they are in communication with other individuals (which also 
have a head full of representations). These representations are also used for thinking and 
it is argued that they themselves might be entrenched in their own ‘language of thought’ 
(or LOT) which is connected but different to public language (Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 2005; 
Cain, 2016). 
On this view, the word ‘hold’ may be created for the same reasons I described above, but 
it does not derive meaning from the movements and reactions of the community, it is 
derived from the head of the individual who has, somehow, set it up in relation to their 
own representational makeup. The word ‘hold’ is understood correctly because the same 
or similar enough representations are activated in the minds of all those involved in the 
communicative act. ‘Hold’, therefore, doesn’t mean hold because of the way it is used 
within a community (as it does with the social view); it means hold because of 
representations in the mind of each person. Such an approach also suggests that language 
works according to a code-model of communication because this is what the 
interpretation of the word ‘hold’ requires. The word ‘hold’ is linked with a unit in LOT, and 
so ‘hold’ is coded to a certain representation that is triggered each time the word is heard.  
Both the social and representational views on meaning are far more complex than what I 
have described here, but this explanation should be enough to highlight my dilemma. On 
the one hand, I am committed to a group-based or social approach to meaning. Human 
language works on the ostensive-inferential model of communication, which admits that 
successful communication relies heavily upon things like the immediate environment and 
mutual-knowledge. Linguistic meaning, therefore, is largely determined by its use—that 
is how society is expected to react to and move with meaning. On the other hand, I argue 
that language evolved to facilitate a form of communication that refers to things outside 
of current context (that is ‘to make relevant what is not salient’). Linguistic structure that 
is underpinned by an FL enhances human communication by combining word-meanings 
to make phrases and sentences. This surely requires something like representations or 
mental units to work in and with the combinatory functions of the FL.  
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These commitments cause friction that winds up the academic intellects committed to 
either side of the language debate. It is, however, worth reminding my reader that, as far 
as this thesis is concerned, intuitions from both sides are required for understanding 
human behaviour and language (see 1.1.1). We cannot deny that humans are largely 
shaped by their social group and that we are obviously highly skilled mind-guessers, 
learners, and rememberers. So, arguments that take linguistic meaning to be wholly social 
and worked ‘off the hoof’ and within the movements of the group are easily relatable. 
They do not, however, seem to wholly explain human life and especially linguistic 
communication which needs to be set and rigid in some sense for linguistic 
communication to be successful at all. Pinker says: 
Language is a lever with which we can convey surprising facts, weird new ideas, 
unwelcome news, and other thoughts that a listener may be unprepared for. This 
leverage requires a rigid stick and a solid fulcrum, and that’s what the meaning of 
a sentence and the words and rules supporting must be. If meanings could be 
freely reinterpreted in context, language would be a wet noodle and not up to the 
job of forcing new ideas into the minds of the listener’. (Pinker, 2005, p. 123) 
Much of human behaviour is explained by the needs of its social setting, but it is hard to 
make a case for creativity that comes from social interactions alone. These interactions 
enforce habit and ‘the norm’, but not the breaking away from these things that give rise 
to acts of innovation. Thus, it makes sense to turn inward and argue some internal 
mechanism supports these sparks of creativity and originality. Therefore, more internal 
stuff beyond the social cognition, learning mechanisms and memory is surely required. 
This seems particularly true when it comes to my arguments about language-use. 
Something that is rigid and inflexible is surely required to help humans communicate 
successfully outside of context; where context is created and maintained by flexible social 
whims. 
With this in mind I will explore linguistic meaning as a two-sided coin, roughly working 
where the tension lies, and offer potential solutions to the problem. It will quickly become 
obvious that this issue cannot be addressed in any satisfactory way in this thesis, but it 
will at least pave the way toward a coherent view on language meaning. On the first side 
of the coin: social interaction creates meaning, much in the way I explored above with the 
word ‘hold’. Due to there use, these words are highly useful for society and are therefore 
created and used on a regular basis to help further the chances of survival for a human 
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group (see section 3.3.1). On the second side of the coin, ‘hold’ and other words are 
‘picked out’ and manipulated by an FL which has the power to bring these meanings 
together and create more complex sentences which can be ‘spat’ back out into the social 
domain with the function of ‘making relevant what is not salient’. The big question seems 
to be: how do social meanings become the sort of thing that can become fixed and 
associated with representations that are ‘picked out’? 
The claim I need to make seems simple enough. The representations associated with 
word-meanings are shaped by those social interactions that take place outside the mind 
but become ingrained ‘into’ the mind. If we follow the current literature on representation 
in the mind, this could go one of two ways. Either word-meanings become associated 
with pre-existing representations that exist in a  LOT  (Fodor, 1983; Jackendoff, 2002; 
Pinker, 2005), or they are associated with learnt-patterns in a neural network based upon 
a connectionist theory of mind (Clarke, 2001). I am not committed to either view, but I 
will briefly explore the advantages and disadvantages of each approach to highlight the 
overall nature and challenge of language meaning in this approach.  
The advantage of a LOT account is that it automatically makes sense of word-meanings 
being entities that are ‘picked out’ by the FL as representations that are fixed and discrete. 
If representations are already entrenched in a LOT, then they are, also, already discrete 
and manipulated through the syntax that underlies LOT. Whether word-meanings are 
associated with representations on a one-to-one basis (Fodor, 1975), or on a one to many 
basis (Jackendoff, 2002; Pinker, 2005); or whether they are set or change over time; it is 
argued that there is at least a sensible connection between the two systems. The 
disadvantage to this approach is that it requires an explanation of the nature and 
evolution of LOT as well as FL and if it altogether makes sense to postulate more than one 
syntactical system (Collins, 2004). This throws up a lot of questions that are hard to 
answer. Did LOT exist before language? Does language change LOT? Does LOT look the 
same for everyone? I will leave these questions to one side and focus my attention on two 
others that I think are more relevant to the thesis. 
An important question arises when we consider the bigger picture of human 
communication. Remember, on the ostensive-inferential model of communication, 
linguistic utterances are used to ‘point ’ to a larger speaker intention. Communication is 
not merely a case of coding a thought into a public language and decoding it again at the 
other end. The process involves ‘decoding’ the sentence, plus everything else in context 
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(this includes the immediate environment, mutual-knowledge, and even things like tone 
of voice). The question, therefore, is what is happening in a LOT when it comes to 
communicative discourse? The reason why this may be important to bring out is because 
it queries a general idea in the field that a sentence can equal a thought (as one would 
expect on a code-model of communication), when what is happening is that the content 
of a sentence can only ever amount to part of a thought that needs to be fully understood 
within the context. The response to this is to simply accept that language, on its own, 
cannot fully reflect human thought. When interpreting a linguistic utterance, LOT is at 
work decoding the sentence, but also working out the rest of the content—perhaps 
functioning on the heuristic of relevance I mentioned above (see chapter 3 for further 
exploration).  
The advantage of a connectionist view is that representations will reflect the meaning 
society attributes to a word, as opposed to the meanings available in a LOT. Unlike LOT, 
representations are not innate and therefore do not require an explanation as to how or 
why meanings could exist prior to humans needing or creating words.  The neural network 
will learn and measure out the ‘meaning’ for itself and based on what is witnessed by the 
individual. In other words, ‘hold’ comes to gain its ‘representation’ as instances of the 
word are observed for the commonalities and differences between each use. The pattern 
that ‘means’ hold reflects those commonalities. If we assume that word-meanings 
somehow become ‘set’ or ‘entrenched’ in the neural network (perhaps based upon some 
consistency or regularity with the use), we can also make sense of how the word can be 
used outside of the context in which it is learnt. A connectionist account of linguistic 
meaning also helps to account for the larger picture of human interaction as all aspects 
of communication are learnable by the neural network and therefore initially generated 
from society as opposed to the individual mind. This includes, for instance, the subtle 
differences between a tone of voice (e.g. the use of sarcasm) or the difference in the 
company one is surrounded by (e.g. speaking with siblings versus speaking with 
grandparents).  The disadvantage of this view, however, is that it is not clear how discrete 
entities become part of the mind, which also poses a challenge for the creative aspect of 
human behaviour.  
I am, however, in a position where I would argue that a plain connectionist account of the 
human mind is not a satisfactory way to explain human behaviour. The usual approach to 
connectionism argues that all aspects of the human mind work on these neural networks, 
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however, it is very hard to accept that the mind is not at least biased so that it interacts 
or observes the world in certain ways. The visual system, for example, is programmed to 
pay more attention and track things that are moving quickly over things that stay still or 
move slowly.  
On my account, the FL would be an example of a very strong bias that evolved in the 
human mind. Although the mind is not set up as an automatically discrete system, those 
parts that are associated with language are selected to funnel or force those learnt word-
meanings into something that is usable by the FL. When it comes to communication such 
a connectionist network may underpin to the ostensive-inferential model of 
communication simply because a hearer would automatically weigh-up the most relevant 
or obvious outcome based upon the input to the network. Something different happens 
when it comes to inferring the meaning of a sentence which, because of the FL, operates 
differently than the rest of the communicative act. Since all humans will be set up with an 
FL, and all should be learning words with more or less the same meaning, it is likely that 
the mind has, in part, evolved to operate some of its communication as code.  
In conclusion and despite the tensions that surround my thesis when it comes to language 
meaning, there are ways in which a representation-based model of meaning can explain 
the hybrid approach to language. Here, social interaction and the external state of affairs 
remain central to creating linguistic-meaning in the first place. Although I will not commit 
to either the LOT or connectionist version of meaning I hope to have shown how and why 
each account does work with this view. Although this lack of a determination means I do 
not promote an all-encompassing theory of the nature of language, it will greatly help 
toward understanding the hybrid theory on linguistic structure and how its primary 
function is ultimately entangled in human communication. 
Ultimately, this hybrid creature approach offers a way of thinking about the primary 
function of language that overcomes what was seen as problematic in the preceding 
theories introduced above (the linguistic creature and the cultural creature). First, seeing 
FL as a social tool, which emerged and evolved to enhance and improve human 
communication (by making relevant what is not salient), is in keeping with the bigger 
picture of human evolution. This recognises that humans are as unique in their 
dependence on social and cultural living as they are with their ability for language. This 
alone makes it worthwhile exploring the idea that language has evolved to perform a 
social function, but further, it directly supports our being cultural creatures. Overall this 
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means that FL is more incorporated into the bigger picture of human evolution which 
includes the survival strategy of flexible living through cultural transmission (Sterelny, 
2012; Laland, 2018) and social interaction (Tomasello et al., 2005; Dunbar, 2014). Second, 
finding a sensible evolutionary story that supports the existence of the FL means avoiding 
the problems that I am due to sketch out in 2.2.2. Overall the hybrid creature approach 
to language neatly integrates intuitions from evolutionary theory, linguistic theory 
(including the thought that humans are linguistic creatures), and the overall 
understanding that humans are social creatures. The rest of this thesis will be dedicated 
to further expanding these arguments. First, however, I will go into more details 
regarding primary function and the processes of both biological and cultural evolution—
this is the focus of chapter 2.  
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Chapter 2 – Function 
2.1 Primary Function in the Natural World  
2.1.1 Primary and Secondary Functions 
In chapter 1 I argue that language is a feature of the natural world and a product of 
biological and cultural processes that have worked together to provide a communicative 
function for human social living. This notion of ‘function’, however, requires more 
attention and explanation as it is not always clear if it makes sense to apply this term to 
the natural world (something I only briefly addressed in 1.1.2). A central issue is that talk 
of function in the natural world often leads us into very murky waters. This chapter, 
therefore, is dedicated to clearly defining what it is I mean by ‘primary function’ and how 
the notion can be applied to products of both biological (2.1) and cultural (2.3) evolution. 
I will also explore how this notion of function is applied to the faculty of language (or FL) 
in the current literature (2.2). Finally, I will show how I apply this notion of function to the 
FL under my view that we are hybrid creatures (2.4). 
I will start my explanation of function in the realms of the biological world. People often 
talk about biological traits having a design; a design that serves some sort of purpose and 
explains its reason for existing. Wings are designed for flying; elephant trunks are 
designed for picking fruit from high trees; or language is designed for communication or 
cognition. Such talk, however, is at great risk of telling ‘just-so stories’, or applying what 
sounds like intentional psychology and not a process of natural or causal mechanisms 
uncovered by scientific investigation of the natural world (Ariew, Cummins and Perlman, 
2002; Ruse, 2002). It is important, therefore, to explore and define this concept of 
‘function’ and carefully explain how it can be applied to non-intentional, but natural, 
phenomenon. 
‘Function’ is a difficult concept to describe. For a start, it is a term that has at least two 
different but related meanings. In one sense, language has many functions. It can make 
us laugh, cry, make the law, break the law and so on and so forth. This sense of function 
points to the many things that we use language to do or powers language has. It does 
not, however, point to the sense of ‘function’ that I am interested in. I refer to these sorts 
of powers as the ‘secondary functions’ of language. The other sense of function points to 
 51 
the power that explains why language is there in the first place, and why it has continued 
to exist. The power of language that explains its very existences is what I refer to as the 
‘primary function’ of language. To pick out the primary function of an object is to answer 
the question: ‘why is it the way it is?’; and to pick out a secondary function is to merely 
answer the question: ‘what can it do?’  
It is worth pointing out that this way of talking about primary function is disputed, 
particularly in evolutionary biology (which I discuss in more detail in the next section), as 
it is argued that to understand the nature of things we should focus on how objects do 
the things they do, and not why they do them (Mayr, 1983; Cummins, 2010). If one wants 
to understand the primary function of the indents of the soles of trainers, for example, 
then one need to observe and analyse what they do and how they do it. When they 
provide grip for the wearer in muddy conditions then we should describe the physics 
behind how the indents interact with the consistency of the mud. I argue, however, that 
this approach to function does not ‘get at’ the thing I am interested in. Like secondary 
functions, focusing on the ‘how’ fails to tell us why those indents came into being in the 
first place. The indents could have been the product of design for an off-trail running 
shoe, but they could have also been the product of a fashionable design16. Thus, it is only 
in the former case that talking about the physics between shoe and mud informs us about 
the sole’s primary function, whereas in the latter we would need to talk about something 
different to get at the primary function (e.g. the current fashion in the world of trainers). 
In fact, in the latter scenario, the detail that the indents prevent slippage in mud is a 
secondary function of the shoes. 
We can explore the difference between primary and secondary functions by observing 
the functions of human artefacts. Hammers are tools we use to strike nails into some 
material, so it becomes attached to other materials. This allows us to do very useful things 
like build houses. Alarm clocks make a loud noise at a set time to wake someone up. This 
allows us to get up at a good time in the morning so that the rest of our day goes 
smoothly, or it prevents us from napping for too long. These are the primary function of 
these objects because they exist or are made for these functions. They are, after all, the 
reason why their inventor created them in the first place. A way to think about this 
                                                        
16 Credit for this example goes to my supervisor, Mark Cain.  
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relationship between the object and its primary function is to say that the form (that is 
the shape the object takes) follows a function (that is something the object does). The 
object has the form it has because of the function it was designed to do.  
Hammers and alarm clocks, however, also provide other functions. A hammer makes a 
good doorstop, paperweight or weapon. The timed ringing of an alarm clock makes a 
good reminder alarm, egg timer, or even entertainment for a child. These functions, 
however, do not explain why these objects have this form, or why they were created in 
the first place. They are just other useful things these objects can do. Even if a hammer 
were always used as a doorstop, door-opening remains a secondary function. This is 
because door-opening does not affect the reason why the hammer has this form. The 
inventor designed the hammer for striking nails and building houses, and not for stopping 
doors. A way to think about secondary function, therefore, is to see that the relationship 
between the object’s form and function is the reverse of the primary function: function 
follows form. The power to hold a door open or entertain a child is a function of these 
objects that is possible due to a form that already exists.  
This approach to primary function works well for human artefacts but does not clearly 
explain the function of objects in the natural world. Their creation or ‘design’ does not 
rely upon forward-thinking human insight, but only on the causal processes as dictated 
by the laws of the natural world. Unless you approach the world in terms of gods and the 
supernatural, there is no case for an inventor who designed hearts, flowers, or language. 
There is, however, a way of answering the question: ‘why do natural objects exist?’ or 
‘why do natural objects have those forms?’  and, therefore, a way of discovering their 
primary function. What this requires, however, is an understanding of how the natural 
world ‘makes things’, which also requires an understanding of biological evolution, and, 
most importantly, the process of natural selection (Darwin, 1859; Dennett, 1996; 
Dawkins, 2009).  
Where primary function in artefacts is ‘foretold’ by human intention, many argue that 
the primary function of biological traits or objects comes about through the mechanical 
and causal processes of natural selection (Neander, 1991; Dennett, 1996; Godfrey-Smith, 
2009). This gives rise to an ‘illusion of design’ in the natural world, but the thought here 
is that even though there is no intended designer, natural objects still have primary 
functions. They still have a reason for existing in the way they do, and there is a 
resemblance to the ‘function follows form’ rule. It is just that the method for their 
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‘creation’ is very different from that of human artefacts. In the next section, I will show 
how it is the process of natural selection reflects this.  
2.1.2 Natural Selection 
The heart is an organ that is the product of biological evolution, but, like the alarm clock, 
it serves several functions. It pumps blood around the body and its sound is an indicator 
of our stress levels whic can be drawn on for medical diagnosis. The first of these 
functions, however, appears to explain the existence of the heart. This is not because a 
creator intended it to be that way, but because of the evolutionary processes that carved 
out that form. Cells need oxygen to work, the blood supplies the cells with oxygen, so the 
blood needs to be replenished with oxygen. If cells get this replenishment from the 
respiratory system, then something needs to move the blood between the system and 
the cells—which is precisely why the heart has the form it does and therefore also 
amounts to its primary function. The fact that a heart communicates stress levels is a case 
of a function following form, and thus a secondary function. However, how did the heart 
gain this form for this primary function, and how was this possible without an inventor? 
The key to this appearance of design is to understand two things about biological 
evolution and biological objects (I use ‘object’ broadly here to refer to a whole species, 
creature, organ, behaviour, or trait). First, is that all biological objects that are alive and 
well today are the product of previous biological objects that were able to survive and, 
most importantly, reproduce. Second, is that the form of biological objects is dependent 
upon their genetic blueprint, and that each time a biological object reproduces, its 
offspring or ‘copy’ is also based on that genetic blueprint. However, it is also in the nature 
of biology and genetics that there is always the chance of having some variance in this 
blueprint (also referred to as ‘copying errors’). Since this is the process that describes why 
biological objects exist, this is also where to start looking for the primary function of such 
objects.  
How do reproduction and variance give rise to numerous designs or forms across the 
natural world? The answer is natural selection (Darwin, 1859; Dennett, 1996; Dawkins, 
2009). A passage from Pinker’s article in ‘The Edge’ magazine highlights how this process 
works with a very simple explanation: 
The core of natural selection is that when replicators arise and make copies of 
themselves, (1) their numbers will tend, under ideal conditions, to increase exponentially; 
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(2) they will necessarily compete for finite resources; (3) some will undergo random 
copying errors ("random" in the sense that they do not anticipate their effects in the 
current environment); and (4) whichever copying errors happen to increase the rate of 
replication will accumulate in a lineage and predominate in the population. After many 
generations of replication, the replicators will show the appearance of design for 
effective replication, while in reality they have just accumulated the copying errors that 
had successful replication as their effect (Pinker, 2012). 
In other words, the current form of the heart is the result of a process which favoured a 
particular ‘variant’ or ‘copying error’ in our evolutionary history. The successful variant 
was well adapted to that environment and thus was more likely to thrive, survive, and 
reproduce than its less adaptive cousins. Therefore, future forms (copies or offspring) of 
that biological object were more likely to be based on that genetic blueprint than any 
other.  
The key thing to understand here is that the variant was adaptive. This means that it was 
particularly successful in producing offspring that was also able to survive, thrive and 
reproduce. In this, the variant had an advantage or ‘edge’ over the other variants living in 
the same environment, but it was better at coping with the challenges and overcoming 
any problems it may have been faced with. Particularly in regard to that ability to 
reproduce well-adapted offspring. An example of such a challenge or problem is in the 
competition for essential resources (like food and water). The variant that is more 
successful at securing those resources is more likely to be selected for because it is better 
adapted to surviving and reproducing in that environment. Here, a variant is selected in a 
purely natural and unintentional fashion, and eventually predominates the entire 
population and defines the typical model for the species it is a part of. The process of 
natural selection, therefore, is the persistent selection for adaptive variants and filtering 
out of non-adaptive or maladaptive variants throughout the generations.  
It is this process that explains how and why biological objects come to have the forms 
they have. Thus, if we continue with the ‘form follows function’ rule then following the 
process of natural selection points toward the primary function of any biological object 
(Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1989; Neander, 1991; Godfrey-Smith, 2009). It is the power or 
function that gives a biological object the advantage or ‘edge’ that causes its selection. 
This process of selection then guarantees the future existence of that particular form of 
the biological object. In other words, the reason, power, or function that certain variants 
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are selected for point toward the primary function of that biological object.  
This claim has its sceptics in the field of evolutionary biology (Gould, 2002; Cummins, 
2010), and, more specifically, in the field of mind and language (Chomsky, 2005; Fodor 
and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010), which I will discuss in in future sections (2.2.3 and 5.1.2) as 
debates in the evolution of language have a particular case with this debate. In the 
meantime, I aim to explain this notion of function through natural selection in deeper 
detail as it supports my overall claim that FL has a social primary function. 
This approach to primary function and biological evolution reflects Millikan’s theory of 
‘Proper function’, where function is fashioned within the evolutionary history of that 
biological object. Therefore, if there is no history, there is no primary function: 
A originated as a "reproduction" [...] of some prior item or items that, due in part 
to possession of the properties reproduced, have actually performed F in the 
past, and A exists because (causally, historically because) of this or these 
performances (Millikan, 1989, p. 288). 
In other words, primary function will not necessarily be reflected in the functions that a 
biological object is performing right now, but in the time that it was selected. This means 
that understanding the history of an object is an extremely important factor in 
determining its primary function. Evolutionary history, however, is not an easy thing to 
gain knowledge of and thus such discoveries hard to come by. If the primary function of 
a biological object is entrenched in history, and it is a history we are not able to witness, 
how can we ever claim to know the primary functions of such thing? The harsh reality is 
that we cannot and may never be able to do this and that any theory of biological primary 
function is doomed to remain a speculative one. 
I will argue, however, that there are ways that help to determine the primary function of 
a biological object even in the absence of our capability to rebuild an accurate 
evolutionary history. We can make sensible guesses about the environment in which the 
biological object emerged and evolved, and also consider what powers such an object 
brings to that environment. It is from this perspective that we gain more information 
about the challenges imposed upon the continued reproduction of a biological object, 
and therefore the variants, powers, and functions that were naturally selected for. 
A larger set of lungs, for example, may have evolved in an environment where the supply 
of oxygen is lower than before (at a higher altitude, for instance). If a creature’s lineage 
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is to continue, then it would be good that its body and cells ‘found a way’ to continue to 
receive the same level of oxygen as before. This is helped by increased lung capacity. 
Here, we see the creature’s environment corresponds with evolutionary changes and 
therefore a consideration of the environment helps toward a theory of primary function. 
This approach, of course, is not entirely accurate as there could have also been other 
reasons that explain why a larger set of lungs were selected for, but it does highlight that 
understanding the larger picture of the creature’s situation helps to build a more 
complete picture of natural selection and primary function. I, therefore, dedicate the next 
section to looking at the general role of selection pressures in biological evolution.  
2.1.3 Selective Pressures 
Let us start by considering the functions of a larger heart. It can both pump more blood 
per beat and make a louder sound, but which of these is the function it was selected for? 
To discern this is to discern the selective pressures that are impinged on the form. 
Selective pressures are those factors which contribute to the likely selection of certain 
forms over others. Mammals that live in very cold environmental conditions, for example, 
are under a stronger selection pressure to maintain their own body heat than mammals 
that live in warmer environments. Thus, in the cold environment, a variant with thicker 
fur responds to this pressure because it is a method that helps keep it warm. The thicker 
fur, therefore, is very likely to go through selection. In a warm environment, such a 
variant is not responding to a selection pressure and therefore is not likely to be selected. 
Selection pressures, thus, have a significant effect on the forms that the process of 
natural selection will bring about.  
Discerning the primary function of the larger heart, then, is helped by understanding the 
selection pressures that exist in the environment at the time it is selected. The heart may 
have been part of a body which was also growing in size, and therefore there was a 
pressure to ensure that the size of the heart ‘kept up’ with the size of the overall body. 
Here, the heart was selected for its function to pump more blood per beat, and not 
because it was louder. The larger heart, however, may have been adaptive because of a 
pressure related to the mother-child relationship. When a mother is holding her child, 
the child can hear her heartbeat, which has a positive effect in reducing stress levels and 
ensuring a longer and healthier life. In this case, there is a selection pressure to ensure 
the child can hear their mother’s heartbeat as clearly and as often as possible. Here, the 
larger heart would be selected for its function of making a louder noise as opposed to 
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pumping blood17. What we can conclude here is that the primary function of biological 
objects is often related to a response to a selection pressure in the environment. There 
are, however, some points we should keep in mind when making such a claim.  
First, is that selection pressures and the related primary functions can change over time. 
If a current form also responds to another selection pressure, this does not mean that it 
gains a different primary function. It is necessary that the form of the object is somehow 
changed by this other selection pressure, otherwise, it is just performing a secondary 
function. If hammers are always used for door-opening because of a pressure to keep 
doors from closing, this does not mean that the primary function of hammers also 
changes. Even if hammers are never used for hammering nails ever again, door-opening 
remains a secondary function. The primary function of a hammer only changes if its form 
adapts to or is changed by the door-opening situation. For example, someone could 
remove the handle because people often trip over it. It is only after a change that the 
(handle-less-)hammer’s form starts following a new function, so it is only then that we 
could say its primary function has changed.  
This is constantly happening in biology (Dawkins, 2009), and a good example is the 
changing primary function of bird feathers. Feathers have obviously adapted for flying, 
but probably had a previous primary function related to heat regulation (Prum, 1999). In 
the first instance, feathers were probably selected for heat regulation but later 
responded to a different selection pressure related to moving through the air (perhaps 
we can imagine an intermediate gliding stage before flying)18. It is only when a variant of 
the feather is selected because it helps with gliding, instead of heat regulation, that we 
can say it has the primary function of gliding.  
Secondly, a biological object does not have a primary function at the point of its initial 
emergence. The variation of biological objects is, ‘"random" in the sense that they do not 
anticipate their effects in the current environment’ (Pinker, 2012). Any function that a new 
variation has is, at this stage, secondary because function simply follows form. If a 
variance on a heart is slightly larger than the heart of the previous generation, then it also 
                                                        
17 Credit for example goes to my supervisor, Mark Cain. 
18 In evolutionary biology this may be the same thing as an ‘exaptation’: where some trait has 
been co-opted for another function (Gould, 1991; Buss et al., 1998). 
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has a variance in the things it can do. It can pump more blood per beat around the body, 
but it can also make a louder noise. However, neither of these functions are primary 
because a selection process for a larger heart has yet to happen. A variation gains a 
primary function once it has been through the process of selection. That is the larger 
heart was selected because it was adaptive, rather than maladaptive, for the subsequent 
copies of the initial variation.   
Third, primary function is not a ‘black and white’ concept and it should be kept in mind 
that there are many ‘shades of grey’. It is not as simple as saying that a form that was 
successfully copied to the next generation has now a primary function. This would 
suggest that neutral objects (objects that are neither adaptive or maladaptive) also have 
a primary function. Further, it may be wiser to see that primary functions come in 
‘degrees’, as some are more concrete than others. If the larger heart ‘sticks around’ or is 
‘continually maintained’ from one generation to the next, then it appears as if it has a 
concrete primary function. On the other hand, if the larger heart only sticks around for a 
couple of generations or is the sort of form that disappears and reappears several times 
throughout the generations of a species then it seems it has a primary function that is 
less concrete. I do not plan to use this terminology throughout this thesis and will treat 
FL as having a concrete primary function, but it is important to keep this in mind.  
My discussion of the primary function of biological objects is almost complete. The final 
thing I feel is important to explore is how the process of natural selection is able to create 
such complex objects (like the eye) or systems (like the nervous system). This is important 
to this thesis as I will be arguing that the FL is, indeed, a complex biological object (see 
chapter 5). 
2.1.4 The Ratchet Effect 
The ‘designs’ found in the natural world are often very complex, and it seems that the 
process of natural selection and the presence of selective pressures are able to explain 
why this is. The process of evolution discussed here is accumulative in its nature. New 
and functional variants constantly build upon the previous generation of functional 
variants. This explains why the process of natural selection is normally seen as a slow and 
gradual one, but also how it is capable of building such complex and integrated systems 
(eg, the eye, the wing, the integration of the digestive system with the nervous system, 
and, of course, the brain). This is important because it also highlights how a change in a 
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form can also change the selection pressures impinged upon that form. As the feather 
becomes better adapted for gliding, for example, so is the selection pressure for full flight 
more likely to impinge upon it. The intermediate stage of gliding, however, was a 
necessary one for flight. To explain this process, I think it helps to turn to the analogy of 
the ratchet effect. This analogy will also become helpful later (see 4.3). 
The ratchet-effect is used to describe a process where a state of affairs is restrained in a 
certain way until something happens that releases that restraint and allows the state of 
affairs to change and improve. This is until it is restrained again. This is analogous to a 
ratchet releasing and moving up to a new position where it is latched again. This is 
followed by another release, change and improvement, and then another restraint 
(probably of a similar nature to the previous one). Although each release is met with a 
further restraint, it has ‘latched’ at a higher degree—at an improved state of affairs—on 
the ratchet. Where there is potential for improvement—an opportunity to move up the 
ratchet—there first needs to be a release. The advantage of the latching or restraining is 
that it allows a state of affairs to confidently shift up degrees of the ratchet and prevents 
any ‘slippage’ back to a previous latching or degree. The disadvantage is that one has to 
wait for the latch to release before it can move. This analogy has been used to describe 
the process of evolution in both biology and culture. 
Robert Pirsig’s fictional book ‘Lila’ (2011, pp. 159–160) uses this analogy to explain the 
process of biological evolution. He expresses this through the relationship between 
dynamic and static patterns, and the motivation to grow towards better or higher 
‘quality’, but we can perhaps use it as a way of describing the relationship between 
genetic variations and the selection of those adaptive variations as growing toward a 
higher chance of reproduction:  
evolution can’t be continuous forwards movement. It must be a process of 
ratchet-like steps in which there is a Dynamic movement forwards up some new 
incline and then, if the result looks successful, a static latching-on of the gain that 
has been made; then another Dynamic advance, then another static 
latch…Sometimes a Dynamic increment goes forwards but can find no latching 
mechanism and so fails and slips back to a previous latched position. 
And Tomasello et al. used it to describe the accumulative nature of culture (1993, p. 495):  
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Once a practice is begun by some member or members of a culture others acquire 
it relatively faithfully, but then modify it as needed to deal with novel exigencies. 
The modified practice is then acquired by others, including progeny, who may in 
turn add their own modifications, and so on across generations. This 
accumulation of modifications over time is often called the "ratchet-effect," 
because each modification stays firmly in place in the group until further 
modifications are made. No cultural products exhibiting anything like the ratchet 
effect have ever been observed in the ontogenetically acquired behaviours or 
products of nonhuman animals. 
I will demonstrate how the ratchet-effect explains this accumulative nature of natural 
selection by means of a simple example, but this should also expose how this process is 
also capable of creating far more complex objects.  
In the grasslands, the main resource for food is grass, which all species that live in that 
space depend upon for energy and survival. As competition for this resource increases, 
however, so does a selection pressure to find another food source. Luck has it that a 
species of tree in the grassland produces leaves that are also edible and nutritious. 
Currently, however, none of the creatures in the grasslands have access to these leaves 
because none of them can reach the branch of the tree. What this environmental set-up 
allows for, however, is that the one variant of a creature that is born with a neck just long 
enough to reach the leaves on the lower branches responds to this pressure and secures 
itself and its children (which also have a long neck) a reliable resource of food whilst the 
other creatures on the grassland continue to compete for grass.  
The longer and more adaptive neck guarantees that this variant will go through selection. 
The appearance of this variant is analogous to a release of a latch on a ratchet (a ‘dynamic 
advance’) and escape from a limiting state of affairs (in the competition for grass). This 
release opened the creature to a more secure and positive state of affairs for itself and its 
offspring. This success is analogous to a new latching further up the ratchet (a ‘static-
latch’). Here, the selection pressure to secure a new source of food does not linger over 
them as they are able to live comfortable lives and reproduce.  
As a side note, if a further variant is born with a really long neck, this is also analogous to 
a release on the ratchet, and an attempt at a dynamic advance. This ‘really-long-neck’, 
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however, struggles to live with a body that is out of balance (perhaps the really long neck 
makes the creature top heavy). Such a body hinders its chances at surviving and 
reproducing. In selection terms, the really-long-neck is maladaptive and not selected for. 
In ratchet terms it is analogous to a failure to latch further up the ratchet, and therefore 
the lack of selection is akin to ‘slippage back’ to the previous more secure state where the 
majority of creatures are born with a neck of a sensible length. 
The stable state of affairs at this point, however, only lasts so long. The healthy 
reproduction of the long-neck creatures will eventually cause competition over the leafy 
food source. A solution is found again when a variant with an even longer neck (but not a 
really-long-neck) is born and can reach both the lower branches and the middle branches 
of these trees. Since they have sole access to the middle branches, then they have 
secured themselves and their offspring a reliable food source. The birth of this variant is 
like another release on the ratchet, and the successful selection is like another latch at a 
higher degree on the ratchet.  This story can continue so on and so forth until these long-
neck creatures have reached the leaves at the very top of the tree.  
This story of the long neck creature demonstrates the forward progression of evolutionary 
biology, usually as a response to selection pressures, and as a constant shifting between 
release, progression, and further latching. This also shows that the shape and condition 
of the evolving form itself has an impact on the environment and presiding evolutionary 
pressures they will need to respond to if the species is to survive. The long-neck would 
have never become a long-neck if it weren’t for a selection pressure to reach for the leaves 
in the trees (which was also dependent on the existence of those trees). Further, the long-
neck would also never have evolved to have longer necks if it weren’t for the selection 
pressure to reach the higher leaves that was created by the existence of the ancestor 
long-necks that could reach the lower leaves. This highlights that the process of evolution 
is far from simple and there are many interacting aspects. A topic I come back to in 
chapter 4.1. 
Understanding the accumulative nature of biological evolution also highlights another 
important aspect: that the process is often messy and entirely capable of producing 
seemingly counter-functional traits. Since there is no intentional designer, natural 
selection just simply does what it can do at each stage there is a selection pressure to 
respond to. When innovations are building on innovations, natural selection will not 
necessarily pick out the tidiest or most sensible route. The form of the giraffe’s neck (a 
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case of a real ‘long-neck’) picks this out very well (see figure 2 as extracted from Dawkins 
2009, p.361). 
 
FIGURE 2 - LARYNGEAL NERVE IN GIRAFFE AND SHARK 
The figure demonstrates that nerves in the shark are ‘well-designed’ because they cover 
a short distance between the two points they need to connect. In a giraffe, however, the 
laryngeal nerve (which is responsible for control of the voice box) is several feet long  
and takes a huge detour all the way up the neck and back down again when the two 
connected points are only a few inches apart (Dawkins, 2009, pp. 260–3). This 
reflects a poor design, but when we consider the accumulative nature of evolution 
and the need to just ‘cobble things together’ as we go, this ‘counter functional’ or 
‘messy’ design is not surprising and simply reflects the evolutionary history of the 
neck which was selected for its length – the nerve simply ‘grew’ with it.  
When it comes to discussing a complex organ like the brain, we have a lot more in 
the way of interactions, complexity, and potential mess to deal with. We should 
certainly not expect designs that are tidy and elegant. I agree, therefore, that it is 
best to understand the brain and other complex organs as ‘kluges’ (Marcus and Hoye, 
2008). Solutions to selection pressures are often ‘haphazard’ or ‘workarounds’ 
working without foresight and with what is available at the time of selection.  
Overall, the use of the ratchet effect and understanding the connection between natural 
selection and selection pressures should help us understand what primary function is in 
the mechanistic and messy world of evolutionary biology.  This explains why things look 
like they have been designed, but most of all, why these things exist in these forms. A 
central point is that attempting to consider the process of biological evolution from the 
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wider picture of selection pressures and the state of a creature’s environment also helps 
us deduce the primary function of certain objects. This is a lesson I push for the 
consideration of the evolution of the FL in chapter 1 when I proposed that we take some 
inspirations and important lessons from the cultural creature view (see 1.2.2) as it will 
help build a far more integrated picture of language evolution (see 1.3). I will return to 
this lesson below when I come to consider the role of cultural evolution in humans (2.3) 
and how this impacts our understanding of the evolution of FL (2.4). First, however, I 
would like to return to a discussion I started in 1.2.1 which concerned the current, but 
problematic, views of the evolution of FL.  
2.2 Evolution of the Faculty of Language 
2.2.1 Cognitive Function 
In chapter 1, I explain that I am committed to the view that we are ‘linguistic creatures’ 
and that our knowledge of linguistic structure is underpinned by the FL. This is supported 
by arguments from the poverty of the stimulus and the idiosyncratic nature of languages. 
What was problematic with this view, however, was the challenges it faced in describing 
the evolution of the FL, and, therefore, its primary function. Now that I have introduced 
evolutionary biology in more detail, and along with this concept of natural selection, it is 
time to revisit these problems. I will start by reviewing what I think is currently the most 
popular and supported view: that the FL was selected for cognitive reasons. 
‘Cognitive reasons’ here is used in a very broad manner to refer to those theories that 
argue FL evolved to support human thinking. This comes in many different varieties which 
I will come to explain (Carruthers, 2002; Boeckx, 2010), but they all have one thing in 
common: they are not related to supporting the cooperation or communication with 
other human beings. They are much more about supporting the survival of the individual 
as an individual; or, if where they do concern social living, supporting the survival of the 
individual within the setting of a social group. On this view, linguistic communication is a 
secondary function of the FL because it is a function that the form of FL turned out to be 
useful for (function follows form). 
How is it that the FL was selected to help human thinking or cognition? The general 
thought is that the capability to combine and recombine meaningful words or symbols in 
an infinite number of ways opens up a capacity for cognition or thinking that was not 
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possible in our pre-linguistic ancestors. I will briefly review two ways in which the FL may 
do this. 
First, is the theory that FL may give rise to our ability to attend to ‘multiple projects’; 
where any meaningful symbol or concept can now be put to use with many other 
symbols, concepts or ‘distinct projects’ (Evans, 1982; Camp, 2009). Here, the feat of 
bringing structure to our thinking means we can do more with it. Where other animals 
might be quite capable in their capacity to think about the world, humans are just able to 
do so with far more flexibility. Where a rat may learn to avoid food that made them sick 
before, they are limited in doing anything else with this knowledge. The underlying 
structure and flexibility of linguistic syntax, however, may be the thing that gives humans 
the power to think not just about avoiding the food, but also about warning others of the 
danger or even using it as a poison to hurt another.  
Second, is the thought that FL allows one to combine concepts from different domains 
or modules of the mind (Mithen, 1999; Spelke, 2003): 
…it is natural language syntax which is crucially necessary for inter-modular integration. 
The hypothesis is that non-domain-specific thinking operates by accessing and 
manipulating the representations of the language faculty (Carruthers, 2002, p. 658). 
This follows a theory that sees the mind-brain as a collection of functional, but stand-
alone modules that describe human behaviour and thinking (see 1.2.1 for a brief 
introduction to modularity). Advocates of this view suggest we have modules for such 
domains as folk psychology, folk biology, folk physics, basic mathematics as well as a 
variety of other things (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Carruthers, 2006; Spelke and Kinzler, 
2007). The underlying mechanisms of FL may provide a way in which we can bring 
together and combine representations relating to more than one domain, thus also 
offering the power of far more flexible thinking.  
In both this view and the previous view, the argument is that humans who could think 
more flexibly were far more likely to deal with the challenges and problems in their 
environment, and, as a result, were far more likely to be selected and pass this capacity 
on to the next generation. Although this thesis is concerned with forging a view of 
language evolution which is more compatible with a social and communicative primary 
function, it will help if I point out some problems with this more cognitive and 
individualistic approach. Not only will this demonstrate that the cognitive view is not as 
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strong as some may think, but it will also throw some light on why a communicative 
approach might be preferable.  
First, is simply the thought that if the FL is so useful in promoting the survival of an 
individual by helping them think more clearly and flexibly about the world, why do we 
not see this capacity emerging in other animals? This is surely a selection pressure that 
looms over all minded creatures who have to interact with and make decisions about a 
dangerous and complex world in which they live. Why is something so obviously useful 
to all only present in one species? The obvious response seems to be that something 
special about the human mind and environment—something that is not present in the 
mind and environments of other creatures—made it possible for the FL to emerge in the 
first place. This requires considering what this environment is, but after what we explored 
in 1.2.2 the answer to this seems associated with human sociality and not individuality. 
An advocate of the cognitive view can take this point on board and argue that enhanced 
thinking and cognition was a response to not the world in general, but to the social world 
that I have been arguing is also unique to humans. The argument would be that the 
cognitive load of managing many social relationships was what prompted a selection 
pressure for such a drastic change to human cognition (Calvin and Bickerton, 2000; 
Carruthers, 2002; Dunbar, 2014). I would argue, however, that these claims start to run 
into the unresolved problems about the relationship between human thought and 
natural language (see 1.3.2 for more). The main question is if there is a difference 
between the structure or syntax that underpins thought (the ‘language of thought’ or 
LOT) and the structures and syntax that underpin language (the FL). This point is not so 
much an argument against the cognitive view as theorists are certainly working with 
these problems (Aydede, 2010), but it does show that these are issues that are not 
present in a more social view on the primary function of FL—this is something I will come 
back in 2.4.  
Second, is to question if the cognitive view can make sense of our ability to externalise 
language, and especially of the evidence that our speech apparatus allows for precise 
control over and a large variety of speech sounds (Lieberman, 1984; Pinker, 1994). It is 
possible to argue that the speech apparatus and FL evolved for entirely separate primary 
functions which then ‘met’ when the FL and speech apparatus could share a secondary 
function of language in communication (Fitch and Reby, 2001; Fitch, 2010), but my 
 66 
response to this is related to my third problem for this view: that is the lack of integration 
with the bigger picture. 
This comes back to the point I made in 1.2.1 that the sociality of humans is what seems 
to be so special about our species, and the reason why we were so successful in survival. 
Although I certainly do not want to deny that our more advanced cognitive capacities 
contribute to our survival, I argue that these powers are secondary functions, and not the 
other way around (see more in 2.4). This way of thinking about the FL fits into a more 
integrated picture of human evolution, which also accepts that language is tied up in our 
being cultural and cooperative creatures, rather than as an entity that is separate to this 
larger function as this cognitive approach seems to suggest.  
2.2.2 Communicative function 
A second, and decisively, less popular view about the primary function of FL, is that it was 
selected for a communicative function. Such a view does support the social angle I am 
advocating, but previous formations of this approach come with several problems. In 
1.2.1 I explained that this view was problematic not because of evolutionary issues, but 
because of an under-appreciation of human social living (the role of cooperation and 
mutual-knowledge), and a fundamental misunderstanding of what human 
communication is (that it works on the ostensive-inferential model and not the code-
model). In this section, however, I will address those evolutionary issues and later (in 2.4) 
explore how they also dissolve when we take human social living into consideration. 
In their 1990 paper ‘Natural Language and Natural Selection’, Pinker and Bloom argue 
that the FL has evolved for a communicative function. Reading through their paper, 
however, demonstrates a commitment to the code-model of communication as they 
focus on a way to standardise the minds of language-users so they are all prepared to use 
the same code in their acts of communication: 
Any communicative system requires a coding protocol that can be arbitrary as 
long as it is shared…There is nothing particularly logical about setting your 
printer's serial interface to the "even," as opposed to the "odd," parity setting. 
Nor is there any motivation to set your computer to odd as opposed to even 
parity. But there is every reason to set the computer and printer to the same 
parity, whatever it is, because if you don't, they cannot communicate.  (Pinker 
and Bloom, 1990, p. 718).  
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As I mentioned in 1.2.2, such an approach to communication is not surprising because 
this is precisely what language seems to do. We ‘code’ our thoughts into a sentence of 
our chosen language, which is then ‘decoded’ by a receiver who also understands that 
language. This theory, however, has at least four issues, most of which clash with 
intuitions from evolutionary theory.  
The first issue is known as the ‘continuity problem’. This is the thought that if the FL 
evolved for communication, then it must be a continuation of a pre-existing system of 
communication that was entrenched in the biological makeup of our ancestors. In an 
early paper ‘The Origin of Speech’ Hockett argues:   
Man is the only animal that can communicate by means of abstract symbols. Yet 
this ability shares many features of communication in other animals, and has 
arisen from these more primitive systems (Hockett, 1960, p. 88). 
The thought that language has arisen from a more primitive form of communication 
makes sense when we consider that biological evolution is a constant process of building 
upon what is already there (see 2.1.4). Further, there might even be some evidence to 
back up this claim as some of our evolutionary cousins, the vervet monkeys, have a 
system of communication that contains something that resembles meaningful words 
(Seyfarth and Cheney, 1985; Price et al., 2015). 
Most theorists, however, see this as problematic because despite some similarities 
language is so unlike other systems of animal communication that it simply cannot be a 
continuation of them. The main reason for thinking this is the presence of the ‘creative’ 
or ‘productive’ aspect of language (see 1.2.1). This is not a feature found in the systems 
of communication of our close relatives. In fact, the structural aspects of language cannot 
even be learnt by our close relatives19. Rather there is a discontinuity between animal and 
human communication.   
The second issue is known as the ‘freeloading problem’ and is that language, as a system 
of communication, does not reflect an ‘evolutionarily stable strategy’ (ESS) (Dawkins and 
Krebs, 1978; Fitch, 2010). An ESS refers to an evolutionary strategy that is stable and is 
                                                        
19 For example, Nim Chimpsky tells the story of a chimp that was raised in a family in the hopes 
that he would acquire a full syntactical language (Marsh, 2011). The project, like many others, 
failed (Fitch, 2010). 
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not easily overcome by another strategy. For example, on flat and spacious grasslands, 
deer have an ESS to run away when they sense predators because, for the most part, they 
succeed in getting away and living another day. Conversely, if the deer find themselves 
in a mountainous environment this strategy is no longer an ESS because the deer is not 
well ‘designed’ to traverse this terrain and less likely to escape. This means this 
evolutionary strategy is open to the dominance of a new and more successful one. The 
deer, therefore, may evolve and adapt to run over such terrain (perhaps following a body-
build similar to that of mountain goats) and produce a new ESS.  
Systems of communication and other cooperative behaviours have a particular challenge 
here.  
a population of sharers can readily be invaded by a population of cheats who take 
the resource ‘donated’ by the others, and then fail to reciprocate (Fitch, 2010, p. 
415).  
Cheating, otherwise known as ‘freeloading’ are seen as non-starters for an ESS because: 
 No instinct has been produced for the exclusive good of other animals, 
but…each animal takes advantage of the instinct of others.’ (Darwin, 1859; found 
in Fitch, 2010, p. 414).  
This is a big debate that I will revisit in 4.2, but here we see why it is particularly 
problematic for language. 
Language not only offers an opportunity to get valuable and detailed information from a 
speaker for free—so a hearer can easily freeload a speaker—but it is also cheap (Zahavi, 
1993; Maynard Smith, 1994). ‘Cheap’ means that it does not require much in the way of 
energy or resources to make linguistic-utterances. Compare this to other systems of 
communication, like the dog’s territorial bark or a bird’s warning call, that do require a 
substantial effort from the signaller. A further reason for the selection of these more 
‘expensive’ systems is that they are guaranteed to mean what they mean to the receiver 
as they are indexical (this means that they are dependent on or refer to something in 
context). An alarm will always mean there is a reason to be alarmed, and a territorial bark 
will always mean you are breaching territory; thus the receiver is not cheated. Any of 
these systems of communication that did attempt to cheat the receiver is not an ESS, as 
it would eventually stop working once the receiver ‘catches on’ to the lie and stops paying 
attention to the signal altogether. It is, however, entirely possible to lie with the use of 
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linguistic-utterances, which means it is also entirely possible for a speaker to freeload a 
hearer.  
This high potential for freeloading brings into question the FL as an ESS in its 
communicative use. This simply does not add up as it ‘fails to satisfactorily cross the crucial 
evolutionary bridge from selfish indexical communication to the honest, truthful sharing of 
propositional information characterising language’ (Fitch, 2010, p. 424). It is for this puzzling 
aspect alone that many thinkers argue that communication cannot point to a primary 
function of FL and that it must be something else (such as cognition, see 2.2.1). 
The third issue is that if language evolved for communicative reasons, it means the FL 
needs to exist in the mind of more than one individual to work as a communicative 
system; at least in the sense Pinker and Bloom have postulated (1990). This brings into 
question how language could start as a communicative system in the first place and is 
known as the ‘bootstrapping problem’ (Origgi and Sperber, 2000; Smith and Allott, 2016).  
Language can only work if, at least, a speaker and hearer are endowed with the FL, 
otherwise communication between language users is not standardised. This makes it 
difficult to explain how the FL could arise for communication in the first place, let alone 
to continually change and evolve to become more complex. This problem supports the 
suggestion that the primary function of the FL should be a selfish one that could benefit 
an individual on their own. 
The fourth issue is that language, when observed for its structural properties, is badly 
designed for communication. So, even if language was necessary or sufficient for 
communication (see 1.2.1), it is not obviously very good at it. This is known as the 
‘counterfunctional problem’ and highlights that linguistic syntax is often redundant in its 
communicative functionality (Newmeyer, 1998a, p. 307; Hurford, 2014; Smith and Allott, 
2016). The syntax of language is redundant in two major ways. First, it is arbitrary, 
(Newmeyer, 1998b) in the sense that not all linguistic rules are coupled with a 
function that is useful for communication. There seems to be no communicative 
reason for why it is right to say ‘I held mummy’s hand’ but not ‘I holded mummy’s 
hand’; or ‘John filled the glass with milk’ and not ‘John poured the glass with milk’ 
(Pinker and Bloom, 1990, pp. 716–7). Second, it is often ambiguous as sentences like 
‘the man chased the dog with the stick’ or ‘the girl saw the boy with the telescope’ 
are unclear in stating who has the stick or telescope. Although the meaning of a 
sentence may be clear in the head of the speaker, it is potentially unclear to the head 
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of the hearer. Since natural selection tends to design things that are meant to work, 
and are not counterfunctional, it is not clear that communication reflects the primary 
function of FL.  
These problems show that even though it makes sense to claim that language has 
evolved for communicative reasons (communication, afterall, is the main thing 
humans appear to use language for!) it is in fact very hard to implement into 
evolutionary biology. Theorists, thus, have a preference that language is either not 
biological (so there is no FL), or communication is only a secondary function of FL. I 
will come back to these thoughts in section 2.4. In the meantime, I will visit one more 
view on the evolution of FL, and that is the thought it is not the product of natural 
selective processes, and therefore cannot be said to have a primary function.  
 
2.2.3 Non-Functional 
In 2.1.2 I explained how the process of natural selection is related to primary function 
and creation of biological objects. Natural selection, however, is not the only process  that 
describes the emergence and evolution of biological traits. Other processes can explain 
how a certain biological object has a certain form without appealing to a power or 
function that is selected for. Genetic variations that are not adaptive can be passed on to 
future generations without being ‘selected for’ (these are those ‘neutral traits’, see 2.1.3), 
and others may exist due to the physical constraints of the world or even as a by-product 
of other evolutionary processes.  
In the literature, there is a whole account of language evolution which adheres to this 
sort of thinking.  Chomsky and others argue that the underlying nature of linguistic 
structure is, in fact, extremely simple and not a product of natural selection. This 
approach argues that the FL is the product of a far simpler evolutionary process that does 
not involve the gradual and incremental selection of ever-improving syntactic structure  
(Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 2002; Chomsky, 2015; Berwick and Chomsky, 2017). This 
has introduced a non-functional theory for the FL20. Under this view, the cognitive and 
communicative powers of language are both seen as secondary functions of the FL 
                                                        
20 This is often referred to as a ‘non-selectionist’ account in the literature (Pinker and Bloom, 
1990; Fitch, 2010) 
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(function following form), but there is no primary function (no function for a form to 
follow, it ‘just happens’).  
This approach argues that the FL consists of a single mechanism which is responsible for 
the hierarchical and recursive structure of language (which we will explore in more detail 
in 5.1.3). This has highlighted issues over what the term ‘faculty of language’ should 
include, this I will briefly address here.  A famous paper by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 
(2002) suggested making a distinction between the faculty of language in the broad sense 
or ‘FLB’, and the faculty of language in the narrow sense or  ‘FLN’. Where FLB consisted 
of all mechanisms relevant to our ability to acquire and use language, and FLN only 
consisted of the mechanisms that were unique and specific to language. The paper 
concludes that since no other creature has shown a capability for ‘recursion’—that is the 
ability to create hierarchical or nested structures—then it is this single mechanism that 
makes up the FLN and is ultimately responsible for our ability to acquire and use language. 
This approach sparked debates concerning the complexity of the mechanism or 
mechanisms required to make up the FLN.  
The thought is that a single mechanism (known as ‘merge’ – see more in 5.2.1) is related 
to what is known as the ‘minimalist program’ or MP in the field of linguistic syntax. Others 
argue that FLN is made up of many mechanisms and is far more complex than what MP 
claims. This particular debate is less about the evolution of FL and more about its form, 
and, therefore, is something I will return to in chapter 5. What I will point out, however, 
is that the MP view is often considered as an argument for the FL as having a cognitive 
primary function: 
…merge emerged as a self-organisation syntactic process for the human 
conceptual apparatus… (Reboul, 2017).  
This is because it makes sense to claim that this ‘single operation’ was selected for or 
‘stuck around’ due to its positive effect on human thinking. The MP view could be told in 
a way that gives it a functional story. In this thesis, however, I want to separate this 
thought from the cognitive view because of wider implications MP has for the theories 
concerning the evolution of language. Some of these I will explain here (others are left 
for chapter 5).  
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A driving factor for this approach to language evolution is Chomsky’s scepticism about 
natural selection—and therefore of primary function—playing an important role in the 
evolution of deeply complex organs such as the spine (Chomsky, 2015) or brain: 
 We know very little about what happens when 1010 neurons are crammed into 
something the size of a basketball, with further conditions imposed by the specific 
manner in which the system developed over time. It would be a serious error to suppose 
that all properties, or interesting properties of the structures that evolved, can be 
‘explained’ in terms of natural selection (Chomsky, 1975, p. 59). 
This way of thinking had Chomsky turn to other evolutionary models that explain the 
creation of the natural world. He points out that there are three ‘design factors’ 
(Chomsky, 2005). The first is due to genetic endowment, the second is due to what is 
learnt through experience, and the third is due to natural law and mathematical 
consequences. This final factor, also known as ‘third factor’, is what Chomsky claims is 
the cause of the underlying shape of natural language syntax21. As a point of comparison, 
my theory and other natural-selection-based theories place language design with the first 
factor; and advocates of the cultural creature view place it with the second factor. 
This means to suggest that the simplicity of the FL (merge) is able to cause complex and 
perfect patterns (natural language), and thus reflects the emergence of other complex 
and perfect patterns in nature that appear to be the product of a simple mechanism (eg. 
honeycomb, snowflakes, Fibonacci spirals). This supports the MP attitude natural 
language syntax is the product of ‘optimal’, not functional, ‘design’: 
we would have an answer to questions about the apparent optimal design of 
language: that is what would be expected under the postulated circumstance, 
with no selectional or other pressures operating, so the emerging system should 
just follow laws of nature, in this case the principles of Minimal Computation 
(Chomsky, 2015, p. 25). 
                                                        
21 This also highlights a deeper debate in evolutionary biology initially sparked by Gould 
(Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Gould, 1991, 2002) which concerns which traits of the 
natural world are actually designed by natural selection and which are merely ‘spandrels’ 
or ‘byproducts’  
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The consequence of this is that the FL cannot really be said to have a primary function in 
the sense we have been discussing. There are no selectional pressures or motivating 
factors that brought about the emergence of the object, it just happened. It is a lucky 
accident, a quirk in the system that just so happened to be useful for thinking and 
communicating.  
The problems I have with this view are more or less the same as problems I had listed for 
the cognitive primary function view. Especially the fact that it is not integrated into the 
larger picture of human evolution. A particular issue I have with this approach, however, 
is the suggestion that all of what natural language syntax is was caused by a single genetic 
mutation in the mind of a single human at some point in human evolutionary history. 
Chomsky has claimed that this fits nicely with the ‘great leap forward’ that happened 
about 60,000 years ago (Chomsky, 2015; Berwick and Chomsky, 2017) as it reflects a 
‘sudden appearance’ of more complex human living through the archaeological 
discoveries of more complex tools and cultural powers. I, however, am not persuaded by 
this way of thinking about human evolution. For the most part, this goes against the idea 
that the mechanisms that makeup our mind-brains are messy ‘kluges’ and certainly not 
elegant or perfect (see 2.1.4).  
With all of this in mind, let us now return to the lesson I urged us to take in chapter 1 – 
and look into those things that were important to the cultural creature account of 
language (see 1.2.2). This means exploring cultural evolution as well as the biological 
mechanisms that underpin the process of cultural evolution taking place at all. 
 
2.3 Cultural Evolution and Social Cognition 
2.3.1 Function and Cultural Evolution 
Biological evolution is important for this thesis because we want to understand the 
existence of a biological object. Cultural evolution, however, is just as important. This is 
for at least two reasons. First, it is central to human life. In 1.2.2 I explain that cultural 
knowledge and behaviour are survival strategies that have helped ensure that humans 
thrive, survive, and reproduce. Second, it is involved in the creation of language. Although 
I argue that the structural aspects of language are underpinned by something biological 
(the FL – see 1.2.1),  word creation and word meaning is a matter of social convention 
and cultural transmission.  
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In this thesis, I argue the process of cultural evolution has its part to play in the overall 
story of language evolution. I will make these arguments in chapter 4, particularly when 
I come to introduce the concept of ‘gene-culture co-evolution’ (see 4.1.2 and 4.3).  It is, 
therefore, important that we understand this notion of cultural evolution and how it 
relates to primary function and biological evolution. What else is important to understand 
is the biological mechanisms that underpin our capacity to rely on cultural evolution. This 
is related to mind-guessing and social cognition, which I initially introduced in 1.2.2. 
Primary function in cultural evolution requires a little more exploration than primary 
function in biological evolution. This is for two reasons. First, the mechanism by which 
change and evolution takes place is very different from the one in biological evolution. 
Second, the form of cultural objects is influenced by both human forethought or intention 
(like the idea to remove the handle of a hammer), and natural selection (like what goes 
in and out of fashion). Like biological evolution, cultural evolution is essentially down to 
a process of copying. The next generation is basically a copy of the previous generation, 
but with some possible changes which may be the cause of a positive or negative 
experience of the copier. Another word for ‘positive change’ is ‘innovation’. Where 
biological innovation is random and restricted to the moment of sexual conception, 
cultural innovation is random or intentional, and open to change at any moment the 
copier is willing.  
Biological objects, therefore, refer to those traits or behaviours we acquire from our 
genetic make-up. For example, I have red hair because my father’s mother had red hair.  
Cultural objects refer to those traits or behaviours we acquire through copying or learning 
from the people who are around us. For example, I often wear jeans because I saw 
everyone else wore jeans whilst I was growing up in the ‘90s. Biological evolution is the 
transmission of genetic information from one generation to the next via the mechanisms 
of reproduction, and where change is down to genetic variance. Cultural evolution is the 
transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next via the mechanism of 
learning. Change, however, is down to variations of different sorts. Cultural change 
happens because of copying errors, unintentional innovation, intentional innovation, or 
simply because something might be easier to learn.  
Since the selection mechanisms between culture and biology are so different, it is worth 
asking if primary function can be applied in the same way. Does the form follows function 
rule apply to cultural evolution?  To explore this, it is worth looking at an example where 
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cultural transmission or ‘social learning’ is simpler than it is in humans. Such an example 
involves the social learning and feeding habits found in fish (Laland, 2018). It seems to be 
the case that creatures that depend on group living for their survival have two ways to 
learn about their environment: either through trial and error (individual learning) or 
through copying others (social learning). Since social creatures are the sort of creatures 
that do not survive well on their own, it is often safer for them to copy the behaviour of 
others when they can rather than risk learning through trial and error. For fish, this means 
feeding upon whatever the other fish are feeding upon. Their basic fish-reasoning being 
that if the other fish are not made sick by the food then it is probably safe to eat. Fish 
who are part of the same group will, therefore, all eat the same thing.  
If the food source starts to run low, however, it puts the lives of these fish at risk and 
some sort of innovation is required to save them. This means turning to individual 
learning. If a fish risks trying something new and succeeds in discovering a new and safe 
resource, all other fish are likely to copy that fish. The change from ‘feed on x’ to ‘feed 
on y’ could be seen as an evolution in the behaviour of the fish, but does it have primary 
function? I want to say ‘yes’ because this process reflects that of natural selection. ‘Feed 
on y’ is ‘selected for’ and as a response to a selective pressure to find more food. It could 
just have been that another fish had taken a risk but ate a poisonous food source. This, 
the other fish would not have copied because even with their limited fish-reason they are 
not going to eat food that has made another fish ill. The behaviour to ‘feed on poison’ 
did not respond to the selection pressure, and therefore, was not copied.  
 ‘Feed on y’, therefore, has this sense of form following function. This behaviour or form 
exists due to a function that concerns the survival of those fish22. The primary function of 
‘feed on y’, however, is quite dull and is simply something like ‘to prevent the fish from 
                                                        
22 This is not to say that, like biological evolution, cultural evolution always concerns the survival 
and reproduction of an individual. In fact, when we look at human culture, we see many cultural 
practices that are counter to this (e.g. drinking and smoking). The forces that motivate cultural 
evolution will be far more complex than this and a full picture will need to take into account not 
only the complexity of one’s culture (what they learn from their parents vs what they learn from 
their friendship group), but also biological aspects too (e.g. prone to addiction). There is also the 
idea of ‘meme theory’ which suggests cultural evolution is more about the survival of the cultural 
objects and not the ones using them (Blackmore, 1999). In this thesis, however, I will stick to the 
idea that cultural objects tend to exist because they help the survival of humans, even of human 
groups (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006), but this debate, unfortunately, remains outside the scope of 
this thesis.  
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dying of starvation’. Although the example demonstrates primary function it fails to 
represent the innovations found in human culture (like religion and law). Fish culture, 
therefore, is a very ‘thin’ conception of culture, and it seems a far ‘thicker’ conception is 
needed to give a satisfactory account of human culture that reflects the definition I 
introduced in 1.2.223. The difference between thick and thin culture, however, requires a 
discussion of the biological stuff that underpins this capacity for thick cultural stuff.  
The thin conception certainly embraces an important aspect of human culture, in that it 
is largely a case of social learning punctuated with the occasional innovation of individual 
learning. This highlights that learning mechanisms play an important role in the lives of 
social creatures. In human culture, this becomes hugely complex as we are not merely 
copying what other humans eat, but also how other humans store, prepare, cook, and 
pray over what they eat. The first big difference between human and fish culture is down 
to the sophistication of the learning mechanisms. This aspect of culture will not be a focus 
of discussion in this thesis, but it’s important to keep it in mind.24  The flexibility of 
learning, after all, allows humans to adapt to their environment far quicker than the 
slower and more rigid process of biological evolution allows (I will revisit this to a degree 
in chapter 4). There are, however, two other features that I argue thick culture has that 
thin culture does not. 
Firstly, thick culture is far more demanding of the psychological sophistication of the 
social creature. It is necessary that the creatures are a part of a socially cohesive group 
where they actively cooperate and share goals. This requires the ability to mind-guess, 
share intentions, and have mutual-knowledge. This is made evident by the fact that 
humans are not just interested in copying and learning from the behaviours of others, 
but are also in teaching others, especially the offspring of the next generation (Tomasello, 
2014). Teaching certainly requires a very sophisticated degree of mind-guessing as an 
instructor needs to be acutely aware of the mind and knowledge of their student if they 
                                                        
23 I thank Mark Cain for his helpful suggestion of using ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ in this way. 
24 The idea that humans have sophisticated learning mechanisms is also hugely important in the debate of 
language evolution, as one argument for the ‘cultural creature’ view is that these learning mechanisms are 
capable of acquiring the structural aspects of language (Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006), or even more 
so, creating the very shape of language in and of itself (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Kirby, 2011). Due to 
interests of time and space, however, I cannot address this in any satisfactory detail and can only turn to 
the arguments in 1.2.1 with regards to the existence of FL. 
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are ever to guide them towards learning something new. This aspect of thick culture also 
greatly enhances culture as a survival strategy. Where, in fish, only a learner is concerned 
with learning; in humans, both learner and teacher are concerned.  In 1.2.2 I explained 
that these abilities were dependent upon advanced social cognitive mechanisms which I 
will come to explore in more detail shortly. 
Secondly, it appears to be an aspect of thick culture that it is accumulative in that one 
innovation can build upon another in order to create vastly complex cultural objects. In 
other words, there is a ratchet-effect at play (see 2.1.4). Fish culture may be capable of 
this to a degree. If at the same time the fish learn to ‘feed on y’, they may also learn to 
‘not feed on z’. Later, their original food source, x, may come back to the environment. 
The feeding habits of the fish could be seen as innovation building upon innovation as 
their knowledge goes from ‘feed on x’; to ‘feed on y’; to ‘feed on y, but not z’; to ‘feed on 
x and y, but not z’. This pattern, however, lacks the depth and richness that is represented 
in human culture.  
In human culture, the growth of technology is a good representation of the depth this 
accumulative effect goes to. We observe this very directly with the way mobile phone 
technology has changed in just a few short years. My old Nokia 3310 that I owned in 2003, 
is a completely different machine from my iPhone 5 that was released in 2012, which 
now also looks and functions very differently to the iPhoneXS which was released in 2018. 
In-between the releases of each of these phones is a gradual accumulation of new 
innovations, gadgets and functions (e.g. Cameras, music players, touch screens, and 
apps), as well as improvements on materials and computational technology (e.g. from 
the use of plastic to silicon, the downsizing of computer chips, and the advancement in 
software development). Each innovation is made possible due to the success and 
widespread use of previous innovations.  
Thick culture is dependent upon sophisticated memory and learning mechanisms, but, 
most importantly, upon mind-guessing or social cognition. Since understanding both 
cultural evolution and human cooperation is so important to my theory of language 
evolution, we take some time out to really understand what social cognition is.   
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2.3.2 Social Cognition and Levels of Intentionality   
No matter how you spin your narrative about language its development and use has to 
involve other human beings. This is particularly true when it comes to acquiring word-
meaning in language: 
For example, it is only if a young child understands other persons as intentional 
agents that she can acquire and use linguistic symbols – because the learning and 
use of symbols requires an understanding that the partner can voluntarily direct 
actions and attention to outside entities. (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 675). 
Advanced social cognition is required for children to acquire language: 
sophisticated “mind-reading” abilities are necessary to deduce word meanings 
and communicate pragmatically (Fitch, Huber and Bugnyar, 2010, p. 795). 
In 1.2.2 I briefly introduced us to ‘social cognition’ as the capacity that allows us to 
understand others as intentional and rational beings (Lavelle, 2018; Ravenscroft, 2019). 
It allows us to think about, consider, and predict the mental states and behaviours of 
others under an ability I have been referring to as ‘mind-guessing’. We do this all day and 
every day in social human life. It is what is in operation whenever we are interacting with 
other minds; when we observe and consider the actions of others; when we 
communicate and cooperate with others; or even when we attempt to fool or manipulate 
others. When I am walking towards the cafeteria at the university and I see my supervisor 
run past me, I would wonder why he didn’t stop to greet me as he would normally. When 
I look at the time, I see it is noon, I am able to conclude he is rushing because he wants 
to beat the cafeteria rush for coffee after the morning lectures—this is an act of mind-
guessing. 
The cultural creature view recognises that social cognition and mind-guessing is at the 
centre of human cooperation and communication. It not only explains how and why 
humans can make use of social conventions and communicate on the ostensive-
inferential model but also explains how and why humans are able to make use of ‘thick’ 
culture that I discussed in the section above (2.3.1). Social cognition is obviously 
important to humans, but is not completely unique to humans as the ability to mind-
guess has been observed in other social animals to differing degrees (Call and Tomasello, 
2008; Fitch, Huber and Bugnyar, 2010). Many argue, however, that humans have a 
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unique and advanced form of social cognition that helps explain why we are so unique 
with the way we interact25. Let me explain.  
Human social cognition does more than just predicting the mind of others. We also have 
confidence that other minds are also thinking about our mind. If, for example, I approach 
a roundabout and I see that another driver is approaching the exit to my left at the same 
time (which means I have right of way), then I will have the confidence to continue driving 
onto the roundabout. Why do I not worry about the driver pulling out in front of me? It 
is because I am confident that the driver has a mind that is following the same rules as 
me, but more than this, I am also confident that the driver is considering my mental state 
considering their mental state. I believe that they believe that I believe I have right of way 
in this situation. This is essentially what it means to have mutual knowledge. What this 
shows is that two drivers approaching the roundabout with the ‘give way to the left’ rule 
in mind is one thing, but two drivers approaching the roundabout with the mutual-
knowledge that we will both follow the rule is quite another. The former is akin to what 
one might also feel when they are blankly following road-signs (I have right-of-way so I 
will just go), the latter introduces a level of interaction, a ‘working together’ (I have right-
of-way, but I see that driver also knows this and will expect me to adhere) that affords us 
quite a different mental experience. 
To clearly conceptualise what is going on here many thinkers have turned to the idea that 
our social cognitive capacity works on what is termed ‘orders’ or ‘levels of intentionality’, 
and the thought that humans have a ‘high level of intentionality’ (Sperber, 2000; Scott-
Phillips, 2014). I should point out that the word ‘Intentionality’ does not mean to refer to 
the term intention in the sentence ‘I intend to write a PhD thesis’, but to the philosophical 
concept that concerns how mental states are about something. Thus all mental states: ‘I 
intend to write a PhD thesis’, ‘I believe I am writing a PhD thesis’, and ‘I desire to write a 
PhD thesis’ are intentional states (Jacob, 2019). I will break these orders or levels down 
by means of an example supported by a comic strip, with the aim to clearly demonstrate 
what degree of intentionality is required for humans to truly interact with one another26. 
                                                        
25 There is a suggestion that it is not so much social cognition that explains this unique capacity 
of humans, but a tendency towards friendliness and altruistic behaviours (Tomasello et al., 2005; 
Tomasello, 2014). This discussion I come back to in chapter 4.2.  
26 Credit of example to Mark Cain. Credit of Images to Jen Webster. 
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In the first comic, we see Jen and Mike are sitting next to each other on the train. Sitting 
across from them is a man who has fallen asleep, but is snoring loudly to the annoyance 
of both. Neither of them is paying attention to the mental state of the other. 
 
FIGURE 3 - COMIC 1 
Here, Jen and Mike have a similar thought: ‘I am annoyed by that guy’s snoring’, but they 
only share it in the sense that they happen to have a similar thought. They do not share 
it mutually. They are not interacting with one another or attending to each other’s mental 
state. They both simply have the same ‘first-order belief’.  
In the second comic, Jen sees the look on Mike’s face and recognises that he is thinking 
the same thing as her. Mike remains unaware of her thoughts.  
 
FIGURE 4- COMIC 2 
Here, Jen is thinking about Mike’s thoughts: ‘I believe that Mike is annoyed by that guy’s 
snoring’ and thus holds a second-order belief because she has a belief about someone 
else’s belief. Mike still has a first-order belief.  
In the third comic, Mike comes to recognise that Jen holds a similar belief to him. 
However, although Jen is aware of his belief about the snoring man, she is not aware of 
this recent realisation about her beliefs about him.  
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FIGURE 5 - COMIC 3 
Here, Jen and Mike are both annoyed by the guy’s snoring and both believe that the other 
holds the same thought. They both hold the second-order belief: I believe they are 
annoyed by that guy’s snoring. However, they still do not have the capability to interact 
with one another about this thought. Again, they have the same thought, but this is still 
not mutual. Why this is the case becomes clear in the next comic. 
In the fourth comic, Jen becomes aware of the realisation that Mike has in the third 
comic. 
 
FIGURE 6 - COMIC 4 
Jen not only sees that Mike has the same annoyance, but that Mike also understands that 
they have the same annoyance. Jen, thus, gains the third-order belief: ‘I believe that Mike 
believes that I am annoyed by the guy’s snoring’. She is having thoughts about the 
thoughts that Mike is having about her thoughts! It is only now that Jen has the 
awareness where she could attempt to interact with Mike. She can see they could have 
mutual knowledge about the snoring guy. However, unless Mike also sees that they could 
have this mutual-knowledge, she cannot utilise it to interact with him. 
In the fifth, Mike becomes aware that Jen is thinking about his thoughts. Upon seeing this 
Jen gestures towards the hopelessness of their situation. Mike responds in agreement by 
smiling slightly.  
 82 
 
FIGURE 7 - COMIC 5 
Here, Jen and Mike both have the third-order belief that: ‘I believe that Jen/Mike believes 
that I am annoyed by the guy’s snoring’. Mike ‘catches on’ to what is going on, and now 
they have the mutual-knowledge and understanding to interact with one another. 
Because they both ‘see’ they are thinking about each other’s thoughts they are both 
‘tuned’ into the possibility of interacting with one another with regards to the snoring 
man and the helpless situation they have found themselves in. 
It is only at this level, where both participants share third-order beliefs, that interaction 
can take place. It is at the level where we can learn about word-meaning and cooperate 
with others. Here, we see that this is allowed by a certain way of perceiving the world, 
that is to see it as full of minded beings that own high levels of intentional thinking like 
our own. Many thinkers agree that this capacity is innate in humans, and not something 
that needs to be learnt (Baron-Cohen and Leslie, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 2001), thus our 
ability to mind-guess is dependent upon some biological underpinning. This also means 
that social cognition is the likely product of natural selective processes and has its own 
evolutionary history and primary function. Exploring the evolution of social cognition and 
how it interacts with the evolution of FL will be an important topic of chapter 4, but now 
I will revisit how these higher levels of mind-guessing impact the powers and primary 
function of FL. 
2.4 FL in the Hybrid Creature 
2.4.1 The Communicative Function Revisited  
In this thesis, I argue that the FL evolved for a social and communicative primary function. 
My hypothesis is formed through a commitment to the existence of the FL, but also it is 
inspired by the view that we are also ‘cultural creatures’. In 1.3 I argue that social 
cognition evolved first, and, thus, set up the environment and selective pressure in which 
the FL would emerge and evolve. I also argue that the primary function of FL is to provide 
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a way for humans to refer to things that are not obvious in the current context or ‘to 
make relevant what is not salient’. I did not, however, discuss the evolutionary issues 
around this view. This is what I plan to do now that we have a deeper understanding of 
biological and cultural evolution, and what it is to mind-guess.  
In 2.2 I explore how current views around the evolution of the FL are problematic. In this 
section, we saw how the most social version of this view was especially problematic with 
regards to evolutionary theory (2.2.2). I argue, however, that these are only problems 
because thinkers of this view have signed up to a code-model of communication that 
does not take into account our ability to mind-guess and the fact that human 
communication is based on the ostensive-inferential model of communication. This is 
how the ‘hybrid creature’ view aims to understand language, and it is with such an 
approach that we see a lot of the issues for a communicative function of the FL start to 
dissolve. Let me explain. 
First, the hybrid creature approach understands that the FL emerges from a place where 
humans are already dependent on social living and cooperation. This has an impact upon 
the nature of the continuity problem in that we admit to a discontinuity between animal 
and human communication. Therefore, we are expected to explain the rise of a new 
system of communication. The thought is not that language is new but that the human 
situation and selective pressures that are present are new. Never before has an animal 
been in a situation where they can use ostensive-inferential communication, and so never 
before has an animal had to deal with the limitations and challenges that come with it. 
On my view, it is this situation that the emergence of FL is responding to, and—if it is 
meant to be seen as a continuation of anything—it is the continuation of our dependence 
on social living. The FL simply allows us to continue communicating and coordinating 
outside of context, and this includes the rise of the mysterious the creativity feature of 
language that was so problematic in 2.2.2 (I discuss this point in more detail in 5.3.2).  
Second, considerations from the cultural creature view also dissolve the freeloading 
problem. This is because of how ostensive-inferential communication works. As I 
explained in 1.2.2, one needs more than the linguistic code to communicate successfully. 
Under this approach to communication, however, the underdetermination (see 1.2.1 – 
this is the problem that linguistic utterances are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
communication) and freeloading problems counteract one another. It seems freeloading 
requires one gets something for free, where the underdetermination problem tells us 
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that it is very hard to get anything for free in human communication! Both speaker and 
hearer need mutual-knowledge to even have the chance of manipulating a hearer into 
doing something to the speaker’s sole advantage or to comprehend what a speaker is 
saying to the hearer’s sole advantage. Ostensive-inferential communication does not 
completely eliminate freeloading, but it does make it a lot harder. A freeloader would 
have to do a fair amount of work in order to cheat or get anything for free. Furthermore, 
an investment into building the relevant background knowledge is required, and such an 
investment needs to be worth cheating in the first place.  
Additionally, the precursors of ostensive-inferential communication involve the evolution 
of group and social living which will come back with all sorts of freeloading risks that need 
to be dealt with. These involve cheating-detection and systems of punishment. Those 
who come to know and use a language must have also built up the relevant mutual-
knowledge for successful communication and are therefore probably members of that 
social group (or they worked to become part of the group). They will also need to consider 
the risks of detection and punishment. This means that language is not at immediate peril 
of domination by a better communicative strategy; and therefore, is an ESS. This 
understanding of language in human communication affects the claim that language is 
‘cheap’. It may be true that using linguistic utterances does not require much energy or 
resources, but it does require relevant mutual-knowledge, social commitments, and a 
group awareness that comes with group membership. I will revisit this in more detail in 
4.2.  
Third, ostensive-inferential communication also dissolves the bootstrapping problem, as 
it is not essential for both speaker and hearer to hold the same linguistic code and rules 
in their head for there to be successful communication: 
Inferential communication is a matter of reconstructing the communicator's 
informative intention on the basis of the evidence she provides by her utterance. 
Successful communication does not depend, then, on the communicator and 
addressee having exactly the same representation of the utterance, but on having 
the utterance, however represented, seen as evidence for the same intended 
conclusion (Origgi and Sperber, 2000). 
This implies that it is possible for the FL of the speaker to have some differences to the 
FL of the hearer, and for them to both encode different linguistic structures, but for the 
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communicative act to be successful. John, for example, may utter a single word, ‘drink’, 
after collapsing after a long walk in the desert. Lisa, however, who has a more developed 
FL has learnt to treat words that indicate an activity (like ‘drink’ or ‘hit’) as being 
syntactically linked to some object (like ‘Lisa’, ‘water’, or ‘tree’’). This means she 
automatically perceives John’s utterance as having an unexpressed word. In other words, 
she does not hear a stand-alone ‘drink’ that John expresses, but the more complex and 
informative ‘drink x’ (example in Sperber and Origgi, 2012, p. 336). Despite the difference 
in linguistic code the speaker intention is the same: John needs to drink water. This means 
it is also possible for gradual changes to the FL to take place without being detrimental 
to communication. 
The fourth problem was the apparent counterfunctionality of language and the thought 
that the structural properties of language are badly designed for communication. These 
issues lie with that fact that language is arbitrary and ambiguous. I have two responses 
to this problem. My first response is to refer back to the fact that evolutionary processes 
build ‘kluges’ (see 2.1.4) and to consider that natural selection is a very disordered and 
messy designer, only working with the materials it has available to it at the time it is 
‘dealing’ with any particular selection pressure (Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Newmeyer, 
1998b; Marcus and Hoye, 2008). This explains why language is often arbitrary. It does the 
job it needs to do, but it by no means does it perfectly.  
My second response is that, under this view, we should also expect linguistic utterances 
to be ambiguous (e.g. the two meanings of the boy saw the girl with the telescope). It is 
evolving upon a background where a form of communication is already well-established 
and so the ‘goal’ is not to build a system of communication where every utterance it 
completely clear in its meaning, but to enhance a form of communication that is already 
there (see 1.3). This means that, during the evolution of the FL, linguistic utterances are 
not only interpreted by virtue of everyone else having an FL, but by virtue of all the stuff 
that is known in context. Thus, syntactical and pragmatic consideration are both 
constantly involved in the evolution of the FL, thus we should not be surprised at 
ambiguity. It could simply be that at most times an utterance is ambiguous, the 
pragmatics is present to resolve the ambiguity (perhaps you can see a boy holding a 
telescope); and where the context is ambiguous, the use of a linguistic utterance solves 
the ambiguity (it makes relevant what is not salient!). Since linguistic communication is 
successful most of the time, I think it is safe to say that the interaction between context 
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and sentence was one that was designed on the basis of communicative success 
(Piantadosi, Tily and Gibson, 2012).   
Above, I also argue that a communicative and social approach to the evolution of FL 
resists problems of the other views. That is the cognitive view in 2.2.1, and the non-
functional view in 2.2.3. My main argument is that, out of all views, the hybrid creature 
approach embraces a far more integrated account of language evolution. One that 
involves consideration of human sociality, the process of natural selection, and the rigid 
and idiosyncratic nature of linguistic structure. My main point is that the hybrid creature 
view is preferable to those views that are less integrated (like the cognitive and non-
functional views). 
A further argument is that advanced human thinking is a secondary function of the FL. 
Here, I argue that it makes more sense that humans, overall, have evolved toward 
becoming social creatures that require cognitive mechanisms that support social living, 
rather than individual thinking. This involves not only social cognition but more 
sophisticated learning mechanisms and memory. There is even argument that our 
capacities for reasoning, decision-making, and planning are geared toward sociality 
rather than rationality as recent research shows how human thinking is often plagued by 
social biases (Haidt, 2013; Mercier and Sperber, 2017). This undermines the argument 
that the FL has evolved for individualistic cognitive reasons because it may be that 
nothing of the human cognitive capacity functions on an individualistic basis. This is 
supported by the fact that other minded animals have also failed to find such a rich 
solution to the selective pressure to get smarter or gain more flexible thinking capacities. 
My point here is that it may well be true that the FL enhances human thinking, but that 
this enhancement is a secondary function (form follows function) of a biological object 
that was evolving to further support human sociality.  
The hybrid creature view also has an advantage in discussions concerning the nature of 
human thought. This is related to the discussion I started in 1.3 with regards to the 
relationship between the syntax of natural language and thought. If one is an advocate 
of the view that the human mind has a ‘language of thought’ or LOT and also argues that 
there is an FL, then one is not stuck for explaining why there are two syntactical systems: 
one that evolved for thinking (LOT) and one that evolved for communication (FL). This 
avoids one of the main problems of the view explored in 2.2.1, which could not make 
sense of two syntactical systems. If one is an advocate of the view that the human mind 
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is based on a connectionist model, however, then one needs to show that human thought 
is primarily influenced by the language that one acquires. This latter point remains highly 
controversial (Camp, 2009; Margolis and Laurence, 2019). These questions, however, 
remain outside the scope of the thesis but they are worth keeping in mind.  
2.4.2 The rest of the thesis 
Chapters 1 and 2 are dedicated to building the groundwork for the main argument of my 
thesis. This is that humans are ‘hybrid creatures’ and that the FL has a social primary 
function which aids human communication by ‘making relevant what is not salient’. To 
make my claim clear it has been necessary to introduce and explain several fundamental 
concepts. This has included describing the nature of language (1.1) and the FL (1.2.1); the 
nature of human sociality, communication, and culture (1.2.2); and social cognitive 
mechanisms that underpin it (2.3.2) – not to mention how the hybrid creature approach 
to the FL (1.3 and 2.4) differs from other views in the field (2.2.2).  I have also gone into 
detail about how processes of biological evolution, cultural evolution, and natural 
selection are related to the concept of primary function (2.1 and 2.3.1).   
The rest of the thesis is geared toward supporting my central claim that the FL was 
naturally selected to ‘make relevant what is not salient’, and I will use many of the 
concepts introduced here to build a richer picture of what the hybrid creature is. 
In chapter 3 I will explain in deeper detail how the primary function ‘to make relevant 
what is not salient’ responds to a particular selection pressure present in the human 
environment. This will involve not only exploring the power that syntax brings to human 
communication (as suggested in 1.3.1), but also the powers of the communicative 
behaviours that preceded it. The point is not that ‘making relevant what is not salient’ is 
a power that syntax has, but a power that syntax was selected to enhance and maintain. 
The story really starts with the powers of word-use because words are able to bring to 
mind concepts or meanings of things that do not exist or are not salient in the current 
environment. I argue that syntax (as underpinned by the FL) was designed to deal with 
the limitations and risks of miscommunication that word-use brings into human 
communication.  It is in this chapter I also introduce us to the relevance theory of 
communication—as this gives us a deeper insight into the workings of ostensive-
inferential communication—and also deals with the counterarguments that the primary 
function of syntax is to more clearly and precisely express our thoughts to others.  
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In chapter 4 I take the claims of chapter 3 into the bigger picture of human evolution, 
thus endorsing my argument that theories of language evolution should be more 
integrated into our understanding that we have evolved to become very social and 
cultural creatures. Here I explore not only the emergence of words and syntax, but also 
the emergence of group living, social behaviours, and social cognition. I expose more 
clearly why cultural behaviours are important to human survival and demonstrate how 
the evolution of the human phenotype is governed by a co-evolutionary process between 
that which is cultural and learnt, and that which is genetic (this is known as ‘gene-culture 
co-evolution). I show how the evolution of the FL is subject to such a process and 
conclude that there is a strong case for the view that syntax is not the product of human 
culture (as the original ‘cultural creature view’ would argue) but has evolved to 
fundamentally support it.  
In chapter 5 I move from the wide picture of human evolution into a narrower focus of 
how the FL works in the human mind. My thesis, by this point, will expose that I advocate 
a certain form or shape of the FL which is complex and made up of several moving parts. 
This is because I argue that the FL was built through the incremental and gradual process 
of natural selection, whilst also coordinating a relationship with the cultural movements 
and needs of the human environment. This intuition, however, clashes with a view in the 
field of linguistics known as the minimalist program (MP) which advocates a far simpler 
form or shape of the FL. It is in this chapter I delve into the theories of generative 
grammar and provide arguments for the ‘government and binding’ or GB approach which 
appreciates a far more modular and complex approach to GB. Here, I will also suggest 
how these modules could be integrated into the gene-culture co-evolution picture I 
present in chapter 4.   
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Chapter 3 – Communication 
3.1 Powers of Language 
The main claim of this thesis is that the FL (that is the ‘faculty of language’ – see 1.2.1) 
was naturally selected for a social function. The goal of this chapter is to explore what 
communicative powers language does have and present a more precise argument 
regarding its primary function as I have come to understand it. In other words, I aim to 
do a more thorough job on the arguments I started to express in section 1.3 when I 
argued that we are neither exclusively linguistic nor cultural creatures, but hybrid 
creatures. My thought was that the FL had a new power to bring to human 
communication by allowing us to refer to things outside of context, or more technically 
speaking: ‘to make relevant what is not salient’. In order to give this argument more 
justification I need to explore the counter-arguments that the primary function of 
language is to more clearly and precisely express thoughts (see 3.1 and 3.3.5); introduce 
a deeper understanding of human communication by exploring ‘relevance theory’ (see 
3.2.1); and also account for the intermediate stage of word-use that must have pre-
existed full language (see 3.3).  
Before going on I should briefly remind my reader of some terminology I will be using in 
this chapter. I use ‘power’ as a vague term to point to something language can do without 
making any direct commitments to if that something is useful, and use ‘function’ to refer 
to a power that is useful. You will remember that I introduced us to ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary functions’ in chapter 2. As a reminder, a primary function points to the 
function that explains why an object was created in the first place, whereas a secondary 
function points to other functions this object may provide. In this chapter, the overall 
claim will be that the power ‘to make relevant what is not salient’ is the primary function 
of language, whereas ‘to make communication more expressive and precise’ is a 
secondary function. 
Usually, when we consider the use of language, we think about it in terms of the ‘code-
model’ of communication (see 1.2.2) where we are focused on the role of the linguistic-
utterances. A thought is coded into a word or sentence in a certain language, which is 
decoded by a hearer, who knows the same language, to reveal the same thought. This 
appears to be the underlying assumption for the theories of language evolution as 
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advocated by Jackendoff (Jackendoff, 2002) and Pinker (Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 
1994). When it comes to exploring the primary function of language, they tend to argue 
that it enhances the expression and precision of a system of communication that works 
on this literal meaning: 
Given such a capacity [that is to embed phrases into larger phrases], one can now 
specify reference to an object to an arbitrarily fine level of precision (Pinker and 
Bloom, 1990, p. 724).  
 I will  argue that one actually can reconstruct from modern human language a 
sequence of distinct innovations over primate calls…each of which is an 
improvement in communicative expressiveness and precision  (Jackendoff, 2002, 
p. 236). 
The move that Jackendoff and Pinker allude to is a move from the use of meaningful 
symbols, words, or word-like objects to a system of communication that is able to 
combine and recombine these meaningful symbols in ways that can better represent the 
complex thoughts or ideas we wish to express (I will discuss word-use in more detail in 
section 3.3). Overall language—or more precisely the syntax of languages—allows us to 
better express the thoughts with more detail and accuracy than we could have done 
without language:  
For example, it makes a big difference whether a far-off region is reached by 
taking the trail that is in front of the large tree or the trail that the large tree is in 
front of. It makes a difference whether that region has animals that you can eat 
or animals that can eat you. It makes a difference whether it has fruit that is ripe 
or fruit that was ripe or fruit that will be ripe. It makes a difference whether you 
can get there if you walk for three days or whether you can get there and walk  
(Pinker and Bloom, 1990, p. 724). 
This perspective on language, however, often diminishes the importance of a wider 
spectrum of factors on which humans depend for their communicative acts. This point is 
made clear by the fact the literal meaning of a linguistic utterance often 
‘underdetermines’ the overall communicative intention of a speaker (Wilson and 
Sperber, 2004; Scott-Phillips, 2014). As we explored in chapter 1 human communication 
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is not based on the code model of communication, but on the ostensive-inferential model 
where linguistic utterances are used to point towards a communicative intention of a 
speaker, and not to the literal meaning of the utterance. It is then the job of a hearer to 
infer from the utterance what the speaker means. In recent years, researchers have 
argued that the ostensive-inferential analysis of human communication should be taken 
more seriously in theories concerning language evolution. 
The likes of Sperber, Origgi, and Scott-Phillips have argued that language-use helps to 
convey communicative intentions, rather than literal meanings (Origgi and Sperber, 2000; 
Sperber and Origgi, 2012; Scott-Phillips, 2014). Linguistic utterances, thus, are a means 
to an end and not the end in and of themselves. They point towards a communicative 
intention, which also depends on other elements of human communication. For example, 
mutual-knowledge and the context of the immediate environment will play a role in the 
correct interpretation of a communicative act.  
When it comes to considering the functions and pressures that prompted the emergence 
of language, however, advocates of the ostensive-inferential approach argue similarly to 
advocates of the code-model. The primary function of language is to make human 
communication more ‘expressively powerful’ (Scott-Phillips, 2014, p. 21). 
The [linguistic] codes provide a way for us to say what we would otherwise have 
to show, and the consequence is that ostensive-inferential communication can be 
used far more precisely, and more expressively, than it otherwise would be (Scott-
Phillips, 2014, p. 17). 
[Linguistic utterances] can be as richly and subtly structured as the communicator 
wishes...The function of linguistic utterances, then, is - and has always been - to 
provide this highly precise and informative evidence of the communicator's 
intention. (Origgi and Sperber, 2000, p. 165) 
In chapter 1 I argue that discussions that concern the primary function of language need 
to work from the ostensive-inferential model of communication, and that language is 
something that brings more to human communication, rather than acting as a system of 
communication in and of itself. This move was inspired by the more complete picture of 
the ‘cultural creature’ approach to human evolution (see 1.2.2). This, however, prompts 
a deeper investigation into the powers of human communication and language. Such an 
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analysis of human communication and language is not something that is often considered 
in other theories of language evolution, but it will be the main focus of this chapter. This 
is something I start in 1.3 where I develop an understanding of what human 
communication is like with and without language.  
My thought is this: on the ostensive-inferential model, humans can communicate with a 
good level of precision and expression even in the absence of language. If we take the 
angle that language evolves to improve communicative expression and precision, we find 
that the rise of language does not bring anything new or special to human 
communication. It would just be more of the same powers. This goes against the usual 
consideration of evolutionary processes which tends to select for new strategies when 
there is a new problem or selection pressure needs them (see 2.1). Let me explain this 
more clearly by means of an example which exposes the difference between linguistic 
and non-linguistic communication. 
Non-linguistic communication is simply human communication without the use of words 
or sentences. Humans depend upon many other strategies to communicate which also 
include actions like showing, pointing, and pantomime. These are also assumed to be 
forms of ‘pre-linguistic communication’ and refer to the ways humans may have 
communicated before the emergence of words and language (Tomasello, 2008). I will, 
therefore, refer to these forms of communication simply as ‘pointing and panto’. This 
leaves open a large question regarding the emergence of symbol and word use, as well 
as language, but I will come to tackle these questions as we go through this chapter and 
the next.  
As I argued in 1.3, it is entirely possible for acts of pointing and panto to express 
information that is both expressive and precise. A brother, whilst looking towards his 
sister, nods in the direction of a hawk circling an area of ground in the distance. Through 
doing this he expresses his communicative intention, which is something like ‘that hawk 
has found some food, let us take this opportunity to also hunt in that area. We should 
fetch our gear and meet near that area to hunt’. His sister understands and leaves to 
collect her things with the intention of meeting him where he spotted the hawk. This nod 
points towards the brother’s communicative intention that contains this expressive and 
precise information. It is precise in that an exact plan is formulated, and expressive in that 
he can express his thoughts about how the present moment can bring about a desired 
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event in the future. This is transmitted through a mere nod because it is well placed and 
pointed to all the information required to express this thought. This information that 
readily exists in this context in the form their mutual-knowledge (that is the hunting 
habits they mutually share and use to survive), and the knowledge they share about hawk 
behaviour and from what exists in the immediate environment they find themselves in 
(that there is a hawk, that they are both currently near a hunting ground, and that they 
are both able-bodied and willing to hunt).  
This example shows it is possible to share information as precise as ‘a far-off region [that] 
is reached by taking the trail that is in front of the large tree’ or ‘that region has animals 
that you can eat or animals that can eat you’  (Pinker and Bloom, 1990, p. 724) without 
use of linguistic utterances as long as the relevant mutual-knowledge is in place and the 
immediate environment serves to establish this information. Either the speaker can point 
to things that bring the relevant information to mind, or—if time and space allow it—can 
even use pantomime to play their thoughts out. Although linguistic utterances may have 
the power to convey this information more quickly and more immediately than pointing 
and panto (I will discuss this power in more detail in 3.3), they do not necessarily bring 
new power to our communicative acts. Furthermore, linguistic utterances are also often 
bad at conveying clear and precise information! Often, linguistic utterances are very 
much vague and imprecise. 
The sister, for instance, could utter ‘remember to be quiet this time’ before she heads off 
to collect her hunting tools. Since the brother speaks the same language as his sister, he 
can grasp the literal meaning of the sentence, but it confuses him because he does not 
recall being loud in the past and is given no indication of how he is meant to be quiet (e.g. 
it is not clear if he should avoid speaking, being heavy footed, or the clicking of his tools). 
All he can grasp from his sister’s communicative act is to attend to his noisiness whilst 
they are hunting. This is likely all his sister needed to inform him, but the linguistic-
utterance is general and vague particularly when compared to what information was 
transmitted by the non-linguistic nod.  
‘Remember to be quiet’, however, does something that the nod cannot. The literal 
meaning behind this linguistic utterance allows the sister to point to and establish 
information that is inconspicuous, obscured, hidden, or simply not available in the 
context of the communicative act. The sister remembers that last time the heavy-
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footedness of her brother scared off the hawk before they could observe its hunting 
ground, but she also knows her brother is not aware of the mistake he made. Thus, this 
information is not part of the mutual-knowledge they share. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in the immediate environment she can point towards—nothing that could bring 
loudness or quietness to mind— to help express such a thought. Upon hearing the 
utterance, the brother is at least made aware of some information that was not available 
to him through any other means. The function of the utterance, ‘remember to be quiet’, 
then, is to hint towards some otherwise unavailable information. In other words, a 
linguistic utterance could establish something between the speakers that could not be 
established between them through pointing and panto alone. The utterance makes 
salient something that was otherwise inconspicuous in that context (I will come back to 
the point of salience in 3.2.1). 
One could argue that pantomime also has this power as one can refer to something that 
doesn’t exist in the current context by acting it out. For example, flapping the arms 
around and squawking may bring a chicken to mind, but I would argue that this still has a 
certain dependence on context as space and energy are required to perform such an 
action. Pointing and panto are acts which are iconic and non-arbitrary, which is quite 
different from the symbolic and arbitrary nature of word-use. The word ‘chicken’ can 
bring chickens to mind in a way which, in comparison, is very detached from context. I 
will come back to the difference between pantomime and word-use in section 3.3.  
Which concepts can be ‘brought into’ the current context that are otherwise missing 
obviously depends on concepts or meanings that are available in a language itself, but it 
remains a new paradigm that offers a whole new way for humans to communicate. My 
main claim, therefore, is that language emerges to provide a means to communicate 
about things that are not salient in the contexts of communicative discourses. The 
primary function is to allow humans to push the limits of pointing and pantomime, and 
ultimately afford a form of communication that allows us to share information that is not 
supported by our immediate environment or mutual-knowledge. Ultimately, this gives us 
the power to communicate in situations and contexts that are new or surprising to us 
rather than just sticking with what we know. I will discuss this latter point in more detail 
in chapter 4.   
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This power to establish inconspicuous information through linguistic utterances—
through language—is a power that I think we seriously need to consider when discussing 
its primary function and evolution. Pointing, pantomime, and linguistic utterances all do 
the same thing in that all ‘point towards’ a communicative intention. All can refer to 
things in the current environment or things that lie in mutual-knowledge, however, there 
will be times when the environment does not provide means to point towards the sort of 
information they desire to share. Only linguistic-utterances have the extra power to ‘bring 
in’ concepts or topics to the current context and make salient something that was not at 
all salient before. It is this power I argue that the FL is responding to, the reason why it 
emerged in the first place. In section 1.3 I argued that this is what the ‘formula’ of the 
sentence was good at doing, but to understand this point more fully I will first have to 
describe the theory of communication I adhere to in more detail (this is the goal of the 
next section, 3.2) and then return to the emergence of words and sentences after (see 
3.3). 
3.2 Human Communication 
3.2.1 The Relevance Theory 
By now we should see that understanding the communicative powers of language 
requires us to understand the communicative powers of ostensive-inferential 
communication. Currently, in the fields of linguistics and the cognitive sciences, relevance 
theory has provided a successful framework towards explaining human communication 
(Wilson and Sperber, 2004, 2012). Relevance theory expands on the Gricean insights 
regarding ‘speaker meaning’ or ‘communicative intention’ (Grice, 1957) that I introduced 
in 1.2.1, but also provides a wider theory of human communication in general. The central 
claim is this:  
According to the inferential model, a communicator provides evidence of her 
intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the 
basis of the evidence provided…The central claim of relevance theory is that the 
expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise enough, and 
predictable enough, to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning (Wilson 
and Sperber, 2004, pp. 607–8). 
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‘Relevance theory, like other broadly Gricean approaches to pragmatics, takes as its 
starting point three of Grice’s assumptions about verbal communication’ (Wilson, 2016, 
p. 2). I will clarify these three starting points as they support the underlying argument of 
this chapter and the overall approach to communication in this thesis. The first—as 
already discussed—‘is that a sentence meaning is a vehicle for conveying a speaker’s 
meaning, where a speaker’s meaning is an overtly expressed intention that is fulfilled by 
being recognised’ (ibid).The second touches upon a point made in 1.2.1 where I introduce 
the ideas of social conventions, and ‘is that a speaker’s meaning cannot be simply 
perceived or decoded, but has to be inferred from her behaviour, together with contextual 
information’ (ibid). This second point is important to discuss in some detail because it 
refers to the sort of thing that makes these communicative acts successful or 
unsuccessful. It means that all parties involved in a communicative act are aware of the 
same sort of behavioural and contextual information that count towards the 
communicative intention of the speaker. 
When a patron at a bar gestures towards his empty glass when he has the attention of 
the bartender, the patron is using both the gesture and the context of the bar to get his 
communicative intention across. He needs and believes that the bartender shares that 
same sort of knowledge about the context of the bar as he does. In other words, the 
communicative act depends upon them sharing the same sort of mutual-knowledge that 
a bar is the sort of establishment where people come to socialise and enjoy a drink 
(example based on Tomasello, 2008). This mutual-knowledge contains all sorts of 
interacting beliefs that play a role in the bartender’s ability to make sense of the patron’s 
gesture. This includes the rule that if someone wants a drink, they must go to the bar to 
order and carry the drinks back to their table, but if someone is sitting at the bar, they 
just need to let the bartender know when they are ready to order again. If these beliefs 
are assumed and maintained by all that part take in the pub experience, the gesture 
towards the glass will work. 
The point here is that it is not just the gesture that is used in evidence towards the 
communicative intention, but also the state of the immediate environment and much of 
the mutual-knowledge held and maintained by the patrons and bar staff.  Thus, any 
change in either gesture, environment, or mutual-knowledge can also change what one 
might infer from the communicative act. The very same gesture could be made in a 
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similar environment but towards the patron’s sponsor from Alcoholics Anonymous. This 
will imply an entirely different message because the sort of mutual-knowledge held 
between the patron and sponsor will be very different from the mutual-knowledge held 
between the patron and bartender. The patron and sponsor share mutual-knowledge 
with regards to the patron’s journey towards quitting drinking (which is unknown to a 
bartender), and the communicative intention will more likely highlight that the empty 
glass contains the only drink they will be having, or even, the last drink they will have 
ever. 
Ostensive-inferential communication, therefore, is an extremely complex process on 
which a successful inference depends upon on many interacting parts, all of which—if 
treated individually—will ultimately underdetermine the overall communicative 
intention. This means that any communicative act (linguistic or not) is highly ambiguous 
on its own and requires context to determine the communicative intention. Where 
systems of communication that are based on the code-model depend on all 
communicators owning a shared-code; systems based on the ostensive-inferential model 
depend on them owning mutual-knowledge and the ability to treat certain contexts in 
similar ways.   
This also highlights how and where instances of ostensive-inferential communication are 
unsuccessful—that is when communicators lack mutual-knowledge. This often happens 
when there is some sort of cross-cultural interaction. An individual who is used to table 
services in bars, for example, may mistakenly assume that table service is also part of the 
pub culture. From a table, they may catch the bartender’s eye and make the same gesture 
towards their empty glass. The bartender, being completely unaware that some cultures 
utilise table service will either be confused or interpret the gesture in a way that makes 
sense with their pub-culture (perhaps he will think patron wants to point out the glass is 
chipped and needs disposing of). The cause of miscommunication here is not just that 
the bar-tender and patron have a ‘variation in perspectives’ (Sayer, 2013, p. 744) on how 
service runs in pubs, but that they initially believed that they shared the same 
perspective. In other words, they assumed that they had mutual-knowledge, when in fact 
they did not. Thus, whether communicators share mutual-knowledge is a big determining 
factor in the success of ostensive-inferential communication.  
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 Since the decisive step in determining the intended meaning of a discourse is 
inferential, individual differences in executing this step are likely to develop 
different intended meanings of the same discourse, which increases the 
likelihood of misunderstanding (Sayer, 2013, p. 745). 
They cannot even begin to coordinate on content without assuming a vast 
amount of shared information or common ground—that is, mutual knowledge, 
mutual beliefs, and mutual assumptions’ (Clark and Brennan, 1991, p. 127). 
The risk around unsuccessful or failed communicative acts is something that should be 
taken into account in our discussion of the evolution of human communication because 
it is only those methods of communication that are successful which are selected for and 
are passed down into the next generation. Methods that fail in supporting successful 
communication are less likely to succeed and will certainly be filtered out as maladaptive 
traits.  When we consider that something as easy as a ‘variation in perspectives’ or a 
mismatch in mutual knowledge causes issues for successful communication one will be 
tempted to ask how it is that humans are able to utilise ostensive-inferential 
communication effectively at all. My response also highlights the sort of selection 
pressure impinged on humans—which concerns the communication of things that are 
not salient—that also prompts the emergence of the FL under my theory.  
This brings me to discuss the third starting point of Grice’s insight: ‘that in inferring a 
speaker’s meaning, the hearer is guided by the expectation that communicative behaviour 
should meet certain standards: for Grice, a cooperative principle and conversational 
maxims, and for relevance theorists, a presumption of optimal relevance’  (Wilson, 2016, 
p. 2). This implies that when faced with communicative acts humans are guided by 
heuristics or ‘principles’ of relevance and paths of least effort to make conclusions about 
what they mean. Relevance Theory applies such principles to both human 
communication and human cognition.  
This implies that when sharing information, a speaker must have an awareness of how 
their hearer’s inference processes will play out when interpreting their communicative 
act. Further, a hearer must have an awareness that a speaker chooses their 
communicative act in a way that will guide them towards the correct interpretation. 
Please note that I use ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ here to also refer to use of non-linguistic 
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communication (so a pointer or a pantomime is also a ‘speaker’ here)27.  The thought is 
that both speaker and hearer adhere to an inference process where ‘every utterance 
communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance’ (Wilson, 2016, p. 7), where 
an utterance is optimally relevant if and only if: 
a. It is at least relevant enough to be worth the addressee’s processing effort 
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences 
(Wilson, 2016, p. 7) 
In other words, upon seeing that someone wants to communicate, a hearer will assume 
that this act is somehow relevant to them and that it is relevant within the confines of a 
context which includes both the speaker’s and hearer’s awareness and relationship with 
the world. Here is an example. 
If a wife points out a flower they like to their husband, the husband will use the principle 
of optimal relevance to infer what this act means. They will assume that the effort of 
pointing means that their wife intends to communicate something that is relevant to 
them in the first place (reflecting a). The husband will also consider that, although they 
are a botanist who knows a lot about the flower, their wife has no interest in botany. 
Thus, his botanic knowledge is probably irrelevant in this act (reflecting b). In fact, the 
optimally relevant interpretation is likely obvious or salient at that moment, and the 
husband concludes it is to do with the fact that it is their anniversary and their wife would 
like some flowers to celebrate (also reflecting b).   
A challenge for relevance theory is stating what is actually relevant to or for humans 
within communicative discourses. This, however, can be helped by thinking about the 
cognitive principle of relevance. This is where ‘human cognition tends to be geared to the 
‘maximisation of relevance’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, sec. 2). This means that the 
human mind attends to those inputs and beliefs that are relevant in the contexts of 
certain decision-making processes. A relevant input is one that ‘yields a positive cognitive 
effect’, where ‘a positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile difference to the individual’s 
                                                        
27 The other option is to use the terms ‘signaller’ and ‘receiver’ but this tends to prompt one to 
think of the code model of communication, which we want to avoid here. 
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representation of the world – a true conclusion, for example’ (ibid). 28 This is highly 
dependent upon context and what is important to the individual, but I think this is the 
right way to think about human communication. It is an inferential process that is about 
yielding positive cognitive processes that are relevant within the context communication 
is taking place.  
These principles of relevance can help us make sense of how the process of ostensive-
inferential communication is successful most of the time for humans, and so also of an 
overall strategy that explains how humans are able to successfully cooperate and 
communicate most of the time. If speakers and hearers are always working towards 
optimal relevance, then this narrows down the number of possible interpretations a 
communicative act could mean. This makes it so ostensive-inferential communication 
functions as a good and useful system of communication. This is the background against 
which I understand human communication. It is also the ground on which language brings 
the further powers ‘to make relevant what is not salient’. I explain this in more detail in 
the next section. 
3.2.2 From Pointing and Panto to Language 
Now that we have a better grasp of human communication, and the problems and 
selection pressures that may surround it (3.1), I can return to my claim that the primary 
function of FL is to ‘make relevant what is not salient’. To describe and explore the 
evolution of language, however, requires more than just explaining the emergence of 
syntax—that is the fundamental structure that underpins sentences—but also the move 
from non-linguistic communication (pointing and panto), as well as the emergence of 
word-use that would have pre-existed syntax. 
In this section, I will propose a simple and linear story that explores this in three stages. 
That is that human communication (working on the ostensive-inferential model) starts 
with an ability for pointing and panto, which gave rise to word-use, which gave rise to 
language (that is word-use structured by syntax). The simplicity of this story is only meant 
as a model on which we can theorise and think about the powers and functions that 
                                                        
28 Continue quote: ‘False conclusions are not worth having. They are cognitive effects, but not 
positive ones’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, sec. 2) 
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explain why language emerged, and not meant to actually reflect the process of language 
evolution. This is something I will expand upon in chapters 4 and 5.  
This order of evolutionary stages (pointing and panto, words, then language) is not 
controversial as thinkers from both the cultural creature (Tomasello, 2003; Kirby, 2011; 
Everett, 2012) and linguistic creature (Bickerton, 1990; Jackendoff, 1999) views have 
argued language evolution proceeds in this way. The main topic of interest here, 
however, is the selective pressure that caused the jump between word-use and language, 
as it is this gap in which the emergence of language takes place. That is how we got from 
using the odd words like ‘chicken’ and ‘hold’ to using a system with an underlying 
structure that allow us to use sentences like ‘Hold this chicken whilst I check its wings’. 
However, to make sense of this jump it is also essential that we explore the jump between 
pointing and panto and word use; and the functions and selection pressures that also 
surround that.  
In this section, I aim to show that word-use has the power to make human 
communication faster and more efficient than to pointing and panto, but also that words 
have the capacity to bring a whole new power to human communication. They are able 
to ‘make relevant what is not salient’. This power introduces a whole new paradigm to 
human communication which also introduces new pressures and problems into the 
human environment. This is what I argue prompted the rise of syntax, and therefore 
language as we know it today. I will, therefore, start this section by introducing us to the 
wonderful world of words. 
3.3 Words in Communication 
3.3.1 The Wonderful World of Words 
What was human communication like before the appearance of words and language? In 
a time when humans may have only relied on actions like pointing and panto to indicate 
the sort of content that we would want to share with others? As I demonstrated with the 
example in 3.1, humans are able to share expressive and precise information with nothing 
more than a nod or a point. If one is wondering what made that odd sound, another can 
respond by pointing to the actual bird that made that sound. If someone keeps getting 
their fishing line tangled and needs help to get it untangled, someone else can show them 
how to do this, and further, demonstrate a better technique where tangling is less likely 
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to happen. All of this is the sort of communication that I assume humans are capable of 
engaging in prior to the emergence of words or language. 
Word-use, however, introduces a new set of powers to human communication that 
enhances or complements the powers of pointing and panto. If anything, it opens a whole 
new paradigm for sharing information because of an important shift from sharing 
information through iconic means to sharing it through symbolic means29. This is not the 
main topic of the thesis, as we are more interested in reasons for the emergence of syntax 
as opposed to words, but I will need to address this point in part. After all, it is the 
paradigm of word-use that I argue prompts the paradigm of language-use, so, before 
exploring the power and function of words, I will briefly explain what I understand words 
to be.  
What are words?  
In 1.3.2 I addressed this question from the point of view of language meaning. There I 
explored how and why words are meaningful; but how they hold, maintain or even change 
their meaning remains part of a huge philosophical debate which concerns the overall 
nature of the human mind. What I will attempt to do here, however, is give a sensible 
description of words and word-meaning that resonates with my arguments and can be 
carried out through the rest of this thesis. 
As I explored in 1.3, it is fairly uncontroversial to claim that words are a pairing between 
a sound and some meaning or ‘concept’. The sound ‘chicken’ denotes, refers, means, or 
brings out the concept of the domesticated bird that scratches around in the backyard. A 
central issue, however, regards how that sound became associated with that meaning.  
Advocates of the cultural creature view argue that words are a case of social expectations, 
whereas advocates of the linguistic creature view will tend to argue words are linked to 
concepts in a language of thought (or LOT).  
In my hybrid theory of language, I showed that I agreed with the latter approach in which 
meaning is somehow maintained and represented in the mind of the individual, but I also 
                                                        
29 Some would argue that it is this shift that is important for explaining the overall uniqueness of 
the human species, and thus focus on explaining the both the shift to mind-guessing and linguistic 
use (Deacon, 1998). 
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argued that meaning was created by social movements and expectations.  How the mind 
was able to maintain the meaning of words was also a question left open for debate, but 
I showed it could either be the work of an internal LOT which pre-exists language, or of a 
connectionist theory of mind which is formed and built alongside language—both 
approaches came with pros and cons with regards to the rest of my theory on language 
evolution and I will return to this discussion in 3.3.5 below. What is important to expose 
here, however, is the difference between pointing and panto, and word-use. 
As I mentioned above, pointing and panto is iconic and non-arbitrary in its nature. What 
this means is that the communicative act directly represents or is the meaning. The acts 
of pointing to a bird or flapping around like a chicken are acts that look like or sound like 
the very thing a speaker hopes to bring to mind. They stimulate the meaning in a very 
direct manner. Word-use, on the other hand, is symbolic and arbitrary in its nature, which 
means the word represents a meaning but does not in itself have to look like or directly 
stimulate what this meaning is. ‘Chicken’ does not look like or sound like a chicken in any 
way, but the sound has established an ‘indirect’ link to the bird that scratches around in 
the back yard. 
The essential difference between pointing and panto and word-use, therefore, lies in how 
the use of any such communicative act is connected with the meaning or concept. 
Pointing and panto tells a relatively simple and direct story, whereas word-use requires 
that some arbitrary link is set up between word and concept. This means pointing and 
panto is limited to communicating about things humans can point to, show, or play out; 
whereas word-use is limited to the pool of meanings a human group has agreed to 
connect certain words to.  
Powers of Words 
Now that we have a slightly better grasp of what words are, I am going to discuss some 
of the powers they have. This is not an exhaustive list, but it will reveal the sort of things 
words can do above and beyond the powers of pointing and panto. I will also point out 
that this list is about the power of words in general, and not of individual words (e.g. the 
word ‘chicken’ may have a specific power related to chickens and can be used differently 
in a variety of contexts—sometimes it may refer to the live animals, and sometimes to 
the meat).   
 105 
1. Word-use allows us to share information more quickly and with less energy than 
we could do with pointing and panto. Word-use means that we do not need to 
point or show anything, we can just speak it. For example, to convey something 
like I need you to hold the chicken, not the duck, whilst I check its wings is more 
efficient to say something like ‘chicken’ and/or ‘hold’ in the same communicative 
act rather than finding a chicken to point to, and/or pantomiming the act of 
holding. 
2. Word-use frees up the hands (with the obvious exception of sign language) so 
that humans can share-information whilst using their hands to perform other 
tasks. The use of speech also means that a speaker does not need to be visible to 
the hearer and vice versa which gives further freedom for other tasks during acts 
of communication.  
3. Word-use can quickly ascertain the meaning of communicative acts that turn out 
to be ambiguous. This is helpful, particularly where pointing and panto may only 
cause more problems. For example, if one person is trying to show or explain to 
another to only collect chicken eggs today when they are also surrounded by 
duck and geese eggs which should remain untouched, the utterance ‘chicken’ 
with an affirmative nod could help quickly get the message across without 
depending upon further pointing or pantomime.  
4. Word-use has the power to make relevant what is not salient in a current context 
(referring to the power of language I have introduced above). Meaning or 
concepts can be called upon in the absence of the actual meaning. In other 
words, words allow us to talk about chickens when there are no chickens around.  
5. Words allow it that interlocutors can communicate with less cumbersome 
mutual-knowledge. For example, for those who live in the same household 
where chickens live in the backyard, a gesture towards the backyard may be 
enough for them to bring the subject of chickens into a communicative act. Such 
a gesture, however, would only work with people who have the relevant 
knowledge. The word ‘chicken’ however can achieve this in the absence of this 
mutual-knowledge. This means that for the same sort of communicative act that 
involves chickens, interlocutors can swap out cumbersome mutual-knowledge 
about backyards and households for just an agreed word-meaning.  
6. Word-use allows humans to continue to communicate in situations where it is 
not possible for them to use pointing and panto (perhaps due to lack of space or 
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time), or where pointing and panto are insufficient for a clear communicative 
act. This power is particularly valuable in situations of surprise or danger where 
humans do not hold a lot of previous experience or mutual-knowledge because 
they have never been allowed to build it in the first place. They can, however, 
use words to bring to mind a concept that may help them point the hearer 
towards their communicative intention.  
What I have come to conclude from this analysis is that the first three powers indicate a 
primary function of words, whereas the last three indicate a secondary—but wonderfully 
new—power which will be the basis for the discussion concerning the emergence and 
primary function of syntax. 
The first three powers reflect powers that are also found in pointing and panto but 
perform those powers in a more efficient way and may well highlight the reasons why 
word-use emerged. Pointing and panto utilise the immediate environment to bring 
relevant concepts or meanings to a communicative act and use them in evidence towards 
a communicative intention. Since the receivers of this act assume the principle of optimal 
relevance, they will use this evidence to infer the communicative intention of the 
speaker. The more mutual-knowledge speakers and hearers share, the more expressive 
and precise this information can be. Word-use allows humans to do this but by merely 
uttering a word instead. This is potentially more efficient, and less time- and energy-
consuming than pointing and panto, it also means communication can take place 
alongside other activities.  
The thought here is that word-use was selected as a method of communication because 
it was more efficient than pointing and panto, or that it enhanced the powers that 
pointing and panto we already have. At the very least, the emergence of word-use may 
simply respond to an overarching selection pressure for methods that are more efficient 
or save time and energy (Dawkins, 2009; Dunbar, 2014). At the very most, the emergence 
of words is responding to a selection pressure to bring more richness and potential to 
human communication. Either way, we can imagine that the primary function of words is 
either to speed up communication, free up the hands for other activities, or clear up 
potential confusion caused by other acts of communication. 
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Word-use is also a case of cultural evolution, and not biological evolution. It’s a case of 
what one learns, rather than what one acquires through genetics30. This highlights that 
word-use is created through the means of social convention or from what one learns 
from the previous generation. To create or learn words in this way, however, depends 
upon situations where the referent, concept, or ‘meaning’ exists in the learning 
environment or at the moment the convention is created. The word ‘chicken’ could not 
be established amongst word-users if chickens could not also be pointed to or 
pantomimed at the moment the word-sound is learnt. If a group of speakers is going to 
agree to use the word-sound ‘chicken’ to refer to a chicken, then surely a chicken needs 
to be around. In the initial creation or learning of individual words, it is important that the 
given meaning is salient.  
The last three powers listed (4-6) however, take us beyond this restriction of salience and 
demonstrate what other things words can do once they are well established in the minds 
of the word-users. These powers cannot reflect the primary function of words because 
they are not related to how they were created (remember, form follows function), but 
they do reflect other powers that words are capable of (where function follows form). 
These powers, however, are new as they are not so easily reflected in the powers of 
pointing and panto. In fact, they appear to introduce something entirely new to the realm 
of human communication.  
Depending on which words exist for any given social group, they give their word-users 
access to a pool of word-meanings that they can call upon to do the job of bringing things 
to mind. These, like acts of pointing and panto, are used as evidence towards a speaker’s 
communicative intention; but unlike pointing and panto, these things do not need to exist 
in the immediate context. The pool of meanings is available as long as minds that share 
those word-meanings (in the link between word-meaning and word-sound) are also 
available, so it is entirely possible for words to bring to mind anything in this pool in any 
communicative context. 
                                                        
30 There is a question here that concerns whether or not there is an underlying system that 
supports the acquisition of words (and one that may well be part of FL), but what I mean to focus 
on here is that word-use is flexible in that different groups will choose different words, and in line 
with their cultural needs. ‘Chicken’ will be created and used if there are chickens to refer to. 
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This means that any member of a group that shares the pool of meanings can utilise the 
connected word-sounds to bring something to mind that does not exist in the immediate 
environment—the things that cannot be shown, pointed to, or pantomimed. When we 
consider the relevance theory of communication and the heuristic of optimal relevance 
this gives word-users the power to make relevant things that are not salient in the context 
of a communicative discourse. When a word like ‘chicken’ is uttered, a hearer will pick it 
up and recognise its meaning. A meaning as created by their social group but held in their 
mind as some sort of representation (see 1.3 for more). The hearer will then also apply 
the principle of optimal relevance to work out what the speaker is trying to say with that 
word used in evidence towards the speaker’s intention—this will also involve 
consideration of the immediate context and the mutual-knowledge they share.  What 
words can be utilised will depend on what is available in the ‘pool of meanings’—the 
meanings that a group has been able to link to certain words, but it also means words 
can be used as creatively as pointing and panto to get an intention across. 
Words, therefore, have a secondary function to make relevant something that is not 
salient and use it in evidence towards a communicative intention (4th power). It also 
means that humans can communicate without depending so much on mutual-knowledge 
or on the immediate environment they find themselves in which tends to be very 
important for the success of communicating through pointing and pantomime (5th 
power). Further, a shift from depending on communicating through pointing and panto 
to some dependence on word-use means that humans can communicate in situations 
where the immediate environment and mutual knowledge are less likely to support them 
(6th power). This also means they have more confidence to communicate and collaborate 
in situations that were risky or dangerous before, and ultimately push beyond the 
limitations of their previous communicative capacities (a point I will revisit in chapter 4). 
It is these secondary functions that I argue expose why words are so wonderful. It opens 
a whole new paradigm within human communication that brings about many things that 
simply were not possible with pointing and panto alone. This is the state of 
communication in the story of language evolution. Further, it is the limitations found in 
word-use alone that prompt and motivate the emergence and evolution of FL. I will 
explain this more fully in the next section.  
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3.3.2 The not so Wonderful World of Words 
No matter how useful new powers might be, the natural world will ensure it is met with 
limitations, not least because new powers often bring new paradigms which affect the 
environment and then also impact the selection pressures imposed on those creatures (I 
will go into this in more detail in chapter 4). It is likely, therefore, that further strategies 
need to be employed to ensure a power like the one word-use introduces continues to 
provide the function that was useful in the first place. What I mean by this can be 
demonstrated through an imagined example that considers the function and limitation of 
the roots of a plant.   
Plant roots have the power to search far and deep for life-sustaining water. When it 
secures a water source it will ensure the plants live longer, endure well, and reproduce. 
This is the ideal situation where the plant may no longer need to respond to selection 
pressures for its ongoing survival. This, however, is not often the case as plants, like all 
species, do not live in an ideal world. The plant roots may find a source deep in the ground 
but may lack the absorption power to carry water that far back up to the plant; or it may 
find the source in a fast-flowing river, but may not have the power to cope with the 
pressure from the flow. Thus, despite discovering a source of water, the plant is limited in 
its power to use it. In fact, the plant has potentially found itself in a counter-functional 
situation where to depend on these water sources could also guarantee its demise. Under 
such a circumstance, the plant roots have the power to find a water source but lack the 
power to feed and keep the plant alive. What this means, however, is that there is a 
selection pressure upon the plant to find a new strategy to make use of those water 
sources. The dilemma of the plant roots represents a case I envision with word-use and 
the power to ‘make relevant what is not salient’. 
 Word-use has the power to bring to mind those meanings held in the ‘pool of meanings’ 
created and shared by society. These words can be used to refer to things outside of the 
contexts in which they were created or learnt. This gives humans far more capability to 
share their thoughts than before. This is like the capability of the roots to find a water 
source. However, it is not possible for humans to communicate about everything they 
may find useful to communicate about in all possible contexts. This is like the limitation 
the roots meet when they cannot utilise a particular water source. This suggests, however, 
that there would be selection pressure on humans to find strategies or ways to further 
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enhance their system of communication and share information in any possible context. 
First, however, I should explain why this is not possible with words alone.  
Firstly, words are limited to representing those meanings that are realised through the 
interactions of a social group, and therefore also the sort of things found in their usual 
environment. It is not possible for someone to share a thought about chickens through 
word-use if the social group has never come into contact with chickens. Thus, if a group 
member were to come across a chicken and wants to share this experience with a group 
member, he will lack the tools to express his experience in any clear way.  Secondly, words 
alone are not very good at representing complex information or different activities. We 
do not experience a world of static things, but a world of activity, of things doing things 
to other things. If we want to communicate about this outside of the context in which 
they exist, then our communication system also needs to reflect this. Word-use alone 
may be capable of representing an object or thing, and even an action, but it is hard 
pressed to describe one thing doing some action to another thing.  
A potential response to the second problem is the creation of ‘holistic words’. This is the 
thought that any one word can represent a full action or piece of complex information. 
So, there would perhaps be a word for ‘hold the duck’, but also another word for ‘hold 
the chicken’ and another for ‘drop the duck’ and so on and so forth (this as opposed to 
separate words for duck, chicken, drop, and hold). With this, however, come cumbersome 
problems. Firstly, there would be far more words to create and learn than there would in 
the more segmented approach. This may become hugely difficult for memory and 
cognitive load, and becomes increasingly demanding with the introduction of each new 
word in a way that is not present in a more segmented approach. Secondly, it seems 
holistic words would be less ambiguous and therefore flexible in their use. It is hard to 
imagine that the word for ‘hold the duck’ could be used in as many different contexts as 
separate words for ‘hold’ and ‘duck’. This sort of approach seems to detract from the 
advantages that ostensive-inferential communication gives us and therefore is an unlikely 
solution to the problem of representing activities and complex information. 
If holistic word-use is off the table, then embracing a more segmented approach is the 
next logical step. That is simply to use more than one word to describe an activity or share 
complex information. This approach, however, is problematic for another reason. Where 
holistic-word-use prevents ambiguity and flexibility for word-use, multiple-word-use 
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comes with ambiguity that could make human communication counter-productive. In 
other words, the potential power to share more complex messages actually results in a 
power to make the system of communication less likely to be successful. I think Jackendoff 
explains this well:  
Concatenating more than two symbols multiplies the number of pragmatic 
possibilities. Much depends on the symbols in question. ‘Bread cheese beer’ might 
well express ‘I want bread, cheese, and beer’; ‘Bread cheese Fred’ is less obvious, 
‘Bread Fred cheese’ even less so…’Eat apple Fred’ and ‘eat Fred apple’ might be 
used to convey exactly the same message. In this particular case there would be 
no problem, because of the pragmatics of the words involved. But in ‘hit Fred 
tree’, did Fred hit the tree or did the tree hit Fred? Though the larger context 
might tell us, the pragmatics of the words alone don’t tell us (Jackendoff, 1999, p. 
275). 
The problem here is not the words and their connected meanings but the different 
communicative intentions a hearer could think an utterance points to, just in virtue of 
more than word being used. If speakers cannot get their hearers to easily come to the 
correct interpretation of their communicative act, then there is a problem. Humans, 
therefore, must opt for using multiple words only when they are sure that their hearers 
will correctly interpret their intentions associated with those words. They must be sure 
that ‘Bill hit Bob’ will not accidentally be interpreted as Bill hitting Bob when they are 
trying to explain that Fred hit Bill. 
I should note that this is not an obvious issue when something in the immediate 
environment is there to help disambiguate the utterance, or, in Jackendoff’s words, to 
reduce the number of ‘pragmatic possibilities’. Understanding that the utterance means 
that Bill hit Bob can be helped by context. For example, in the presence of Bill hitting Bob, 
or in talking with those who have the mutual-knowledge about Bill’s anger and tendency 
to hit things. In these scenarios, multiple-words continue to sustain the powers of word-
use. It does not, however, help in situations where humans want to share such 
information but the immediate environment or mutual-knowledge does nothing for 
reducing the pragmatic possibilities. 
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It is here that multiple word-use meets a limitation. If ‘Bill hit Bob’ is uttered in a context 
without Bill, Bob, or mutual-knowledge about Bill’s anger, then the utterance will either 
be misunderstood or ambiguous to the hearer.  It is in these scenarios that multiple word-
use is an unreliable form of communication that humans are more likely to opt out of 
using despite the power that words have to refer to things out of context. This reflects 
the trouble the plant roots have with being unable to obtain water, despite a power to 
find and access the water source. 
The interpretation of multiple-words, therefore, remains heavily dependent on current 
context (in the form of the immediate environment and mutual knowledge). As with the 
plant roots, it would be extremely beneficial if word-use could get around this limitation 
and find a way to make further use of this power ‘to make relevant what is not salient’. It 
is the very existence of such a power that introduces the selection pressure to make 
further use of it and do so to the fullest capacity. The process of evolution and natural 
selection, therefore, will certainly motivate and support the discovery of a new strategy 
that will fortify such a move. Thus, the rise of wonderful syntax. 
3.4 Syntax in Communication 
3.4.1 The Wonderful World of Syntax 
My main point, so far, has been that word-use introduced the power to make relevant 
what is not salient in the current context of a communicative act. This brings whole new 
powers to human communication (see 4-6 in 3.3.1), but it also comes with limitations. 
Limitations, I argue, that introduce a selection pressure to relieve them.  Above I show 
where word-use is badly equipped for a speaker to explain activity or complex 
information to a hearer. Unless the context the utterance is spoken in contains the sort 
of thing that will help fill in the gaps, it risks coming across as ambiguous and confusing 
to the hearer (for example: did Bill hit Bob, or did Bob hit Bill). Yet, if humans did have the 
ability to do this—that is the ability to share complex information in situations where such 
information is not salient—then this would further enhance their communicative 
capacities. 
This reflects the story of the plant roots I introduced above. The equivalent to finding a 
new strategy for word-use is also the equivalent to the roots findingh a new way to absorb 
water. In the natural world, this can only be done through the process of natural 
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selection—that is,  the process of variation and selection (see 2.1 for more). The day the 
plant produces an offspring with a genetic variation that has the power to better handle 
water absorption is also the day the roots start resolving the limitation that prevented it 
from securing the abundant water source deep in the ground. Likewise, in the story of 
word-use, some change or new strategy needs to be introduced that will allow a 
community of word-users to speak and understand more complex utterances in contexts 
were relevant information is absent. 
The solution, the strategy we are already aware of because it is an essential part of natural 
language, is to bring some sort of order—a syntax—to multiple word-use.  The set of rules 
that underdetermine the syntax has a role in reducing the ambiguities of multiple word-
use and will ultimately provide a better system of communication over the use of 
structure-less ‘word salads’ I have been alluding to so far. Where word salads can only 
depend on the current context to help discern the correct interpretation of a speaker’s 
utterance, a syntax gives word-use a whole other means of discerning the correct 
interpretation of an utterance. I argue that the primary function of syntax is to provide a 
means of communication that does not depend solely on context and responds to this 
selection pressure to continue the good work that word-use seems to have started. 
Ultimately, therefore, the primary function of syntax is to make relevant that which is not 
salient within a communicative discourse. 
If we continue with the example that I introduced in the previous section, the 
introduction of syntax means that the utterances that involved the words ‘Bob’, ‘Bill’, and 
‘hit’ can have different meanings depending on the order in which the words are uttered. 
A syntax, after all, suggests that words are connected to one another in a larger 
framework, and do not just operate as stand-alone meanings. ‘Bill Bob hit’, ‘hit Bill Bob’, 
‘Bob hit Bill’, and ‘Bill Bob hit’ could all mean something different just by virtue of where 
one word turns up in comparison to another word.31  
As an example, we can return to what we already know about syntax and the structure 
of sentences that was introduced in 1.3. Here we learnt that all sentences are made up 
                                                        
31 In chapter 5 I will revisit the thought that syntax is not about word order, but about the 
distribution of words in a larger hierarchical structure. For now, at this early stage of language 
evolution I will remain talking about word orders.  
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of a subject and a predicate and that such a formula has power in helping to express 
activity or the description of something. If we take this as a rough framework to go by, 
we could suggest that the emergence of a ‘subject first’ rule helps to resolve the 
limitations of multiple-word-use. Under such a rule ‘Bill Bob hit’ would suggest that it was 
Bob who hit Bill. Where ‘Bob Bill hit’ suggests that Bob was the one who hit Bill. 
Here, the word ‘hit’ in these examples is somewhat ‘standalone’ from the ‘subject first 
rule’ because one can imagine situations where it could be uttered anywhere in the 
‘sentence’, but the hearer could still understand the speaker’s meaning. This, however, 
starts to run into problems when a speaker may be trying to describe that both Bill and 
Bob got hit, or they were both doing the hitting. To clear up these ambiguities a larger 
system and more rules would be required—one that involves a syntactical difference 
between ‘nouns’ and ‘verbs’ for example. As more rules are introduced, however, more 
rules will be required, but this is something I will come back to in section 4.3.1.  
My argument is that the process of natural selection will continually bring more and more 
order to word-use, slowly building them into the larger syntactical system we call natural 
language today. This is all motivated by the need for a speaker to bring to mind certain 
things for a hearer; or, more precisely, to make relevant, those more complex activities 
or sorts of information that cannot be brought to mind by any other means.  To further 
show why it is this power that motivates the evolution of language, I want to push how 
particularly useful this is in situations of surprise or danger. These are the sorts of 
situations that are incredibly important to human survival. Thus, the human groups that 
can successfully communicate here are more likely to survive, thrive, and reproduce—
and therefore have their communicative abilities passed down into future generations. 
In human life, there will be a number of situations where ambiguous communication 
should be avoided. If there is a chance that a hearer would misunderstand a speaker, or 
simply become confused then this could be detrimental to the whole situation. One such 
situation is that which involves some sort of coordinated hunt. If hunters are running 
through a wood in order to hunt a type of monkey for food and one hunter sees that his 
partner—whose focus is elsewhere—is close to a tree that a monkey has run up, he can 
shout something to the effect of ‘up the large elm tree behind you’. Such an utterance 
distinguishes one tree from the other nearby trees, and even indicates the monkey is up 
the tree, and not at the base of it. When this is successfully understood by the hearer 
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who is able to shoot the prey down it also contributes to a more successful hunt which 
also promotes the survival of the group. 
This success is dependent on syntax, and how the utterance was constructed to make 
relevant what was not salient to the hearer. This fact could not be pointed out to him by 
non-linguistic means, because if the speaker did try to just get the hearer’s attention and 
pointed towards the precise tree in this high pace situation (where the speaker may have 
also been running after another monkey) there is a high chance that this act would be 
too ambiguous to the hearer (as there are many trees in the direction the speaker was 
pointing). Further, if the speaker had used just words, they would probably have still 
failed to get the message across. The standalone words of ‘large’, ‘elm’, ‘behind’ may 
have been interpreted in a number of different ways: do they mean the large tree behind 
me or the large tree behind the elm tree; or do they mean the large elm tree behind me, 
or the tree behind the large elm? 
Syntax, therefore, gains the form it has because of this function to make relevant to 
hearers what is not salient in their immediate environment or their mutual-knowledge. 
It also reflects what is helpful for humans to share with one another to ensure their 
survival. The structure is built in a way that can handle bringing to mind the active world 
humans live in—that can explain how one object interacts with another; and structures 
that can pick out a thing in a complex world—that can pick out a thing amongst similar 
other things. If the human environment was different, however, then I would also argue 
that syntax would take on quite a different design.  In an alternative world, humans may 
have to think about a lot of things for their survival, but only need to communicate about 
a very narrow aspect of their experience—like how, where from and what predators are 
likely to show up and attack a group in the middle of the night. In this case, the syntax 
may only require a couple of rules to make these messages clear. Humans, however, are 
group-dependent creatures who will benefit from sharing many aspects of their 
experience, and not just which predators they will be attacked by. Thus, they need a 
syntax that can manage this.  
I argue that the shape of syntax has been carved in such a way that is useful for human 
communication. It does the job of ‘making relevant what is not salient’ by taking on a 
certain shape or formula that is good at helping humans talk about things that it is useful 
for them to talk about. I have argued that sentence structure is good for representing an 
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activity or for describing things, especially when those activities and things do not exist in 
the current context. This means that the shape of syntax is dependent upon and formed 
by the human environment, and not upon the shape of human thought. This final point, 
however, brings me back to the discussion I opened this chapter with. Those who argue 
that syntax does reflect human thought also argue that the primary function of language 
is to (clearly and precisely!) express human thought (Pinker, 1994; Jackendoff, 2002). I 
will use the final section of this chapter to explain why this should be seen as a secondary 
function of syntax.  
3.4.2 The Secondary Function of Syntax 
The view that the primary function of syntax is to better and more precisely express our 
thought, as opposed to making relevant what is not salient, deserves special mention and 
discussion. This view reflects a more traditional approach to human thought, 
communication, and natural language.  The sticky factor between this view and my view 
appears to be about what humans are communicating. What is it that they are giving 
more precision and expression to, or making relevant?  
In the more traditional way of thinking about it, syntax gives humans a way to more 
clearly and precisely express the thoughts they already have. ‘Bob hit Bill’ and ‘Up the 
elm tree behind you’ reflects the precision and shape of the thought that a speaker can 
have, and what they also want to ‘input’ to the mind of the hearer. In my view, syntax 
gives humans a way to communicate about things that are useful to communicate about 
in their environment. The structures that allow for sentences like ‘Bill hit Bob’ and ‘up the 
elm tree behind you’ reflects a reality often found in the environment and are utilised so 
a speaker can bring their hearer to certain conclusions when they cannot depend on 
other forms of communication. 
What is problematic for my approach is that it is not clear what might be going on with 
thought, and furthermore with sentence meaning. ‘Sentence’ here simply refers to an 
utterance which is underpinned by a syntax (and thus to any stage in the process of syntax 
evolution). In 1.3 and 3.3.1 I explained that word-meaning is created by a social group, 
but entrenched in the human mind as a representation that can be called upon during 
communicative discourse, but does this mean that a sentence in language is the same as 
a sentence in thought and vice versa? And how does this work on a picture where 
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linguistic communication is about ‘acting in evidence’ towards speaker intention, rather 
than the thought itself. I will use this section to clear up these confusions.  
3.4.2.1 No selection pressure for expressing thoughts  
First, I want to be clear why syntax was not designed for the clear expression of thoughts. 
This is because, as far as I understand the evolutionary process in the larger picture of 
human communication, there is no selection pressure for this in the first place. As I 
explained in 3.1 pre-linguistic human communication was already well-equipped for 
humans to share the thoughts they have. All they needed to do was use some 
communicative action to make relevant to their hearer what they wanted to share, and 
their mutual-knowledge would do the rest of the work. In this way, a speaker is able to 
‘input’ even their most complex thoughts into the head of a hearer through something 
as simple as a nod. Under this understanding there are no further selection pressures for 
a strategy to clearly and precisely express thoughts—humans were already very good at 
this.   
If a parent wanted to show their child how to fish, there is no better way to ‘input’ this 
complex information into their head than taking them out to the water edge with a fishing 
rod and showing them how to do it. This is better than trying to explain it indirectly by 
the campfire where the child cannot even observe the techniques the parent is talking 
about. Such an example exposes there is nothing extra which language brings to human 
communication in terms of expression and precision. In other words, if humans lived in 
the sort of environment where they could always use this direct kind of communication 
to share and express their thoughts, then I would argue that linguistic syntax would not 
emerge and evolve32. This is simply because there is no need and no selection pressure 
for it. 
This, however, is not the environment that humans live in. There will often be situations 
where humans simply cannot share their thoughts by pointing and panto alone. Those 
who argue that syntax exists to clearly express thoughts would have to argue that 
language is doing this in a fashion that pointing and panto cannot. Suggesting such a 
                                                        
32 I am open to the argument that word-use would emerge in this context, but words would have 
a different primary function – see 3.3.1. 
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selection pressure is perhaps not so problematic—it could be that the primary function 
of syntax is somehow similar to the primary function of words in that it makes human 
communication more efficient (see 3.3.1), but this would require an exploration of the 
relationship between language and thought. As I have mentioned before there are two 
ways to approach this factor about human language, and therefore two responses. 
3.4.2.2 Thought and Language  
In section 1.3 I explained that I understand that word-meaning is attached to a 
‘representation’ in the human mind, but that this could come in one of two forms. Either 
as a pattern in a neural network, as proposed by the connectionist theory of mind; or as 
a concept in a language of thought. I will show where the argument that the primary 
function of syntax is to clearly and more precisely express thought has problems with 
both of these views. 
First, the connectionist theory. There lies the question about what thoughts one is trying 
to express in the first place. Here, the forming of patterns in a neural network that is to 
become the representation for a word-meaning is wholly dependent upon the 
movements of society—this surely also becomes part of human thought. On this 
approach syntax (as underpinned by the FL), adapts to this architecture of mind and 
somehow ‘funnels’ the patterns that make up word-meanings into structures that form 
sentences. If this is the case for the human mind it would be extremely hard to argue that 
syntax evolved to better express human thought, because it is not at all clear here what 
thought there is to express. If the units of thought are dependent upon the movements 
of society, then there is a question of how we are able to form full thoughts (or thoughts 
that are made up of several units) without some deeper sort of structure. In fact, the 
evolved FL seems to be the thing that brings this structure, and therefore hugely impacts 
the way humans will also think. The power to clearly and precisely express thought does 
not make much sense as a primary function here, as there is yet to be much in the way 
of thought to clearly express. This seems to depend on language existing first. This power, 
however, could be a secondary function of language because as language builds thought 
it can subsequently also be used to express it. This power, however, cannot explain why 
language exists in the first place on this model of mind. 
On this view, one would claim that language comes before thought. This is quite a 
controversial claim to make, especially in the field of cognitive science where this 
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research on thought and syntax come from (Camp, 2009; Margolis and Laurence, 2019). 
The view of language evolution I have been establishing, however, may fit quite nicely 
with this claim. If syntax has evolved to make relevant what is not salient, or to reflect 
the state of the human environment then it looks like the human mind is evolving to 
becoming the sort of mind that helps ensure the survival of humans as socially designed 
animals, and not as standalone thinkers. Such a claim, however, needs far more research 
and unfortunately, goes outside the scope of this thesis. It would be worthwhile pointing 
out, however, that the idea is not original, and there is now a lot of research that looks 
into the idea that human thought is a reaction to the needs and selective pressure formed 
by human sociality (Haidt, 2013; Mercier and Sperber, 2017), I just suggest that natural 
language syntax might have something to add to this.  
This brings me to explore this point from the second way of understanding word-meaning 
and human thought: that a word-sound is linked to a representation or concept in a pre-
existing language of thought. On this view of mind, it makes far more sense to argue that 
the primary function of syntax is to clearly and precisely express thought because there 
are sophisticated thoughts to express! Syntax simply evolves to better reflect these 
thoughts, and with an angle towards communicating them rather than thinking them 
(Pinker, 1994; Jackendoff, 2002). My first response to this view, however, is to seriously 
question how and why the LOT came to gain the shape it did before natural language 
came onto the scene. This is bizarre because LOT must have its own syntax that is 
separate from that of natural language (Collins, 2004) but evolved for a different reason. 
This is a question that also takes us beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead, I will continue 
my criticism assuming a LOT is established before natural language33.  
My second response is to review how the ability to express one’s thoughts more clearly 
would have come about through the process of natural selection and gradual evolution. 
Unless the syntax of LOT and the syntax of natural language are simply the same thing, 
then evolutionary time is required to create the syntax—the FL—that dictates the 
structures of natural language. Apart from the creation of words, what is the first move? 
Surely, it is for a linguistic utterance to better reflect the thoughts of the speaker. It could 
                                                        
33 The ‘language of thought’ I have in mind here is the ‘semantic composition’ sort (Jackendoff, 
2002; Pinker, 2005), and not the ‘mad dog nativism’ sort of Jerry Fodor (Fodor, 1975) .  
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be that the ‘subject first’ rule does this well in this early stage, and thus is selected 
because it helps the speaker to express what he is thinking to the hearer. Subsequently, 
the subject first rule can also be used ‘to make relevant what is not salient’, but this will 
be a secondary function (it is a case of function following form and does not explain the 
selection of the subject first rule). 
The question that comes to my mind here, however, is: what if the subject-first rule ends 
up being the sort of rule that causes issues in communication? It may be that it comes 
across as ambiguous in some contexts, or often leads a hearer to an incorrect conclusion. 
My worry is that a rule naturally selected for the expression of thought in communication 
could also be detrimental for communication overall, but it could still be ‘functional’ 
because it clearly expresses a speaker’s thoughts in a communicative act. This seems 
wrong because it is more important for syntactical rules to be geared towards successful 
communication in the first place than towards the expression of thought.  
If we relate this argument back to my view (where syntax is selected on the basis of 
‘making relevant what is not salient’) and suggest that subject first rule is at risk of causing 
an issue in communication, then it is simply the case that the rule will not be selected. 
This is because it will fail in the job to make relevant what is not salient. My argument is 
not that syntax does or does not reflect or express human thought, but merely that there 
is a matter of priority when it comes to human communication and language. It is more 
important for human survival that we are able to communicate and cooperate at all, 
rather than worry over the content of what they are communicating about. It is, 
therefore, more important that language reflects and deals with the challenges of 
communicating in the external environment of human social life, rather than the 
challenges of expressing the internal environment of the human mind. ‘To make relevant 
what is not salient’ deals with communication in this manner because it interacts directly 
with human acts of communication overall, and not just with what is in the head. 
A counter to this argument is to point out, that no matter how you spin it, linguistic syntax 
is a source of ambiguity. Sentences, when inferred alone or out of context, often have 
multiple meanings and sometimes they are not much better within context. ‘The dog 
chased the cat with the fish’, for example, can either mean the dog was chasing a cat that 
had a fish, or that the dog was using a fish to chase the cat. This highlights that no matter 
one’s arguments with regards to the function of syntax, there is a need to explain the 
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existence of ambiguity in language. If it is a problem for the approach that language is 
about expressing thoughts, then it is also a problem for the approach that language is 
about making relevant what is not salient. My response to this, however, is to again 
realise that language evolves in interaction with a form of communication which is 
primarily contextual in nature, therefore, even though the syntax may evolve to help 
humans communicate in new contexts (by giving them the power to make relevant what 
is not salient), context and other pragmatic factors remain hugely important factors in 
understanding the meaning behind a linguistic utterance—so much so that they will 
disambiguate ambiguities caused by syntax. Therefore, syntax is built with this power to 
disambiguate pragmatically as part of the package. Unfortunately, I do not have the 
experimental means to go and test this in the real world, but if I could we could test this 
by picking out sentences that are ambiguous when they stand alone seeing how often 
they are ambiguous when actually used in context. I suspect we would find that language-
use is rarely ambiguous when in use (Piantadosi, Tily and Gibson, 2012). I also make a 
similar point to this in response to the ‘counterfunctionality problem’ in section 2.4. 
That being said, it is not to say that what is in the head or in LOT does not influence the 
design of natural language syntax. It is just that natural syntax is not doing the job of 
communication alone, there are many other factors at play (see 3.2.1, ‘The Relevance 
Theory’). This brings me to my third response, and that is to remind my reader about the 
bigger picture of human communication. If it is right to say that when communicating, an 
individual is attempting to ‘input’ their thought into the head of another, then this is not 
achieved by language alone, but by the ostensive-inferential nature of human 
communication overall. Language merely helps point towards the sort of thought the 
speaker wishes to ‘input’ in the hearer. On the understanding of language I have been 
trying to put forward this means that a sentence in natural language cannot directly 
represent a thought in LOT. Contextual aspects will always be required to fill in the gaps 
or make the thought complete. This is a direct challenge to the view that natural language 
syntax is selected to clearly and precise express thought, because, as it turns out, 
language cannot do this alone. Instead, I argue, natural language syntax only works to 
express thoughts in situations where forms of pre-linguistic communication (pointing and 
panto, and standalone words) fail to do so, which is subsequently the function of ‘making 
relevant what is not salient’. In this LOT-based approach to mind, I would argue natural 
language syntax is designed with the expression of LOT as part of the package (because 
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this will have something to do with what humans want to communicate), but it is certainly 
not the exclusive goal of it.  
Following these three responses I, therefore, argue that expressing our thoughts 
precisely and clearly is a secondary function of syntax. It does not explain why syntax has 
the form it does (for this also includes factoring the overall nature of human 
communication and the environment it is taking place in), but it is certainly something 
we can use it for. It is even possible for me to say things like ‘I think that...’, ‘I feel that....’ 
and ‘I believe that...’ and explain things in depths that may never be possible through 
other forms of communication. This power, however, is one that follows a pre-
established form and is, therefore, only possible because of the form, and not responsible 
for it. It is the power ‘to make relevant what is not salient’, however, that is responsible 
for the form of syntax, and therefore reflects the primary function of language. 
To conclude this chapter, I remind my reader that the main argument of this thesis is to 
show how linguistic syntax improves or enhances human communication This, however, 
required that I take a deeper look at human communication and the powers that 
language brings to it. I have argued that the power to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ 
is the primary function of language. Where word-use initiates a new paradigm for human 
communication, language enhances it by dealing with the limitations and risks. Here, I 
have given an argument as to why syntax emerges in the system of human 
communication. In the next chapter I intend to explore how syntax emerges. If we take 
seriously the insight that I have carved out here I can show how this primary function is 
implicated in the larger picture of human evolution.  
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Chapter 4 – Evolution 
4.1 Human Evolution 
4.1.1 The Stages of Language Evolution 
In chapter 3 I explored the primary function of language—that is why it emerged—and 
claimed that it was to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ in communicative discourse. In 
this chapter, I aim to explore how, following this claim, the emergence and evolution of 
language took place. As a point of terminology, the use of ‘language’ in this chapter will 
often refer to it as supported by the faculty of language or ‘FL’ as I describe it in chapters 
1 and 2. As I hope to have made clear in the previous chapter, language has evolved for 
communicative reasons, but this requires understanding both the nature of linguistic 
communication and the nature of human communication in general. This is because I 
argue that the emergence of language is motivated by a form of communication that pre-
exists language (that is human communication that works on an ostensive-inferential 
model – see 2.2.2). This story of language, then, is ultimately tied up in all the things that 
also made this more general form of communication possible. This is implicated in not 
just communicating thoughts and information, but also in human interaction and social 
life, which is also ultimately tied up in human culture. 
In chapter 1 I explained that humans are unique creatures not just because they use 
language, but also because they are ‘cultural creatures’ that rely heavily on cultural 
strategies for their survival. Cultural strategies that are devised and passed on through 
an ability to interact and understand one another due to an capability to see each other 
as intentional beings or to ‘mind-guess’ (see 2.3.2)—an ability that also underpins the 
basis of human communication. On this picture, the evolution of language is implicated 
in the evolution of human communication and interaction. The story of language 
evolution, therefore, is also the story of the ‘cultural creature’, and a story of human 
evolution in general.  
This chapter has the task of attempting to break down the events and processes that 
turned us from the non-cultural to the cultural; from the non-linguistic to the linguistic; 
the non-human to the human; and, ultimately, to the ‘hybrid creatures’ I argue we are in 
1.3. To explain how I envision this process I have provided a table which lists the 
important stages that took us through this evolutionary journey (see table 1). It highlights 
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the order in which these stages came and the selection pressures and processes I theorise 
that brought them about. I will go through the stages of the table in more detail 
throughout the course of this chapter.  
TABLE 1 - HUMAN EVOLUTION 
Stage Thing emerged Underlying 
Mechanism 
Selective Pressure 
1 Group living E.g. Tolerance of 
others 
E.g. Safety in numbers 
2 Mind-guessing Social cognitive 
mechanisms for group 
maintenance 
Social living and cheating 
detection 
3 Social Conventions and 
Culture 
Social cognition for 
cooperation   
Social Interaction 
4 Word-use (preceded by 
pointing and panto) 
Social 
interaction/social 
cognition 
Sharing information that is 
salient 
5 Language Faculty of Language Sharing information that is 
not salient  
A big message to take away from the stages presented in the table is that although I argue 
language is underpinned by the FL the process of humans becoming linguistic creatures 
ultimately depends upon them becoming cultural creatures first and that becoming 
linguistic creatures is part and parcel of becoming better cultural creatures.  
To give the full picture on language evolution I will tell the story of evolution in the fullest 
way possible. I will start by explaining how biological and cultural evolution are ultimately 
intertwined in a process known as ‘gene-cultural evolution’. This will involve revisiting 
natural selection and selection pressures in order to explain the more complex ‘co-
evolutionary’ processes found throughout the natural world, and especially in human 
evolution. I will then explore the evolution of group living and the challenges that 
accompany it. I will then explain how this made space for the evolution of communication 
and culture which ultimately paved the way for the evolution of language.  
4.1.2 Co-Evolution and Selection Pressures 
In chapter 2 I explained how it is that biological evolution, through a process of genetic 
variation and selection, produces all living things in the natural world. Biological traits 
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come about due to selection pressures that ‘select’ the phenotypes that are more prone 
to survive, thrive, and, most importantly, reproduce in whatever environment they 
happen to be born into. Certain forms are selected because they contribute toward these 
goals. Here, the function or power that is selected for is also the primary function of that 
form and a secondary function is any other functions that a form can carry out.  
What I did not discuss in much detail, however, was what can influence the processes of 
natural selection. That is, what elements in the environment can have an active role in 
the selection of the genetic variations of a phenotype.  As it turns out, this can be an 
extremely complicated story as it is entirely possible for cultural elements to influence 
the selection of genetic variations, and for biological elements to influence the process 
of the selection of cultural variations. Before I discuss this ‘gene-culture co-evolution’, 
however, it is worth briefly exploring co-evolution in general. ‘Co-evolution’ takes place 
when the evolutionary processes of one thing impacts or changes the environment of 
another thing. This impact affects the selection pressures that impact on the second thing 
and therefore also has an effect on the form that is naturally selected for. 
Species Co-Evolution 
The most obvious form of co-evolution is co-evolution of species where the form of one 
species exerts a selection pressure that affects the form of another and vice versa. The 
relationship between insects and flowering plants is often referenced, as the plant 
depends upon the insect for pollination and reproduction, and insects depend upon their 
flowers for food in the form of nectar (Darwin, 1859). Since plants are under a pressure 
to attract insects and insects are under a pressure to access the nectar made available by 
the flowers a change in one is sure to effect a change in the other. For example, a flower 
that is shallow is more likely to be selected because an insect can reach its nectar by just 
purchasing on it. On the other hand, a deeper flower exerts a selection pressure on the 
insect to find a way to reach the nectar, which is why we find insects with long tongues 
or noses (such as butterflies or the hummingbird hawkmoth). Species co-evolution is 
known for explaining such mutualistic relationships, but it also explains the more 
aggressive nature of the predator-prey relationship. As prey are naturally selected to 
escape their predators (as those who avoid escape are the ones that survive), so there is 
a selection pressure on the predator to up their game, and so on and so forth. 
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Niche Construction  
Where it is possible for a species to effect a pressure upon another species, it is also 
possible for a species to effect a pressure upon itself. Where the state of a flower can 
impact the environment and selection pressures of an insect, the state of a creature’s 
own state or behaviour can also have an impact on its own environment and selection 
pressures. The beaver, or any other creature which creates its own home, provides a 
good example of this. Beavers build dams of mud and wood to slow down the flow of 
water and provide a safe nest for their young, but this ability is the product of natural 
selection and must have only come about due to a selection pressure for dam building. 
This form of ‘co-evolution’ is known as ‘niche construction’ and is where the behaviours 
and activities of a creature enact changes on the very environment in which natural 
selection will take place. 
It is unrealistic to suggest that the dam building behaviour of the beaver (which I will 
assume is entirely innate) was the result of a single genetic mutation. It is far more likely 
it came about through several genetic variances over the course of many generations, as 
shaped by the process of natural selection (see 2.1.4 for more on gradual change). 
However, for something like this to happen the selection pressure for dam building had 
to be in place. In other words, the beaver and its future generations were far more likely 
to survive, thrive, and reproduce in this environment if they could build dams. This 
implies, however, that some basis of dam building existed first (perhaps as a disposition 
for just manipulating mud and wood)34. In other words, without an initial disposition for 
manipulating mud and wood, there would be no selection pressure for dam-building. 
What this tells us is that it is the beaver’s own behaviour and interaction with its 
environment—which is part of its genetic makeup—that caused the selection pressure 
for dam building.  
The selection pressure determined by the beavers environment is determined by the 
beaver’s behaviour, which is determined by the beaver’s genetic makeup. Therefore, the 
                                                        
34 How dam building came about in the first place – e.g. the first genetic variation for manipulating 
mud and wood – is not a question I am concerned about here. However, I would remind my 
reader that the initial emergence of some behaviour or trait is down to a random genetic variation 
that has yet to go through a selection process, and therefore has yet to gain a primary function 
(see 2.2). In a sense, it does not need an explanatory story as long as it is possible for our genetic 
makeup and any variation of that makeup to make it so.  
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beaver, as a species, has a sort of co-evolutionary relationship with itself—between its 
interaction with the environment and its own biological evolution. Beavers and other 
such creatures, in a way, become masters of their own evolutionary destinies as they 
seem to create their own ‘niches’ within the larger environments in which they live. What 
I hope to have shown here is that natural selection is far more complex than the process 
I introduced in chapter 2, but also that understanding the basics of co-evolution will help 
us understand the process of human evolution, which (for my theory at least) includes 
language evolution. 
Gene-Culture Co-Evolution 
With these evolutionary processes in mind, I can introduce the process of gene-culture 
co-evolution. I will start by recognising a huge difference between a beaver home and a 
human home. The beaver’s dam only improves at the rate in which the beaver’s biology 
changes, but a human’s home can improve at the rate in which culture—that is what is 
learnt from others—can change. Cultural change and accumulation happen at a far 
quicker rate than biological change. Human behaviour can, therefore, change more 
rapidly and respond more quickly to problems in the environment than to other animals 
who only have their genetic inheritance as their means of meeting selection pressures35.  
The theory of gene-culture co-evolution appreciates a unique relationship between these 
two types of inheritance that humans can depend on: that which we gain from our 
genetic heritage, and that which we gain from our cultural heritage.  
Like the beaver’s dam, that which is culturally inherited has an impact on the state of the 
environment in which humans find themselves. This could involve anything from hunting 
strategies to farming methods. Since this has an impact on the environment, it also has 
an impact on the selection pressures within that environment; which changes and 
impacts on the selection pressures imposed on human biology. In other words, human 
culture has a role in the natural selection of human biology. Evidence shows this 
evolutionary process has had an impact on the human phenotype as it can explain some 
of the genetic differences found throughout different cultures, and the rate at which 
genetic change has taken place through the history of the human phenotype. 
                                                        
35 See 2.3.1 for learning abilities in other animals, and the differences between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ 
culture that explain why only humans are subject to cultural evolution. 
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The cultural choice of farming method, for example, can influence biological evolution. 
The human groups that came to depend on dairy farming for food, for example, have 
adapted for better lactose absorption than those cultures that did not. Human groups 
that came to depend on farming practices that introduced more still water in their 
environment, and therefore more mosquitos, have adapted to be more resistant to 
malaria. These changes happen because those phenotypes that had genetic mutations 
that dealt better with these farming methods were more likely to resist disease and 
intolerance problems and therefore more likely to survive, thrive and pass on their genes 
than those that did not (Durham, 1991; Laland, 2008).  
Furthermore, it seems in recent evolutionary history humans have gone through a more 
rapid biological change than what would normally be expected:  
Homo sapiens have undoubtedly undergone strong recent selection for many 
different phenotypes…Given that most of these selective events likely occurred 
in the last 10,000–40,000 years…it is tempting to speculate that gene–culture 
interactions directly or indirectly shaped our genomic architecture’  (Wang et al., 
2006, p. 140; italics from Laland, 2008, p. 3578). 
Our biology is adapting to rapid changes to our environment, which is not the case for 
other animals who lack culture.  
The human phenotype, therefore, is not only the product of both biological and cultural 
evolution but a product of a co-evolution between both processes. The protein for 
lactose-tolerance would have not been selected for if it weren’t for the innovation of 
dairy farming in the first place. Furthermore, this allows a sort of gene-culture 
accumulation that reflects the ratchet effect I explored in chapter 2.1.4. The greater 
dependence on the use of dairy or of still water in farming would allow further 
development and exploration of those farming methods, and this would not have been 
possible if it weren’t for the genetic change. It is therefore entirely possible for cultural 
innovation and genetic change to be deeply intertwined with one another. A change in 
one affects and inspires a change in another and so on and so forth. This is demonstrated 
in the diagram below (Laland, 2008, p. 3578): 
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FIGURE 8 - GENE-CULTURE CO-EVOLUTION 
 
This section should expose the potential outcomes of a co-evolutionary relationship 
between biology and culture that will help inform the upcoming discussions on the 
emergence of culture and language. 
4. 2 The Evolution of the Cultural Creature 
4.2.1 The Emergence of Group Living 
In 1.2.1 and 2.3 I go into detail about what a cultural creature is, here I intend to explain 
how humans evolved into one. In 1.2.1 I also briefly introduced the importance of group 
living. Under this view, understanding the dynamics and challenges that come with group 
living was key to also understanding the emergence and primary function of language 
and other cultural phenomena. It was pointed out that group living was a strategy that 
many of our ancestors and cousins also employed to ensure their survival in the 
environments they lived in. A popular theory is that coexisting in larger groups provided 
protection against predators, and better protection for the vulnerable young (Dunbar, 
2014). 
What is interesting about group living is that it requires some degree of cooperation 
between group members (Sterelny, 2012). This could be as simple as just tolerating the 
others being near you; to actively protecting or looking after the young of others (e.g. 
redwing blackbirds); to sharing workloads in the form of hunting or childcare (e.g. Wolves 
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and African hunting dogs). The challenge that lies at the centre of every group living 
situation is the ‘freeloading problem’ which I have already explored in 2.2.2 as a problem 
for a communicative account of FL (to which there is a response in 2.4.1).  
As a reminder, the freeloading problem is that, unless certain conditions are met, a group 
of sharers is readily invaded and predominated by cheaters. In other words, if any one 
member of a group is willing to invade space, not care for the young of others, or not 
take on any of the workload, then that one individual risks destroying the ‘agreements’ 
that maintain group living (Dawkins and Krebs, 1978). Group living, however, is common 
enough in our world to show that many animals have managed to get around this 
problem and demonstrates that various forms of cooperation are indeed ESS (an 
evolutionary stable strategy). For this to be the case there is either a very secure balance 
within the group living situation; the pay-off for any freeloading is not worth it; or the 
payoff for freeloading is not costly enough to completely unbalance the status quo put in 
place by cooperation.   
This discussion is particularly important and interesting in exploring group living in 
humans as, apart from language, human group living may also be another anomaly in the 
animal kingdom (see 1.21). Our group dependencies and ties far overshadow the ties 
found in other social creatures that do not even come close to matching this apparently 
altruistic nature. Humans are willing to trust both kin and non-kin and will also go to great 
lengths to protect the old and injured. Such group living is unique in humans and so it 
shares a feature with language.  In a paper that compares human cooperation with that 
of our closest cousins, the chimps, Tomasello aptly points out:  
In general, it is almost unimaginable that two chimpanzees might spontaneously 
do something as simple as carry something together or help each other make a 
tool, that is, do something with a commitment to do it together and to help each 
other with their role if needed (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 685).  
Why humans evolved to become so vastly different to chimpanzees in their approach to 
group interactions remains a matter of debate that I will not visit in detail, but a general 
review of the literature shows two possible reasons for this. Human evolution either 
found itself in a game of ‘tit for tat’ (Trivers, 1971) or we evolved to become especially 
friendly (Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2014). I will explore both options here but 
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ultimately adhere to the ‘tit for tat’ view, that I will use to springboard into the further 
discussion of the later stages of language evolution.  
What seems essential for the development of these cooperative relationships is a 
‘reciprocal altruism’ or ‘tit for tat’ situation where the act of helping another at the cost 
of their own resources evolves because it is beneficial to do so (Trivers, 1971). It is, 
however, in the expectation that the one helped will respond in kind. The creature that 
tolerates the space of another does so as long as other creatures will tolerate their space 
also—as a result the risk of sharing space with another is overall beneficial because they 
are less likely to be attacked by a predator. The expectation is managed by strategical 
decision-making as modelled by game theory and often demonstrated by the prisoner 
‘sdilemma (Maynard Smith, 1982). This means that to cheat in this situation will be at a 
disadvantage to the cheater, as well as the one cheated. If one creature decides that they 
will invade the space of another, or not protect another’s offspring, then they will 
ultimately lose out on those benefits to others as well. The environment in which these 
cooperative or co-dependent ties emerge will also be the environment in which going it 
alone is risky. Therefore, it is not worth breaking these rules.  
On the other hand, Tomasello argues that human cooperation is down to a want or 
motivation to help each other that is the important factor in the human ability to interact: 
[A]lthough apes know that others have goals and perceptions, they have little 
desire to share them. They can interact with other triadically around objects, but 
they do not engage with others in shared endeavours with shared goals and 
experiences (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 685). 
In general, almost all thinkers who are interested in human and animal interaction argue 
that social cognition and mind-guessing is essential for explaining the underlying nature 
of human cooperation (see 2.3.2). Tomasello’s thought, however, is that just 
understanding that the other has a mind is not enough to fully explain human behaviour.  
It is not a lack of social cognition that prevents chimps from helping each other36, but a 
Machiavellian attitude toward group living. In other words, the reason why humans can 
                                                        
36 Note that several studies demonstrate the social cognitive abilities of chimps are on par with 
that of humans (Tomasello et al., 2005). 
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cooperate at the degree they do and chimps do not, is because human nature is just 
nicer, friendlier, or more trusting than chimp nature. They have the power to manipulate 
others toward certain goals, but they are also willing to help others achieve their own 
goals too. From an ESS viewpoint some human behaviours seem problematic because of 
a willingness to sacrifice their time, energy, and even life for the benefit of another. This 
flies in the face of the freeloading problem, and so an exceptional evolutionary story 
about human altruism may be necessary to describe human behaviour (Dunbar, 2014; 
Tomasello, 2014). Unfortunately, however, I do not have the space or time to explore this 
potential aspect of human nature with the detail it deserves. 
Although the discussion concerning altruism is important for the overall question 
regarding the evolution of humankind and therefore will intersect with the question of 
language evolution, we can approach the debate in a way with a basic assumption that 
allows us to put it to one side. What is important at this point is to simply show that 
human interaction has a way to manage freeloading and cheating—and therefore 
maintain an ESS—even when they are sharing cheap and potentially false information 
with one another through language-use.  
For this, we can simply hold that humans are at least ‘mutualistic’ in their behaviour and 
interactions towards one another. Mutualism is ‘where [cooperative] activity is beneficial 
to all participants’ (Reboul, 2017, p. 169). Mutualism, after all, is the very definition of 
‘reciprocal altruism’ described where a beneficial and on-going agreement of ‘I will 
scratch your back if you scratch mine’ is enough to keep freeloaders at bay. The thought 
here is that a ‘tit for tat’ approach to group living, social interaction, and communication 
is also enough to explain how humans became ‘hybrid creatures’ that use language in 
communication without the freeloading problem getting in the way. In other words, 
language-use in communicative discourse is unlikely to be overrun by another more 
useful evolutionary strategy, or by a strategy where humans become the kind of creature 
who always use language to cheat. I also make a similar point in 1.3.1, 
and how and why this is the case will become clear as we go through this chapter. What 
is central to human group living, cooperation, and human communication, however, is 
the emergence of ‘social cognition’ (see 2.3.2 for a description of social cognition). Under 
my view of language evolution, it is the emergence of this internal mechanism that is the 
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real starting point of the story because it also leads to the emergence of human 
communication and culture. 
4.2.2 The Emergence of Social Cognition 
It is evident that social cognition is central to explaining the cooperative and social 
behaviour of humans, as well as their ability to use language in communication. Up until 
now, we have explored its role in both these behaviours (see chapter 1.2.1 for social 
interaction and 3.2.1 for language), but we have yet to consider its primary function (see 
chapter 2.1 for definition) and initial emergence. Following the discussion of group living, 
reciprocal altruism, and mutualism it should come as no surprise that this ability to ‘read 
or guess the minds of others’ reflects a selection pressure that would exist in an 
environment that must be shared with peers.  
Like everything else in language, communication, and human evolution, the evolution of 
social cognition is a complex story with its own field of research. What I give here is a 
simplified story with the goal of providing the essential stepping stones between the 
emergence of group living and the emergence of language—as represented by ‘stage 2’ 
on the table above. Here, I follow the insight from Sperber’s paper on ‘Metarepresention 
in an Evolutionary Perspective’  (2000)37. 
As a reminder, I introduced social cognition in section 2.3.2 and I explored the ‘levels of 
intentionality’ needed for the sort of social interaction that we observed in comic 5 (also 
copied here as figure 9). Cooperation or communication was only possible when Mike 
recognised that Jen was aware of his thoughts about her being aware of his thoughts—
this is ‘third-order intentionality’. In other words, Mike believes that Jen believes that he 
believed that x. Therefore, another way to think about social cognition is as the ability to 
represent representations and to represent representations of representations, or more 
simply to ‘metarepresent’ (Sperber, 2000). Here, ‘representation’ refers to something like 
a mental state like ‘I desire food’ or ‘I know where the best hunting ground is’.  To 
metarepresent is to have a mental state about your own mental states like in ‘I believe I 
                                                        
37 Dan Sperber is also a lead researcher in the development of relevance theory I introduced in 
chapter 3.2.1.  
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desire ice-cream’, or to have a mental state about another’s mental state like in ‘I believe 
that they desire food’.   
 
FIGURE 9 - COMIC 5 
Sperber’s claim is that metarepresentation evolved as a response to selective pressures 
caused by group living. The ability to metarepresent would help us better function in a 
world where our survival and wellbeing is often affected by other minds that have their 
own desires and intentions. The primary function of social cognition—the ability to 
metarepresent—is to help us deal with these risks.  
 The ability to interpret the behavior of intelligent conspecifics not just as bodily 
movement but as action guided by beliefs and desires gives one a much-enhanced 
predictive power. Predicting the behavior of others helps to protect oneself from 
them, to compete successfully with them, to exploit them, or to co-operate more 
profitably with them. A metarepresentational ability is a plausible adaptation 
quite independently of communication. (Sperber, 2000, p. 123). 
Social cognition is an adaption that helps the individual predict the behaviour of others 
because it is a good strategy to protect oneself. If a mother sees that her offspring is near 
a dominant male who is not behaving as he usually does she can predict that his intention 
might mean danger for her child—‘I believe that he believes something is wrong’—and 
therefore act to take the child to a safer place. This need to predict the behaviours of 
others, however, only explains the initial emergence of mind-guessing and gets us to 
‘second-order’ intentionality. To get to the essential ‘third-order intentionality’ needed 
for human communication we need further explanation. 
The ability to predict the mental statse of others has further power to manipulate others 
toward actions for one’s own benefit. An individual could exploit another by causing him 
to leave his food by fooling him into thinking they are danger—I believe that George 
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believes that he cannot win a fight for his food—and therefore get a free snack for just 
putting on a show of intimidation. This, however, is not an ESS that is likely to stick around 
as to be manipulated in this way is maladaptive for the victim. If it is possible for members 
of the group to be manipulated and cheated out of food, space, or energy then we have 
a freeloading problem that needs to be replaced with another, more stable, evolutionary 
strategy.  
What sort of strategy could one use to protect themselves from the dishonest behaviour 
of another? Well, it would help if they could read the manipulator’s attempt at 
manipulating their mind—I believe that Fred believes that I believe that I cannot win a 
fight for my food—and therefore detect and protect against potential manipulation. 
When Fred puts on the display of aggression George, who sees Fred is trying to 
manipulate him (this is third order intentionality because George can have thoughts 
about Fred’s thoughts about his thoughts, and not just about Fred’s thoughts), can now 
decide it is worth holding his ground as there might not be a fight. This response means 
Fred must give up his attempt at manipulation (that is give up his attempt at freeloading), 
and either spend his energy actually fighting George or find another food source.  
What we have here is a sort of co-evolutionary process that reflects a construction niche 
(see 4.1.2). The state of the human mind has an impact on the environment in the form 
of manipulating others, which also introduced a selection pressure to avoid manipulation. 
The response to the selection pressure was to select for phenotypes that could ‘up’ the 
mind-reading game to the next level, giving them the ability to detect and therefore avoid 
manipulation. The thought is that the powers of mindreading crossed with the risk of 
manipulation triggered a sort of feedback loop or co-evolution between manipulation 
and detection of manipulation. This brought about the emergence of social cognition that 
allowed for mindreading or metarepresentation at a third-level of intentionality.   
The advantage of third-level intentionality is that everyone can read everyone else’s mind 
trying to read their mind. What is important to recognise is that the process of natural 
selection will ensure all members of a group are equally good mind-guessers and 
maintain a status-quo whenever possible so that cheating remains difficult to achieve. If 
more levels of intentionality did evolve and manipulation was possible again, then natural 
selection would respond with the suitable manipulation detecting strategy on the next 
level of intentionality.  
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This evolution through the levels of intentionality of social cognition puts a group of mind-
guessers in an interesting situation. From the third-level of intentionality they will find it 
hard to manipulate each other for exploitive gain, however, there is a possibility they 
could manipulate each other for a mutualistic gain. For it is at the stage that that 
‘connection’ for communication or mutual-cooperation is also possible (as represented 
in figure 9). Sperber puts it this way:  
Moreover, a well-developed metarepresentational ability makes certain forms of 
communication possible quite independently from any code or language. 
Organisms with metarepresentational abilities live in a world where there are not 
only physical facts but also mental facts. An individual may form beliefs or desires 
by emulating those it attributes to another individual. An individual may want to 
modify the beliefs and desires of others. It may want others to become aware of 
its beliefs and desires and to emulate these (Sperber, 2000, p. 123). 
In other words, a manipulator could manipulate the mind of another, let’s say, by alerting 
it to a poisonous snake whilst in the forest. This ‘manipulation’ is advantageous to both 
minds because the manipulated avoids getting bitten, and the manipulator continues to 
have the protection of moving through a dangerous place as a pair (at least where 
travelling solo is more dangerous). If reciprocal altruism is maintained, then so is the 
possibility of this mutual form of manipulation—this is cooperation.  Notice also, that we 
are describing the beginnings of ostensive-inferential communication (see 3.2.1) because 
the act relies upon the manipulated inferring the intention or meaning of the manipulator 
and not just the meaning of the act itself. The manipulator points out the snake with the 
awareness that they share mutual-knowledge about it being poisonous. This brings us 
onto the next stepping stone and stage 3 in the evolution of language: the emergence of 
culture. 
4.2.3 The Emergence of Culture 
Social cognition gave humans the power to manipulate and detect manipulation in group 
situations, but it also opened the doors for humans to cooperate and communicate. 
Upholding these traits, however, would require the further overcoming of the freeloading 
problem. This time there is a challenge to maintaining reciprocal altruism in acts that 
involve group members working together in cooperative behaviour and not merely 
sharing the same space. If cooperation were to become an established part of group 
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living, humans had to somehow guarantee that everyone would willingly invest and 
benefit from such behaviour, and that freeloaders were not tempted to take advantage 
of the cooperative willingness of others.  
If we assume that social cognition is the very basis on which humans could start to create 
social conventions and knowledge transmission (see chapter 2.3), then I believe there is 
a clever story to tell that explains how we evolved from creatures who could use 
cooperation to the full-blown cultural creatures I introduce in 1.2.1 (this is stage 3 in the 
table above). There are, of course, other important cognitive mechanisms such as 
memory and learning that are also important for this story, but I will set these aside for 
the time being, and later I will also explain how I think the FL is also an important aspect. 
The point is that cooperation, as underpinned by social cognitive mechanisms, opened a 
door that had great potential to promote human survival, one that triggered a co-
evolutionary relationship between human cooperative behaviour, the human 
environment, and human biology that ultimately built a kind of construction niche that 
kick started the existence of what would become cultural heritage in humans.  
The basic thought is that human cooperation transformed the human environment in a 
way that changed the selection pressures that act upon the human phenotype. 
Cooperation between humans meant that it was possible for humans to share workloads 
in important tasks like hunting, gathering, and childcare. This also meant they could 
access more food than before, have more protection than before, ensure the survival of 
their children, and even have more time for other tasks. Since cooperative behaviour has 
such a positive impact on human survival then surely there would be a pressure to 
maintain it and even promote it. Evolutionary processes would simply select the children 
of the more cooperative humans because they were more likely to survive and reproduce 
than the children of humans who were less cooperative.  
Here is a more precise example of this effect. Humans who can cooperate—that is, mind-
guess at the third level of intentionality—can work out a mutual agreement and work 
together to collect berries. Whilst one reaches up to pull down the higher branches full 
of berries, another picks them. This is far better than picking berries alone because, first, 
they gain easy access to the berries on the higher branches which is a whole new resource 
of food; second, these berries are more nutritious than the ones on the lower branches 
as they get more sunlight; and third it is safer to roam the berry bushes in pairs. All that 
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is required to maintain this practice is the one who picks the berries shares their harvest 
with the one that helped them. This practice has an impact on the environment because 
it gives these humans access to larger and more nutritious food resource which will help 
this pair and their children survive, thrive, and reproduce. Thus, those phenotypes that 
are better equipped to maintain this practice—those who are perhaps more prone and 
open to mutual behaviour—are more likely to be selected and have more offspring.  
Overall, the introduction of cooperative behaviours into human behaviour results in the 
natural selection of those humans who, overall, are more willing to share activities for 
gathering food and protection, which can result in access to even more food which will, 
again, result in adaptation to further cooperation. This co-evolutionary relationship 
triggers a further and even greater benefit to humans as knowledge transmission of 
useful practices (cooperative or not) across and down generations also becomes 
essential. Social cognition is not only the basis of creating social conventions like berry-
picking, it is also the basis of passing down useful conventions to the next generation so 
they do not have to work it out for themselves. This is a starting point for cultural 
inheritance. This is the main lesson from Stereny’s recent book on human evolution: The 
Evolved Apprentice  (2012). 
In this book, Sterelny argues that this process creates strong selection pressures for 
humans to become good teachers and learners, to ensure that the children of the next 
generation can learn the tricks and strategies of the older and wiser generation before 
them. Many aspects of the mind are said to adapt as a response to an environment that 
changed due to social interaction (for example planning, material manipulation, and 
freeloading management), but it is the ability to teach and learn that is fundamental to 
explaining the rise of culture, and thus the great survival strategy for mankind. The 
advantage of knowledge transmission is that children do not have to reinvent the wheel 
and work out how to survive in their environment from scratch. They are prepared for 
survival in their early years as they learn from their parents and cultural environment. A 
further benefit is that this knowledge is not rigid like the innate knowledge of the beaver’s 
dam-building. This means that the knowledge that they learn is specialised to the 
environment they will grow up in, but it is also entirely possible for it to change. If it turns 
out that the berry bushes die out and the human group is forced to find a new food 
resource, such as digging for roots, the social behaviours around gathering will change, 
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and it is this new knowledge that is passed down to the next generation. Cultural 
knowledge is flexible knowledge, and therefore it is not restrictive when the environment 
goes through a change. This means that humans have the power to adapt quickly (or at 
least more quickly than their biological make up can) and still ensure their children are 
well equipped for survival.  
In fact, the point about adapting to a cultural change in the environment is also another 
factor in the feedback loop that concerns the rise of our cultural behaviour. Sterelny 
argues that human cognitive traits are also selected for their more ‘general’ approach to 
interacting with the environment. The dispositions to learn, teach, and interact with 
others do not provide any specific solutions to problems posed to humans, but give us 
the power to work it out as we go. Our ‘working it out’ culturally, rather than biologically 
also causes a rapid change to our environment, because culture is subject also to 
evolutionary processes and the gradual accumulation of improvements (see cultural 
evolution in 2.3.1 and the ratchet effect 2.1.4). Any cultural innovation has the potential 
to change the environment and thus change selection pressures in that environment. 
Since culture moves more quickly than biology humans can use cultural solutions to 
respond to the selection pressures which also has an impact in creating further selection 
pressure. Thus, humans can cause an environment to go through a rapid change even in 
the space of a lifetime. This reality further prompts the selection of these more general 
traits that support the creation of cultural innovation and transmission as this method of 
meeting selection pressures can ‘keep up’ with the rapidly changing environment.  
The rise of culture is also the rise of an adaptive feature, an evolutionary strategy that 
helps humans cope and manage not just in the environment they are born into, but many 
other possible environments they could be faced with. Social convention and cultural 
innovation also give humans a way of managing intergroup conflicts and cheating 
problems which can change and move with group size and dynamics—this provides 
further defences against the freeloading problem we were discussing above. They are 
also the foundation to word creation and word-use which emerge to further improve 
human communication (this is stage 4 on the table and something I discussed in more 
detail in chapter 3.3). What is left to explain is the emergence of full language and how I 
envision a domain-specific faculty (which goes against Sterelny’s view that it is all 
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‘general’), with the power ‘to make relevant what is not salient’, continues to support the 
rise of culture as an evolutionary strategy. 
4.3 The Evolution of the Linguistic Creature 
4.3.1 The Co-Evolution of Language and Culture 
By now my reader will understand how I envision evolutionary processes that got humans 
to stage 4 on the table I introduced above (keeping in mind I discuss the emergence of 
word-use in 3.3). What is left to do is knit together my understanding of the emergence 
and evolution of the FL with my understanding of its primary function that I introduced 
in section 3.4. What I hope to also demonstrate is that the primary function ‘to make 
relevant what is not salient’ is a part of the package that made the rise of culture so 
powerful and useful to human beings, and therefore is ultimately implicated in the same 
evolutionary process I introduced above. In this section, I will be turning to the process 
of gene-culture co-evolution (see 4.1.2) to explain this event, but first, it may be helpful 
to compare my approach to language to other evolutionary theories of the FL.  
Appreciating that there is a relationship between biological and cultural evolution is not 
unheard of in other theories about the evolution of the FL. There are views that will argue 
that culture holds has no impact on the shape that the FL was to become; like, for 
example, the Chomskian ‘non-functional’ approach (see.2.2.3). This is where one genetic 
mutation basically meant the emergence of language, and it is thought this mutation is 
selected because it was useful for general cognition, not communication (Berwick and 
Chomsky, 2017; Reboul, 2017). Others, however, argue that language and any biological 
mechanisms that underpin it would not have the form and shape it does today without 
the influence of culture.  
An example of such an approach becomes clear when we consider that culture makes 
human life a whole lot more complicated. The FL may have emerged to help better 
navigate an increasingly complex world of not just the physical and biological, but the 
psychological, social, and cultural brought on by group living (Mithen, 1999; Carruthers, 
2002; Spelke, 2003). Thus, it may be that the internal object was selected to help us deal 
with the mental landscape that social living and culture creates. On the flip side of this 
line of thinking, the FL would not emerge in non-cultural landscapes because the pressure 
for complex thinking would not be present. Here, we could say that language evolved to 
help one navigate a cultural world and that the function of it is a selfish one as it helps to 
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ensure the survival of the individual within the group, rather than as part of a group. This 
is where my approach to language evolution is different. The FL evolves, not for selfish 
reasons, but for mutualistic reasons.  
On my view, the FL evolves to aid an individual to cooperate or communicate with their 
ever-growing social landscape made up of other individuals. In chapter 3 I argued that 
the evolution of the FL is responding to a selection pressure to ‘make relevant what is not 
salient’ in communicative discourse. Where other cognitive mechanisms, such as social 
cognition and memory, may help establish such communicative connections in the first 
place, FL enhances the connection by making it more possible for humans to 
communicate more successfully in contexts where they lack their usual dependence on 
pointing and panto and mutual-knowledge. The point of the internal object is to support 
this connection to other humans, and not just cope better with a social landscape (as a 
cognitive function view may suggest).  This very evolutionary process, however, is 
implicated in a broader evolutionary process to make us better cultural creatures and, 
therefore, may be implicated in motivating the rise of culture in the first place.  
The function ‘to make relevant what is not salient’ could be described as a ‘narrow’ 
function in the sense that it works within the ‘broader’ function of communication and 
cooperation. Above, I explained that culture, overall, provides an excellent evolutionary 
strategy for humans. It allows humans to pass on tried and tested knowledge to the next 
generation; it is a sort of knowledge that can change and adapt quickly to the 
environment; and has its own evolutionary trajectory that is separate from biological 
evolution. The narrow function to ‘make relevant what is not salient’, however, could 
have an important role to play in this ‘broader primary function’. I think this becomes 
clear when we consider the rapid change that culture has caused to the human 
environment.  
As cultural accumulation and rapid change in the environment happens the pressure to 
‘make relevant what is not salient’ becomes more and more important as humans are 
more and more likely to find themselves in contexts where they will need a method like 
language for communication and pre-linguistic forms of communication become less 
helpful. The cultural evolution of the canoe, for example, will allow humans to access new 
and unexplored lands. The human phenotype that is better equipped for ‘making relevant 
what is not salient’ when they are sharing their thoughts in the exploration of these new 
lands are more likely to survive and thrive than those that do not. The cultural evolution 
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of practices and rules that promote social bonding may also allow groups to grow larger, 
but this also means humans are unlikely to know everyone who lives as part of their 
group. Again, the humans that are better equipped to communicate without full 
dependence on mutual-knowledge (that is, to communicate about things that are not 
salient at the moment!) are more likely to do well within the social environment, and 
therefore more likely to be selected. 
Furthermore, the power to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ is also good for knowledge 
transmission in and of itself. To have the power to explain to a child something they need 
to know when the relevant context is not available is hugely beneficial.  For example, it 
will always be better to teach a child how to fish through directly showing them how to 
do it because they will receive very direct instruction about how to perform a skill that 
will help them feed themselves and their families. It is also important to teach a child to 
avoid any dangers associated with this activity, which may not be something a teacher 
can communicate through showing, pointing, or pantomime. It may be that there is a 
certain type of fish that is poisonous to the touch, and it is safer that the child learns to 
avoid it. If, during their lesson, they do not come across the poisonous fish the teacher 
will need to explain this danger in its absence. Language gives the teacher the power to 
do this: ‘Do not touch the fish that are large and red’ or ‘Do not touch the fish that are 
smaller and faster than these fish’.  Language means that there is a way to make sure the 
child is aware of potential danger even before meeting it. At the very least this means if 
the child meets the poisonous fish during further instruction with their teacher, they will 
know not too go to near it, even when their experienced teacher has pulled it safely out 
of the water. At the very most it means if the child meets the poisonous fish whilst their 
teacher is not around, they will know to release the line or look for help. The latter 
scenario also has two advantages in that the child can fish alone safely, and that the 
teacher can leave the child to practice as they get on with other activities.  
To further support my argument that the narrow function (to make relevant what is not 
salient) is implicated and ultimately supports the broader function (to communicate, 
cooperate, and depend on culture) it is worth asking what human life might look like 
without the narrower function—without the emergence of the FL.  In other words, what 
would our cultural innovations look like with words alone? My thought is that we would 
be limited to successful communication only in situations where we can make relevant 
what is salient (unless, of course, words alone are satisfactory in certain acts). What this 
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implies is that it would be harder or a lot slower for us to push the boundaries of our 
current situation. Without sentences we would find it far harder to communicate and 
explore new lands; to share information with a member of the group we do not 
personally know; or to teach the next generation vital information we cannot directly 
show them. The FL aids communication in all of these situations as well ass the on-going 
advancement of cooperation, knowledge transmission and culture.  
To finish this section it is worth comparing my arguments to the view that language is a 
learnt phenomenon and that there is no FL (Sterelny, 2012; Tomasello, 2014). On this 
approach language is part of the set of things that are created by human interaction and 
knowledge transmission—it is a product of those things that make us cultural creatures. 
On my view, however, language is part of those things that underpin culture, and plays a 
fundamental role in creating culture—it is an integrated part of what makes us cultural 
creatures. With all of this in mind, I will now attempt to describe the process of language 
evolution in deeper detail.  
4.3.2 Co-Evolution of Words and The Faculty of Language 
I should have now set the stage in three major ways. First, I have given an argument for 
the primary function of language, which was ‘to make relevant what is not salient’ (this 
was the topic of chapter 3).  Second, I have sketched out the background on which 
language emerges. This was the task of section 4.2 which shows how social cognition and 
culture comes about in humans prior to language.  Third, I have introduced the concept 
of gene-culture co-evolution to explain how the FL emerged. What remains is to give a 
more exact description of how, following this, language evolved to become the entity we 
see it as today. What is most important to keep in mind is that both biological and cultural 
evolution play an essential role in explaining its emergence. Natural language syntax is 
ultimately the product of biological processes, but the process does not start until it is 
possible for humans to communicate, create conventions, and pass knowledge down to 
the next generation—in other words until human culture is established. On this story of 
language evolution, the FL is adapting in an environment where culture, and therefore 
cultural evolution, already exists. Biology and culture are, therefore, deeply intertwined 
in this dimension of human life.  
To help explain my story it will help to make use of the ratchet analogy that I introduced 
in section 2.1.4. The ratchet analogy helped to describe how the process of evolution 
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created complex traits through an ongoing accumulation of new innovations building 
upon old innovations. In 4.1.2 I also argued how this could be applied in gene-culture co-
evolution. In the progression up the ratchet—toward the resolution of a selection 
pressure—a latch has two ways in which it can release, progress, and latch at a higher 
degree. Either when a genetic mutation is selected and passed to the next generation 
(e.g. lactose tolerance), or when a cultural innovation is selected and learnt by the next 
generation (e.g. farming cows). What should be kept in mind, however, is that the most 
recent biological latching will always pre-determine the space of the cultural latching. The 
biological latching can always release and change a state of affairs, whereas cultural 
latching can only do this within the confines of biology. In other words, it is not possible 
to fully integrate dairy farming into the life of a human group if there is a general 
biological intolerance to dairy38. 
In the case of language evolution, the progression up a ratchet represents the 
evolutionary response to the selective pressure ‘to make relevant what is not salient’, 
and the latch on the ratchet represents where humans are with using this power in their 
communicative discourses. Any degrees below the current latch position represent the 
situations where communicative acts are clear and unambiguous when communicating 
about things that are inconspicuous. Any degrees above the latch represents situations 
where communicative acts are unclear and ambiguous about things that are 
inconspicuous. In other words, someone could easily communicate that a tiger—unseen 
by others—is approaching the group, but could not communicate from what angle and 
how soon that tiger may attack the group.  The latch represents both how we can utilise 
the power, but also where we are limited with it. In this section, I will argue that this 
process of releasing and latching the ratchet happens as a coordination between the 
cultural development of word-use and biological development of syntax until we get 
something that represents what we refer to as natural language today. I will demonstrate 
                                                        
38 This, of course, changes when cultural innovations, such as medicine and technology, 
can change biology before the natural processes of biological evolution can. This is 
demonstrated today through long life as allowed by our knowledge of health and disease. 
Here culture can predetermine the space in which biology goes. But this is not something 
that is happening at the time in evolution we are interested in (medicine is post-language 
emergence!).  
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this by suggesting a potential storyline for the evolution of language.  I would like to make 
clear here that this is not meant to suggest how language actually evolved as the process 
is obviously a lot more complex than this, but it is meant to demonstrate how both culture 
and biology are needed to spur the process along. A story that is more appreciative of 
the linguistic technicalities, however, is given in the next chapter (see 5.3.2). 
The discovery of words initiates the power to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ and is 
also representative of the first latch on the ratchet (see section 3.3.1).  The use of a word 
brings to mind a simple object or action (e.g. ‘chicken’ or ‘hold’), however, words are 
limited when it comes to sharing information that is more complex or represents some 
activity. This power lies beyond the current position of the latch on the ratchet. The 
solution, as discussed in 3.4.1, is to bring an agreed order to multiple-word-use. This, if 
done well, allows the latch to release and move further up the ratchet. Thus, once such a 
genetic mutation is available the process of natural selection will react to it. Let’s use the 
subject first rule as an example where a genetic variation predisposes a speaker to utter 
a subject before an object. The initial appearance of the subject-first rule is like the 
releasing of the latch as it offers a human group a strategy or tool to enhance their power 
of ‘making relevant what is not salient’. If we assume it has succeeded in filling this role it 
is selected for and becomes established in all word-users. This will represent a new latch 
at a higher degree on the ratchet. 
 This, however, is not like the case of the ‘long-necks’ I explored in 2.1.4. Here a genetic 
mutation was followed by further genetic mutations as the necks grew longer and longer 
in response to a selection pressure to reach the leafy food source high up the trees. With 
bringing order to word-use the next step for improvement is not so clear. This is where 
cultural innovations come in. The subject-first rule now gives the human group a new 
platform on which to explore their word-use. It may allow them to venture into situations 
they have not ventured before, and further dominate their environment. They could 
perhaps give clearer directional instructions or more specific hunting instructions in the 
absence of the whereabouts and details of a hunt. These new situations and altered 
environments will surely call for new words to be added to the group’s vocabulary. The 
exploration of the new environment and the successful creation of words counts as a 
further release and latch on the ratchet as it also enhances the power for humans to 
communicate information that is not salient.  
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What is likely to happen here, however, is that the human group are met with a new 
limitation. When there are no more words to be created, and the subject-first rule has 
carried them as far as it can go the pressure for a further strategy to enhance their ability 
‘to make relevant what is not salient’—for the latch to release—is back on. The new 
strategy that is (biologically) selected for could be a tendency to ‘categorise’ words into 
noun- and verb-like categories. Thus, when someone utters multiple-words there will be 
a tendency not only to assume that the subject is spoken first, but that if a verb is also 
uttered that it indicates how the subject was acting on the object—something that was 
not possible before. If this tendency to categorise is successful and remains clear it will 
be selected for and provide a new latching at a higher degree on the ratchet. The human 
group, once again, can explore this new power along with its likely impact on the 
environment. This will also spur the cultural creation of new words, but this time taking 
full advantage of noun and verb distinctions—these cultural innovations also count as a 
further release and latch on the ratchet. 
Once the tendency to categorise can no longer help humans expand upon and manipulate 
their environment, they will meet another limitation and further pressure to release the 
latch. Even though the introduction to speak in these nominal and verbal categories 
allows them to quite clearly explain an action, they cannot further elaborate on that 
action. They can explain ‘the dog chased the cat’, and all the possible versions on that 
formula. They, however, cannot do other potentially useful things like describe the white 
colour of the dog and nervous tendency of the cat. And so, the pressure to introduce 
more ‘rules’ continues until this is satisfied, or until genetic variations on the biological 
form can do no more. And, so the story continues in this fashion. 
 Thus, a cycle between a biological innovation on syntactic structure followed by a cultural 
overhaul on word-use within the new structure is followed by a further pressure to do it 
all over again. In this story, the biology is always adapting to what is invented by culture, 
and the culture makes full advantage of what is made possible by biology. When a genetic 
mutation or cultural invention does not enhance it is simply filtered out or overcome by 
a more useful mutation or invention. 
In conclusion, I hope to have described and demonstrated how I view not just the 
evolution of language, but the evolution of humans in general, and how our linguistic 
ability should be appreciated as part of the bigger picture and our being cultural 
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creatures. There is still one more large task to tackle and that is to make clear how the FL 
fits into and operates as part of the human mind. This is the goal of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – Mind 
5.1 Generative Grammar 
5.1.1 Grammar and Mind 
In this chapter, I intend to delve into the human mind and explore the ‘seat’ of language—
or, at least, the seat of natural language syntax. Understanding and theorising about the 
architecture of the human mind is important for any naturalistic theory of language as it 
is this internal environment that gives rise to the possibility of language in the first place. 
Advocates of the linguistic creature view (see 1.2.1) need to explain the mechanisms that 
underpin the structure of language; whereas advocates of the cultural creature view (see 
1.2.2) need to explain the domain-general learning mechanism that can pick out the 
structures of language from other structures in the external environment. It follows, 
therefore, that one’s theory of the structure and shape of language will reflect one’s 
theory of the human mind. Exploring the human mind, therefore, requires exploring the 
grammar of the world’s natural languages. As a reminder, the term ‘grammar’ often 
overlaps with the term ‘syntax’ because they both concern the overall structures of 
language. I use ‘grammar’ when referring to any general rules of language, and 
particularly what a speaker knows, and ‘syntax’ when referring to word distribution in a 
sentence (see chapter 1.1.1 for further explanation). 
There are a number of theories concerning the grammar of natural languages, but what 
I will introduce in this chapter is the most prominent version of ‘generative grammar’, a 
theory which is associated with the thought that our linguistic abilities are underpinned 
by the FL. This may seem the obvious ‘go-to’ for an advocate of the linguistic creature 
view, but even before considering how this describes the human mind it is worth pointing 
out that the theory is well established in the field of linguistics due to its success in 
describing and predicting the structures of many of the world’s languages.  
Generative grammar is dedicated to explaining this is and theorises that linguistic 
structure is not serial, but hierarchical. This means the grammars of language are not 
about one word following the next, but about one phrase nested in another phrase and 
so on and so forth. Sentences only appear one-dimensional when they are uttered, 
otherwise, they are two-dimensional phenomena with a far deeper structure to what we 
initially experience (see 5.1.3 for more detail).  There are other theories about grammar 
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that are important in the debate (such as construction grammar39, the ‘go-to theory’ of 
the cultural creature view), but I will not be addressing these in this thesis.  
The field of generative grammar—and of linguistic syntax in general—however, is a 
minefield40. The complexity of the details and range of debates over small and large 
technicalities are often confusing and infuriating. What I aim to present here is a 
simplified version of generative grammar which avoids getting tangled in this complexity 
and these issues. That is not to say that they do not have a place in this discussion as they 
certainly do. Without even the minor details on language being known and explored we 
lose out on valuable input about the very thing we are interested in. I keep things simple 
to ensure our focus is where it needs to be: on that larger question of language evolution 
and the primary function of the FL.  
I will show that even within this narrow field there are ongoing disagreements and 
tensions, particularly between the ‘minimalist program’ (or MP) and the more complex 
‘government and binding theory’ (or GB). The story of language evolution I have given in 
the thesis supports the latter view as the theory that captures the messy and ‘kluge’-like 
nature of the FL—which has emerged through a process of gradual and accumulative 
evolution. GB also directly reflects the idea that language has the power to ‘make relevant 
what is not salient’ as the FL reflects the sort of formula that was useful to enhancing 
human communication (see 1.3 and 3.4). 
The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore this linguistic background and 
explain why and how GB fits into my viewpoint of language and human evolution. I will 
also explain how and why I think the MP view is misguided when it comes to language 
evolution—despite their claims of going ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’—and give an 
account of the FL which fits with evolutionary theory. 
5.1.2 Beyond Explanatory Adequacy 
Generative grammar has a complicated history. It has been through a number of 
theoretical changes and phases as linguists have tried to offer a theory which is successful 
in describing all the world’s grammars as according to UG (see 1.2.1), but also has success 
                                                        
39 For construction grammar I reference the works of Goldberg (2006) and Tomasello (2003). 
40 Especially for someone (like me!) who is trained in philosophy and not in linguistics.  
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in explaining language acquisition and evolution. In order to understand this perspective 
on language evolution it would help if we also understand this history in linguistic theory. 
The story starts back in the 1950s at the beginning of the cognitive revolution and with 
Chomsky’s response to behaviourism (see 1.2.1). 
The initial goal for linguists was to find ‘descriptive adequacy’ in their theory of grammar. 
A descriptively adequate theory is one that: ‘provides a comprehensive description of the 
full range of structures found in a given language’ (Radford, 2016, p. 8). In the early days 
all that it seemed necessary to do was produce a list of ‘phrase structure rules’ (PS) which 
defined how the words of language were combined into phrases, and then also how those 
phrases combined with other words or phrases to make ever larger and more complex 
phrases and sentences  (Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010; Smith and Allott, 2016). Ultimately, 
they described the creative aspect of language—the capability to make infinite use of 
finite means (see 1.2.2)—because a phrase structure rule could describe how one phrase 
was embedded within another phrase, which was embedded in another phrase and so 
on and so forth. 
In 1.3 I introduced the fact that all sentences are made of a subject and predicate, but 
also mentioned that this formula is more complex as sentences come in many different 
forms (e.g. declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamative). In PS the formula is 
far more complex as sentences are built in many different ways. Here are two examples 
(example adapted from Carnie, 2013, pp. 82–6)41: 
• Language makes infinite use out of finite means 
This sentence contains a ‘noun phrase’ or NP (‘language’) and ‘verb phrase’ or VP (‘makes 
finite use out of finite means’).  
• Humboldt said that language makes infinite use out of finite means 
                                                        
41 Please note that I have purposefully blurred some facts about linguistic theory here for the sake 
of simplicity. The formations of sentences or ‘S’ that I have used here are better known as 
‘clauses’. ‘Clause’ is a linguistic term which is very close to the definition of a sentence and refers 
to a phrase that contains a subject and predicate. Unlike a sentence, which is usually treated as a 
complete unit in itself, clauses can contain (like in the example I have given) or appear alongside 
(with ‘conjunction words’ words like ‘and’ or ‘or’) other clauses. In linguistic theory, there is an 
important difference between clauses known as ‘tense phrases’ (TPs) and complementizer 
phrases (CPs) that I do not go into here, and lump both under the unit ‘S’.  
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This sentence (Humboldt said that x) contains another sentence (language makes infinite 
use out of finite means). The larger sentence or phrase is connected to the smaller 
sentence or phrase by means of the complementizer word (C ): ‘that’. 
Respectively the phrase structure rules for sentences can be formulated in this way: 
• SàNP VP 
• Sà C  S 
The capability to embed phrases within other phrases describes the creative aspect of 
language. If an S is contained within an S, then there is nothing preventing that S being 
contained within another S. Thus, we can continuously and infinitely build a sentence: 
• Chomsky said that Humboldt said that language makes infinite use out of finite 
means. 
• Pinker said that Chomsky said that Humboldt said that language makes infinite 
use out of finite means. 
• Annie said that Pinker said that Chomsky said that Humboldt said that language 
makes infinite use out of finite means. 
PS, however, was only the start of a long journey of describing the structure of human 
natural languages. It had many difficulties in its task of predicting which phrase structure 
rules should be used at which time. One such difficulty was its inability to predict which 
phrase structure rules should accompany the use of any one verb. For example, the use 
of a transitive verb like ‘paint’ or ‘hits’ is only grammatical when it is followed by an object 
(these are known as two-place-predicates). So ‘John paints the table’ or ‘Bob hits Bill’. 
Whereas intransitive verbs like ‘sleep’ or ‘stumble’ are ungrammatical if they are followed 
by an object. They can either stand alone or be followed by a prepositional phrase (PP). 
So, ‘John sleeps’ is grammatical, but ‘John sleeps the bed’ is not; and ‘John stumbles over 
the fence’ is grammatical, but ‘John stumbles the fence’ is not (these are known as ‘one-
place predicates’) (Smith and Allott, 2016, pp. 76–7). This leaves the formulation of these 
verb phrases as any one of these formula (simplified from Carnie, 2013, pp. 80–82): 
• VPà V NP 
• VPà V  
• VPà V PP 
 154 
Furthermore, PS not only requires a set of phrase structure rules that described how to 
build a sentence, but also ‘transformation rules’ that described how the formation of any 
one sentence transforms into another as with the example of ‘Wh-movement’ briefly 
introduced in 1.2.1 (Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010, p. 44; Carnie, 2013, pp. 290–1; Smith and 
Allott, 2016, pp. 68–9). Overall, the PS approach to try and explain every possible 
grammatical formation by means of a phrase structure rules was creating a lot of 
redundancy in the theory.  
This also meant that PS did not make much sense when it came to language acquisition. 
When children are acquiring their target language with the help of the FL this early theory 
seemed to suggest that this large list of phrase structure and transformational rules was 
somehow present in their head, with no clear guidance on when to use which rule with 
a verb, etc. PS also struggled to explain the nature of linguistic diversity because, as 
expected, not all languages adhered to the exact same list of rules. Overall, the theory 
failed to explain how language and the mind work, and so by the 1980’s linguists worked 
on a theory of generative grammar that had an ‘explanatory adequacy’: ‘which is to be 
attained by a theory that explains how language is acquired’ (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 
55).  
From this emerged the theory of Government and Binding’ (GB), which is often also 
known as ‘Principles and Parameters’ (P&P)42. GB reduced the redundancy by uncovering 
further generalisations that were still capable of explaining UG, and they also uncovered 
a tidy theory that explained the variety in languages (see ‘parameters’ below).  This is the 
theory I advocate in this thesis, and so I will come to explain this in far more detail in the 
section below (5.2.1). For now, it is enough to say that GB suggests the FL is not a list of 
rules but:  
…a number of autonomous systems (sometimes called ‘modules’), each of which 
is maximally simple, but whose interaction accurately characterizes our intuitions 
in all their complexity (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 79). 
                                                        
42 There is some tension about the use of the term ‘Government and Binding’ for this theory (this 
is because the precise technical concepts of ‘government’ and ‘binding’ may not be important or 
relevant for linguistic theory) and thus preference to stick to the term ‘principles and parameters’ 
instead (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 79). In this chapter, however, I use ‘principles and parameters’ 
to also explain aspects of the strong minimalist thesis, so prefer to keep these terms separate 
(similar to the approach in Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010).  
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Apparently complex phenomena were seen as the result of the interaction of 
simple modules (Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010, p. 44) 
‘Modules’ here means roughly the same thing as the concept I introduced in 1.2.1, except 
where I was indicating that the FL was a module, I am now indicating that the FL is a set 
of modules which interact with one another and are specific to the domain of language. 
There are seven postulated modules in GB theory, two of the most important being ‘X-
Bar theory’ and ‘a-move’. I will introduce these in more detail below (5.2.1), but it is 
worth mentioning here that a-move greatly simplified the need for transformational 
rules: 
…the transformational component of the grammar of a particular language was 
thought to be a long (partially) ordered list of very detailed transformations, some 
marked optional and others marked obligatory, specific to the language in 
question. In such a framework, explanatory adequacy is a very distant goal. The 
GB framework replaced these transformations with very general optional 
operations, Move α (displace any item anywhere)… (Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010, p. 
44) 
This move from PS to GB involved moving some of the ‘explanatory weight’ of grammar 
away from the internal mechanisms that bring the words or ‘lexical items’ together, and 
onto those words or lexical items. In particular, the lexical items which are categorised as 
verbs were assigned ‘theta-roles’ which determined if they were treated as one-, two- or 
three-place predicates and what sort of lexical items could occupy those places when 
processed by the internal machinery that created sentences. The verb ‘thought’, for 
example, is a one-place predicate that only needs one argument (like ‘stumble’) but that 
argument has to be of a certain ‘type’ in that it needs to be ‘animated’ or ‘minded’ thing. 
Thus, ‘the man thought’ sounds grammatical, but ‘the table thought’ does not (I will come 
back to this when I introduce theta-roles and another module known as ‘theta-theory’ in  
5.3.2).  This started a shift from an entirely ‘top-down’ explanation of grammar, to a partly 
‘bottom-up’ explanation (Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010; Smith and Allott, 2016).  
GB was largely successful in its efforts to explain the complexity and structures of natural 
languages, but in the 1990s there was a further push to minimise the theory of generative 
grammar (Chomsky, 1995). The thought was that GB conflicted with a sensible 
explanation of language evolution and that linguists should seek to give a theory of 
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grammar that was ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’: to ‘seek a level of explanation deeper 
than explanatory adequacy, asking not what the properties of language are, but why they 
are that way’ (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 55).  
The apparent trouble with both PS and GB was that these theories made it difficult to 
explain how and why, with that shape, the internal object came to be that way. No one 
could make sense of a large list of phrase structure rules evolving, and GB theory was 
accused of not making sense of the evolutionary steps that prompted the emergence of 
multiple modules: 
[T]he proliferation of modules… appeared to be a problem because it made it hard 
to see how the language faculty could have evolved. Each of the modules should 
have its own evolutionary history: they might all have arisen at different times 
and served different functions. But it is hard to see what each module could do in 
the absence of the others.’ (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 197) 
This prompted the rise of the ‘minimalist program’ (MP) which suggests simplifying and 
reducing the number of ‘descriptive devices’ needed to explain language. The general 
idea was to place even more of the ‘explanatory weight’ on the lexical items, to go with 
a theory that was more ‘bottom-up’, rather than ‘top-down’. This followed the thought 
that the fewer descriptive devices there were, the less complicated the FL would be, and 
therefore the more sensible the evolutionary account. What has emerged from this, 
however, is the rather extreme view known as the ‘strong minimalist thesis’ (SMT).  
SMT claims that language could be described not by several descriptive devices (like the 
seven modules of GB), but by a single descriptive device known as ‘merge’43 (Smith and 
Allott, 2016; Berwick and Chomsky, 2017).  
The advantage of this approach is that it made the evolutionary explanation of the FL far 
easier because only one descriptive device needs to be explained: 
If there was a single evolutionary step which took place at some point in human 
evolution which gave rise to language, it is unlikely to have been a step in which 
a whole range of different properties idiosyncratic to language were acquired at 
the same time. Rather it seems more likely that some genetic development gave 
                                                        
43 This has other terms or names to describe it. Such as ‘recursion’ (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 
2002) or ‘the basic property’ (Chomsky, 2015). 
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rise to one new type of operation which enabled humans to acquire language 
(Radford, 2016, p. 28). 
I will explain how merge and a fully ‘bottom-up’ approach to language work below (see 
5.2.2), but here I will point out two things. First, this act of minimising descriptive devices 
is the same as eliminating any need for phrase structure rules. Linguistic structure arises 
through that one simple operation ‘merge’ and the complexity and diversity is a matter 
of ‘third-factor’ constraints (see 2.2.3):  
The question which then arises is whether these are properties which are 
idiosyncratic to natural language, or whether they can be explained in other 
terms. Chomsky has argued that most (perhaps all) universal properties of 
languages are reducible either to interface conditions, or to more general 
properties of cognitive or natural systems (e.g. general principles of biology, or 
fundamental principles of the natural world such as computational efficiency) 
(Radford, 2016, p. 28). 
Second, this means that SMT also looks to eliminate transformational rules, and thus has 
a very different way of explaining how transformations take place. PS and GB rely on a 
two-stage approach to explaining transformations. First, the phrase structure rules are 
applied to the lexicon at a level known as ‘deep structure’. For PS theory, this was that 
large list of phrase structure rules; and for GB, it is the more generalised rule of X-bar 
theory (see 5.2.1). Second, the construction at this deep level then goes through 
‘transformation’ to reveal a construction at a level of ‘surface structure’. For PS theory 
this involves applying the transformation rules; and for GB, this involves applying a-move. 
It is this construction we use in linguistic discourse44. SMT, however, looks to have only 
one stage, and thus eliminates the need for an intermediary of ‘transformation’ between 
deep and surface structure. For SMT the equivalent ‘calculation’ for transformations is, 
                                                        
44 The theories, however, are more complex as GB theory goes on to claim that the 
construction at this ‘surface structure’ goes on for representation in a phonological form 
(or PF)—that which is externalized in speech—and a representation in logical form (LF)—
that which is represented in the conceptual system. For PS everything meaningful, 
including LF, happens in the construction built at deep structure, and the construction at 
the level of ‘surface structure’ (after transformation) only causes a change in what we 
externalise (roughly PF). 
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in fact, produced by the merge operation (described as a difference between ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ merge) and is something I will come back to below  (Lasnik and Lohndal, 
2010; Radford, 2016; Smith and Allott, 2016).  
This chapter is about GB and SMT and their respective approaches to the evolution of 
language. This is something I explored to some degree in chapter 2, but here I aim to 
tackle this debate from the more precise perspective of generative grammar, as it is here 
that we come to really understand what the FL is doing. Essentially, the debate comes 
down to what takes us ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’. Is the FL a messy system made 
up of many moving parts (as in GB), or is if a simple and elegant system (as in SMT)? In 
this chapter I argue for the former as this follows the idea that the FL is a ‘kluge’, a product 
of the ratchet-effect (see 2.1.4), created and designed by the forces of natural selection 
in an incremental and gradual process that responded to a selection pressure to enhance 
and improve our communicative powers. The latter, however, I argue fails to go beyond 
explanatory adequacy because the goal should not be about reducing the number of 
descriptive devices, but about making sense of the evolution of the FL in the larger picture 
of human evolution. 
 
5.1.3 The Constituency of Sentences 
In this section, I explain how the basic units of language (words or ‘lexical items’) are 
arranged and rearranged into larger units of language (phrases and sentences) so that 
we have an account of language that can explain the structure of all sentences. Here, we 
temporarily suspend the question: ‘why is it like that?’ and just focus on ‘what is it like?’. 
As well as explaining what language is like, I will also briefly address how linguists were 
able to come to the conclusions given below.  
To explore the constituency of sentences is to explore what a speaker knows about them. 
Linguists who study grammar must keep this in mind because everyday language-use is 
full of sentences that contain ‘performance errors’ caused by laziness, tiredness, 
confusion, and various other human complications. This means that language 
performance does not always reflect language competence–that is a speaker’s actual 
knowledge of language (Chomsky, 1965; Radford, 2016, p. 5; Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 
30). Although linguistic performance is not fit for the scientific observation of a speaker’s 
linguistic knowledge, linguistic competence is. Observing the linguistic competence, 
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however, is a challenging task. Where performance merely requires recording what a 
speaker says, competence requires asking what a speaker knows of their language, what 
they intuit. 
To study a speaker’s linguistic competence, linguists ask native language speakers if a 
particular sentence sounds sensible and correct or wrong and incorrect. In other words, 
if the sentence is grammatical or ungrammatical. For example, to an English speaker, a) 
‘the dog chased the cat with the fish’ sounds like a sensible sentence, but b) ’the dog the 
cat the fish chased’ sounds less sensible, and c) ’fish the cat the dog the chased’ doesn’t 
sound sensible at all. From this we learn that the organisation of words in a) reflect what 
the speaker knows and expects from their language more than b) and c), therefore a) is 
a better representation of English as far as the speaker sees it.  
A linguist can check the intuition of a whole group of speakers in this way to gain an 
understanding of English grammar without worrying about performance errors. This tells 
us ‘what you need to know to have native-like competence in the language (i.e. to be able 
to speak like a fluent native speaker’ (Radford, 2016, p. 5). The linguist can then proceed 
to point to the commonalities and differences between speakers and cultures to see what 
is universal and what is not (as well as what might be a ‘parameter setting’ – see 5.2.1) 
and gain an insight into the overall shapes and patterns that make grammar grammar. 
What follows in this section is an overall understanding of what linguists have learnt from 
taking this approach to studying language. 
This approach has exposed some surprising insights into natural language syntax. One of 
which is that sentence structure is not dependent on serial word order, but a constituent 
structure in which words and phrases are organised in a hierarchical structure.  That is to 
say, the actual structure of a sentence is not in the linear order in which words appear as 
we speak or hear them, but in a hidden level which has only been exposed through 
rigorous studies in linguistics.  
I can highlight this with an example that shows that ‘agreement’ between words in a 
sentence does not depend on adjacent words but on hierarchical phrases. Take the 
sentences a)-c) and notice that c) is ungrammatical (ungrammatical sentences are 
traditionally marked with a *). This is based on an example in Adger’s article called 
‘Syntax’ (2015, p. 132).   
a) Paris is beautiful 
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b) The girls from Paris are beautiful 
c) *The girls from Paris is beautiful 
The grammatical string of words in a) are found in c), yet c) is an unacceptable sentence 
in English. Why is this? The grammatical sentence b) exposes that the issue seems to lie 
with the form of the verb: ‘is’ or ‘are’. In a) ‘is’ agrees with the noun ‘Paris’, but in c) it 
does not. This word-string ‘Paris are beautiful’ would sound ungrammatical if it weren’t 
for its placement in the full sentence of b). Here, it seems that ‘are’ does not agree with 
the adjacent noun ‘Paris’, but with some other part of the sentence. 
The issue is resolved when we consider there is more than one noun the verb could agree 
with in sentences b) and c): ‘Paris’ and ‘the girls’. ‘Girls’ is a plural noun which agrees with 
‘are’, and ‘Paris’ (or ‘girl’) is singular noun which agree with ‘is’. The reason why b) is 
grammatical is because ‘are’ correctly agrees with the plural ‘girls’, whereas in c) it does 
not. This is the case even though ‘girls’ is two words away from the verb we are concerned 
with (‘from’ and ‘Paris’). 
The agreement phenomenon … is captured by saying that the verb agrees with 
the whole constituent the girls from Paris rather than the adjacent noun Paris 
(Adger, 2015, p. 134). 
Constituents, therefore, are sentence-parts that are independent of one another, and 
two constituents can combine to form a larger constituent. The more constituents a 
sentence has, the more hierarchical levels it has. What becomes an important task for 
the linguist is to work out where the boundaries between constituents lie. There are 
several ways to test for this (Radford, 2016, pp. 133–46), but a good rule of thumb is that 
they lie where a string of words sound grammatical when they standalone (Carnie, 2013, 
p. 98; Radford, 2016, pp. 133–46).  
For example, the words ‘is’ and ‘beautiful’ can be combined to make the grammatical 
sounding phrase ‘is beautiful’, and therefore this is probably a constituent. When ’Paris’ 
and ‘is’ are combined together they make the ungrammatical sounding ‘Paris is’, and 
therefore this is not a constituent. ‘Paris is beautiful’ is, overall, grammatical and 
therefore forms the larger constituent that contains the smaller constituents, ‘Paris’ and 
‘is beautiful’ (and not ‘Paris is’ and ‘beautiful’). We can demonstrate constituent 
boundaries using square brackets like so: 
[Paris[is beautiful]] 
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*[Paris is][beautiful]] 
This constituent structure helps to explain the agreement phenomenon observed in the 
sentences above. We can confirm this by looking into a new sentence: 
d) The girl from Paris is beautiful. 
This sentence has two singular nouns that could agree with ‘is’, but by exploring its 
constituency we expose, once again, why it is the phrase ‘the girl from Paris’ that agrees 
with ‘is’, and not the singular and adjacent noun ‘Paris’.  
If ‘Paris’ were to agree with ‘is’ then we should expect both ‘Paris’ and ‘is’ to be a part of 
the same constituent. If I underline the parts of the phrase that play a part in the 
agreement the sentence looks like this: 
*[The girl from [Paris is beautiful]] 
This bracketing, however, does not reflect the constituency of the sentence because ‘The 
girl from’ sounds like an incomplete phrase. ‘The girl from Paris’ however is a complete 
phrase, so it is necessary to change the bracketing like so: 
[The girl from Paris]is beautiful]] 
Here, we can see the phrase that agrees with ‘is’ is actually the larger phrase ‘The girl 
from Paris’, but it may remain unclear why ‘is’ does not agree with ‘Paris’ as the noun is 
still part of this larger phrase.  If, however, we find the constituency boundaries in the 
phrase ‘The girl from Paris’ we will see why it is ‘girl’ that ‘is’ agrees with, and not ‘Paris’. 
One interesting way to do this is to see that the smaller phrase ‘from Paris’ can be entirely 
removed and not affect the overall agreement in the sentence. This gives us bracketing 
that looks like this: 
[The girl [from Paris]]is beautiful]] 
And the smaller sentence that looks like this: 
[The girl] is beautiful]] 
This shows us that ‘from Paris’ is an adjunct: that is some extra piece of information that 
is secondary or less important to the overall form of the sentence. Here, it occupies a 
different level of the sentence structure and is irrelevant to the overall syntactic 
relationship that determines the form of the verb. ‘Paris’, thus, is not related to the 
constituent that contains the verb, ‘is’, and so does not need to agree with it. The 
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constituent that contains ‘girl’, however, does. Once again, we see that the fact that the 
word ‘Paris’ is next to the word ‘is’ is merely a result of the order in which the phrases 
are said, and not because of a more direct syntactical relationship.  
We can observe these syntactical relationships by means of two-dimensional 
constituency trees as shown below. These trees show the constituency boundaries 
between all words in the sentence, and not just the few I picked on above. These have 
also been categorised into their relevant word and phrase categories45.  
 
FIGURE 10 - SYNTAX TREE - PARIS IS BEAUTIFUL46 
 
FIGURE 11- SYNTAX TREE - THE GIRL IS BEAUTIFUL47 
 
                                                        
45 Again, this is kept extremely simple to keep the focus of the chapter to the point, thus these 
trees do not reflect an up to date version of generative grammar. Neither are they completely 
consistent with a certain version. ‘S’ and ‘DP’ (which means ‘determiner phrase’), for example, 
should not appear together because they are concepts from different phases of generative 
grammar. ‘S’ is associated with the PS view and replaced with ‘TP’ and ‘CP’ (see footnote 41) by 
the time GB was established. DP is a concept established during GB, whereas in PS it was seen as 
a noun phrase or NP.  
46 [S [NP[N Paris]] [VP [V is] [N beautiful]]] 
47 [S [DP [D The] [NP[N girl][PP [P from] [N Paris]]]] [VP[V is] [N beautiful]]] 
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The first tree (figure 10) represents ‘Paris is beautiful’ and the second tree (figure 11) 
‘The girl from Paris is beautiful’. Both trees contain the string ‘Paris is beautiful’ but when 
one sees this hidden pattern one can directly observe the difference of relationship 
between ‘Paris’ and ‘is’ in each tree. In the first tree ‘is’ is contained within a larger phrase 
that also contains ‘Paris’, but in the second tree it is not. Here, ‘Paris’ is contained in the 
larger phrase ‘girl from Paris’ which is part of ‘The girl from Paris’. Ultimately, ‘Paris’ in 
the second tree occupies a level of syntactical structure which ‘is beautiful’ does not, 
whereas in the first tree they are on a closer level.  
Using syntactical trees in this way also helps to expose the differences in syntactical 
structure found in ambiguous sentences of the sort we explored in 2.2.2 and 2.4.1. Let’s 
take the example: ‘The dog chased the cat with the fish’ which, on the surface, has two 
possible meanings. Either the cat possesses the fish, or the dog does: 
 
FIGURE 12 - SYNTAX TREE - THE CAT WITH THE FISH48 
 
FIGURE 13 - SYNTAX TREE - THE DOG WITH THE FISH49 
                                                        
48 [S [DP [D The] [N dog]][VP [V chased][DP [D the][NP[N cat][PP[P with] [DP [D the] [N fish] 
49 [S [DP [D The] [N dog]][VP [V'[V chased][DP [D the][N cat]]][PP[P with] [DP [D the] [N fish] 
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Where the string of words did not expose a difference between the two possible 
meanings, the syntax trees do. We can see the difference through observing the 
placement of the PP ‘with the fish’. In the first tree (figure 12) ‘with the fish’ is part of the 
larger NP ‘cat with the fish’, whereas in the second tree (figure 13) the PP is part of the 
VP ‘chased (the cat) with the fish’. In the first tree it is evident ‘the fish’ has some 
relationship with the cat and not the dog. In the second tree it is evident that ‘the fish’ 
has some relationship with the act of chasing and therefore with the subject, the dog, 
performing that act.  
There are far more technicalities to syntactical trees that I will only scrape the surface of 
in this chapter, but here I hope the visual illustration helps to make sense of the hidden 
structures that are so essential to understanding natural language syntax. Further, there 
are some specific details regarding the way GB and SMT theorists build trees—I will 
attempt to expose these differences in the next section. Overall, we find that sentence 
structures are not comparable to beads on a string, but to Calder-style mobiles (Baker, 
2006). This understanding of sentence structure gives us the basics of how languages, in 
general,⁠ build their sentences. With this background in place, we can now explore the 
details of GB and SMT. 
5.2 Competing Theories 
5.2.1 Government and Binding Theory 
In 5.1.2 I gave a brief description of GB and explained that this theory took the first step 
toward a ‘bottom-up’ model of generative syntax, where explanatory weight was placed 
upon the lexical items; and away from a ‘top-down’ model, where explanatory weight 
was placed upon the machinery that combined those lexical items together. Overall, GB 
is largely a top-down model of generative grammar because some form of internalised 
rule exists to define how lexical items should be combined. On the other hand, SMT 
eliminates all rules (apart from merge) and is largely bottom-up. The top-down aspects 
of GB lie in the set of seven interacting modules (see 5.1.2) and the ‘bottom-up’ aspects 
lie in the way lexical items will define their behaviour in a sentence (e.g. if a verb is a one- 
or two-place predicate). In this section, I will attempt to explain this theory in more detail 
by introducing the two most important modules: X-Bar and a-move. I will also give 
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reasons as to why it is preferable for my overall approach to language evolution in this 
thesis. 
X-Bar Theory 
An important development of GB was that of X-Bar theory which invoked a general rule 
for the relationship between the lexical items that shared the constituent structure. Such 
a development recognised the redundancy of the list of rules developing in PS and 
replaced it with one rule which reflected a general pattern (Carnie, 2013, p. 173; Smith 
and Allott, 2016, p. 78). That is, all phrases had heads. So, for every XP the most important 
lexical item was X that would, overall, define the behaviour of the phrase (in verb phrases, 
that was the verb, and in noun phrases the noun, etc.). Further, these heads were 
accompanied by a ‘complement’, but also preceded by a ‘specifier’: 
 
FIGURE 14- X-BAR50 
 
The complement modifies the head by giving it more information and lies within the same 
phrase. For example, in ‘from Paris’: ‘from’ is the head, and ‘Paris’ the complement, 
therefore ‘Paris’ complements and gives more information about the preposition ‘from’, 
and not any other lexical item in the sentence. The existence of and relationship between 
head and complement is the case for all phrases. Some phrases, however, also have a 
specifier that precedes the head but are still part of that phrase. X-Bar theory also 
accounts for this ‘intermediate level’ of syntactical structure as represented by the X’ in 
figure 11. 
In the sentence ‘Bob went to the pub’, ‘to the pub’ is a PP. We know this because ‘to’ is 
a preposition, but it is also the head of the phrase. This is then part of the VP ‘went to the 
pub’, and so on. In the sentence ‘Bob went straight to the pub’, however, something else 
has happened. We have the same set of words ‘to the pub’ as a PP, but we do not want 
                                                        
50 [XP [Spec] [X' [X] [Comp]]] 
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to say that the introduction of the adverb ‘straight’ is a head that makes ‘straight to the 
pub’ an AdP (an ‘adverb phrase’). This is because ‘straight’ seems to be telling us about 
the PP ‘to the pub’, and not that ‘to the pub’ is telling us something about the adverb 
‘straight’. X-Bar recognises that, although on a syntactical level above the PP, the adverb 
is not the head of a phrase. It is, therefore, a ‘specifier’ that ‘modifies the head, specifying 
how it is to be understood’(Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 78). ‘To the pub’ is, therefore, 
labelled as a P’ (highlighting the intermediate structure) and ‘straight to the pub’ is 
labelled as PP. 
This rigid structure makes room for specifiers, but also prevents the sentence set up from 
being any other way—complements and heads can’t swap roles, or complements can’t 
be mistaken for specifiers—and therefore strictly defines the overall structure of phrases 
and sentences51. Thus, X-Bar theory defines the nature of phrases which tend to build 
around a central core, the head. It is this underlying structure that affords the power to 
help human communication in the way I have been advocating in this thesis. In other 
words, it provides a means of ‘making relevant what is not salient’ in communicative 
discourse. If a speaker is in a situation where the context fails in helping to get the 
message across that Bill hit Fred (see 3.3.2), then X-Bar theory as part of the FL, can (see 
3.4.1). Let me explain: 
 ‘Hit’ is a word that describes an action and it can occupy the head position within a VP. 
In this position it has space for a complement. If ‘Bob’ occupies that complement position, 
then the two words gain a syntactical relationship which defines a meaning beyond the 
stand-alone words. Since ‘Bob’ occupies the complement slot, this means ‘Bob’ tells us 
something more about the head, ‘hit’, and not the other way around. Semantically this 
tells us Bob was the one who was victim to the act of the hitting.  
‘Hit’, however, can also be part of a larger unit, a whole sentence52,  with an NP as the 
parent phrase over our VP (‘hit Bob’). If ‘Bill’ occupies that noun phrase, then it becomes 
the head of the larger constituent. Here, ‘hit Bob’ complements ‘Bill’. Bill ‘projects’ over 
or governs the VP and describes an overall direction of the phrase. This suggests Bill was 
                                                        
51 Keeping in mind that in GB they do not use the term sentence, but TP and CP – see footnote 
36  
52 Or ‘TP’ in more up-to-date terminology. 
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the hitter, rather than the hittee. The underlying X-Bar structure, therefore, describes the 
whole action by means of the relationship the head has with its complement (and any 
specifiers).  
Provided everyone has their mind ‘set up’ with this X-Bar module as part of the FL then it 
becomes entirely possible for one to use the utterance ‘Bob hit Bill’ to deliver the message 
that Bob was the one who did the hitting, and Bill was hit, even in a context that lacks the 
salience of Bob, Bill, or the act of hitting.  
Move-α 
Another important module in GB is known as move-a and that describes the nature of 
transformations in linguistic structure based upon the model X-Bar has offered. Without 
going into the technicalities linguists recognised three different ‘types’ of transformations 
(Carnie, 2013, pp. 289–390). These are ‘Head movement’, ‘DP Movement’, and ‘Wh-
Movement (the latter refers to the example used in 1.2.1). Despite some differences 
between these transformations, theorists saw that they also shared similarities enough 
to generalise them to a single unified theory of movement: 
Notice that while there are significant differences between the motivation for the 
various types of move, there is one overwhelming similarity. The movements all 
occur so that one item can appear near another…All the motivations for 
movement, then, seem to be locality constraints….if all movement types are 
motivated by locality, then there isn’t really a significant difference between rule 
types. Perhaps we can unify them into a single rule: Move. Move says simply 
“move something” (but only if you have to) (Carnie, 2013, pp. 393–4). 
As a very brief note ‘locality’ and ‘locality constraint’ relate to another of the seven GB 
modules which concern constraints around the relationships within embedded phrases. 
This module informs the syntactic structure that cases of agreement are ‘bound to some 
local domain’(Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 83). Again, in avoiding technicalities this points 
roughly to the facts that ‘himself’ in ‘Bill thinks John likes himself’ must agree with John 
(which is ‘local’), and not Bill (which is non-local) (example in Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 
83). 
As a reminder to my reader GB implies a two-stage process in the generation of sentences 
that includes the application of move-a. The transformation ‘happens’ at the shift from 
Deep (or ‘D-Structure) to surface structure (S-Structure) as suggested in figure 15 
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(extracted from Jackendoff, 2002, p. 109):  
 
FIGURE 15 - GB MODEL FOR TRANSFORMATIONS 
I will come back to the discussion of transformations and move in the next section when 
I compare this approach to the SMT approach. 
Parameter Setting 
What requires more explanation, however, is how GB explains the nature of variances 
throughout the world’s languages, as a theory of how a child is able to acquire one of 
these many varied languages is also an important part of generative grammar: 
The answer is that not only X-bar structure and Move-α, but also the various sub-
modules of the grammar … are innately specified, so do not need to be acquired 
at all. Syntactic differences between languages are explained as relatively minor 
differences in the way these modules function and in the different properties of 
individual lexical items (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 80). 
The thought is that syntactic variances are entrenched in the differences in ‘the way the 
modules function and in the different properties of individual lexical items’ (ibid), but what 
does this mean? The way into describing grammatical variances in languages is broadly 
known as the ‘principles and parameters’ (P&P), with a focus on parameters. Later, I will 
also explain how this notion of ‘parameter’ is important in SMT. 
P&P appears to be the same theory as GB but it tackles the nature of these interacting 
modules from a different angle. Where GB was very much focused on how the overall 
syntactic structure of language was rigid and where it was flexible; P&P focused on what 
aspects were common throughout all languages (UG or ‘the principles’) and which 
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aspects were not (the variances or ‘the parameters’). In GB those aspects that were not 
common were described by the different ways in which the modules interacted, in P&P 
they are described as different ‘parameter settings’. They are essentially telling the same 
story, but P&P offers a simpler way to explain the differences in language.  
UG suggests that ‘languages don’t vary arbitrarily - ‘there are universals underlying the 
superficial diversity’ (Smith and Allott, 2016, p. 56) and this is what P&P has set out to 
explain. A basic way to think about parameter setting is to imagine there are ‘switches’ 
that can be turned between one setting or another. Which position a switch occupies is 
dependent on the way the mind experiences the world; or in this case, what linguistic 
input it receives. The way switches are ‘set’ influences the overall ‘output’ of the FL and, 
thus, the overall shape of one’s linguistic knowledge. Through this method ‘grammatical 
learning will be limited to parameterised aspects of grammar (I.e. Those aspects of 
grammar will vary in parametric fashion from one language to another)’ (Radford, 2016, 
p. 33).  
This quote from Chomsky (1991, p. 41) helpfully adds that:⁠  
 Notice that change in a few parameters, even one, may have dramatic 
phenomenal consequences as its effects filter through a fixed network of 
principles, so that historically related languages  might look rather different in 
their surface properties, in ways that do not seem closely connected; 
correspondingly, an unrelated language might share structural properties over a 
substantial range because parameters are set in the same way.   
In the modular approach of GB, these parameters could be seen as the different but 
limited ways in which the seven modules could possibly interact with one another. 
An example of such a parameter setting is reflected directly in the discussion of the ‘head’ 
of the phrase above. All of my examples have been English where, when uttered, the 
head is always followed by its complement, but this is not the case for all languages. Other 
languages work in the reverse order where the complement is, in fact, followed by the 
head. So, where we would say ‘from Paris’ in English; the Japanese would say the 
equivalent of ‘Paris from’. English, therefore, is a ‘head-first’ language, and Japanese is a 
‘head-last’ language (Baker, 2001). What is important here, is that the head is either 
always first or always last, and never sometimes one or the other. The thought is that 
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once this ‘head’ parameter is set, it accounts and predefines all possible linguistic 
sentences. Or all possible linguistic sentences of endocentric languages. 
Before the head-last or head-first parameter is set, an ‘endocentric’ or ‘polysynthetic’ 
parameter must be set. Where endocentric languages rely on word-order to define the 
head-complement relationship, polysynthetic languages rely upon the use of prefixes and 
suffixes (Baker, 2001). What is important to note here is that all languages adhere to the 
X-Bar theory but have been set up to utilise it in different ways. Through this example, 
we can see that even with just a couple of parameters the FL can potentially provide a 
large number of different languages, all of which could be traced back to this same set of 
internal principles and parameters.  
The theory of P&P, as well as GB, still has many theoretical issues to iron out. For example, 
this leaves open questions like what does it take to select a parameter: is it an automatic 
or gradual process?; how much experience is required to do this?; is there an initial 
‘default’ position?; and can the flip be switched back? These questions, however, are 
central to a fairly successful field of language research that takes seriously that language 
acquisition is a mixed dichotomy of both innate and experiential input (Yang, 2002; Lidz 
and Gagliardi, 2015). 
With GB and P&P explained I hope to have shown how, overall, this ties in with my 
approach to language evolution, and I will give a deeper explanation of this below. First, 
however, I will explore the more recent theory of generative grammar that has come to 
counter this more communicative understanding of language. That is the view of SMT. 
5.2.2 Strong minimalist Thesis 
Merge and Binary Branching 
In 5.1.2 I explained that the overall goal of MP was to minimise the descriptive devices 
that explain the complexities of language. So, although the theory of GB was shown to be 
very successful in explaining the complex structures of the world’s languages, it was 
argued that the seven interacting modules that underpinned language did not provide a 
theory that was ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’. I will provide an argument against this 
approach to language shortly (see 5.3.1). But first I want to visit the motivating factors 
for the extreme version of MP in more detail. This is known as the ‘strong minimalist 
thesis’ (SMT). 
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A key property of the linguistic structure we explored above is that it is binary branching. 
This is most obvious when we look at the syntax trees and see that phrases are 
consistently built out of only two constituents, and not three or more. A phrase either 
contains two words; a word and a phrase; or two phrases; and never three words, or two 
words and a phrase (Adger, 2015; Radford, 2016; Smith and Allott, 2016). This property 
is extremely important for several reasons, but it is also a driving factor for the SMT—one 
cannot get more minimal than binary. A focus on this aspect of language has brought 
about an approach to generative grammar which was very different to the X-Bar 
approach of GB, and one I will briefly introduce here.  
SMT argues that language is essentially down to one operation—a single descriptive 
device—known as ‘merge’. Merge simply takes two elements (lexical items or phrases) 
and combines them together to produce a larger phrase. In the sentence ‘Jen eats 
marzipan’, for example, ‘eats’ and ‘marzipan’ are merged together to build a phrase ‘eats 
marzipan’. Then ‘Jen’ and ‘eats marzipan’ is merged together to build the larger phrase 
‘Jen eats marzipan’. And so on, to build larger and larger sentences (Smith and Allott, 
2016, pp. 110–1).  
SMT theorists suggest that this operation takes place in a sort of cognitive ‘workspace’ 
where the operation ‘merge’ works to create these phrases from the building blocks: the 
lexicon. This then gets ‘sent to’ either our conceptual-intentional systems (the C-I 
interface) or our ‘sensory-motor’ systems (the S-M Interface) in whatever tasks the mind 
needs it for. The S-M interface refers to our use of language when speaking, signing or 
hearing it—basically, when using it in communication (I will revisit this point shortly). 
When it is sent to the S-M interface the structure is ‘flattened’ into the one-dimensional 
form that is used in expression (beads on a string). The C-I interface refers to our use of 
language in constructing and organising thought (and thus closely related to LOT – see 
3.3.2). When it is sent here, the C-I might use it in its hierarchical form (thus capable of 
distinguishing between the different structures of the ambiguous ‘the dog chased the cat 
with the fish’). The point here is that even though the ‘sentence’ might look or function 
differently in either of the two interfaces, it is the same ‘sentence’ built in the initial 
‘workspace’ that they share (Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010; Adger, 2015; Smith and Allott, 
2016). 
This approach, however, leaves open the question as to how such a simplistic model can 
account for the phenomena of transformations in language, as well as for linguistic 
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diversity and complexity. The answer lies in this concept of third-factor constraints 
(introduced in chapter 2.2.3) which suggests that syntactic structure is a product of 
general aspects of mind and world (such as physical, mathematical, and cognitive 
constraints) as opposed to a natural selection (and therefore something that has 
developed with a primary function). All aspects of language are explained in the model 
below, which is a simplification of the model introduced in the GB theory (extracted from 
Jackendoff, 2002, p. 110):  
 
FIGURE 16 - SMT MODEL FOR TRANSFORMATIONS 
Notice that there is no longer a need for deep structure and surface structure and, 
therefore, a separate space or level for transformation to take place. They ‘take place’ in 
the same space as merge. Furthermore, without the constrictions of the more specific X-
Bar theory and Move-a (as well as the other modules of GB theory), this also means that 
linguistic constraints are explained mostly by the state of the lexicon. SMT, therefore, is 
a wholly ‘bottom-up’ model of generative grammar. Much of this is made clear when we 
introduce ‘features’. 
‘Features’ are carried by a lexical item and are the parts of it which place constraints on 
how lexical items are merged. It is not the case that any old lexical item can be merged 
with any other to create any sort of ‘word salad’, but that they are merged with other 
lexical items that fit. On this conception of the process of sentence building it is rather 
like puzzle building: where only certain puzzle pieces will fit with others. Sentences take 
on the form because of the way puzzle pieces or lexical items are, and not because of the 
puzzle-builder or FL. 
SMT suggests that, in order to build grammatical sentences, it is required that features 
‘agree’ with and ‘delete’ one another. If this does not or cannot happen, then the 
derivation ‘crashes’ and creates an ungrammatical sentence. In an oversimplified 
example, the lexical item that concerns the word ‘eat’ would carry features that tells the 
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merge operation that it is a verb. To ‘delete’ the verb feature, ‘eats’ needs a noun. If it is 
merged with the lexical item ‘marzipan’—which has a noun feature—then the verb 
feature is deleted, and the derivation is either complete or continues to be built. If, on 
the other hand, ‘eat’ is merged with ‘eat’ the derivation crashes because the second ‘eat’ 
does not agree with and delete the feature. In other words, ‘eat marzipan’ works, but 
‘eat eat’ does not. The features that ‘eats’ and ‘marzipan’ carry in actual linguistic theory 
will be far more complex than this. They will also include if the lexical item is a count or 
mass noun, transitive or intransitive verb, or a whole variety of syntactical elements 
(Radford, 2016, pp. 99–103; see also Smith and Allott, 2016, pp. 101–2). What this 
introduction to features does highlight, however, is how transformations and linguistic 
variety work in SMT. 
Internal Merge 
In GB ‘Where is Ethiopia?’ is established in ‘surface structure’ following the application of 
move-a in ‘deep structure’. In other words, ‘where is Ethiopia?’ is a transformation of the 
sentence ‘Ethiopia is in x’53. In SMT, this act of movement happens as part of the building 
process and the need to delete the features of the phrase ‘x’. The thought is that ‘x’ is 
not resolved by merging further external lexical items or phrases, but by moving the 
phrase to another position further up the tree where its features can be deleted. This 
very process is still the merge operation at work: 
Chomsky has argued that Merge comes in two flavors: External and Internal 
Merge. External Merge is when items are first-merged in the syntactic tree, 
whereas Internal Merge is when a copy of an item is made and remerged 
elsewhere in the tree … The conceptual advantage of this view is that there is only 
one basic operation, Merge, and not e.g., two basic operations Merge and Move 
(Lasnik and Lohndal, 2010, p. 47). 
SMT not only rids of the need for X-Bar theory but also a-move. In fact, it is the overall 
goal of the theory to have no rules in language whatsoever—everything is explained by 
merge, the features of the lexical items, and their interaction. Further explanation is 
needed, however, to explore how SMT understands linguistic variety. 
                                                        
53 See the intro of ‘wh-movement’ in 1.2.2 
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Parameter Settings and Lexical Features 
In GB, I explained that linguistic differences (such as head-first and head-last languages) 
were described by the different ways in which the modules interact with one another. 
This theory made further sense when we took the P&P framework. In SMT linguistic 
differences are also explained by P&P, except that rather than talking about a course of 
interacting modules, we are talking about a far finer set of parameters or features. 
Features on the lexicon are parameter switches. ‘Eat’ is positive for the nominal 
parameter, and negative for the verbal parameter. ‘Marzipan’ is positive for the verbal 
parameter and negative for the nominal parameter (Radford, 2016, p. 102).  
It is the variation in these switches that accounts not only for the differences between 
lexical items, but the differences between languages overall. Once again, SMT explains 
the nature of natural language syntax by further generalising their overall linguistic theory 
into just a handful of working parts. The big question that remains open here, however, 
is where do these parameter settings come from, if not from the interaction of modules? 
In linguistic theory there are a number of responses to this question ranging from 
arguments that there are no parameter settings at all (Boeckx, 2014), to that they are a 
case of third-factor constraints defined by the ‘states’ or inputs of the S-M and C-I 
interfaces  (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 2002; Chomsky, 2005). I will come back to this 
point in 5.3.1. 
From this analysis we can see that the SMT approach of natural language syntax stands 
in opposition to my proposed view on language evolution. Nothing in this model of 
language could have evolved for social or communicative reasons except for the 
externalisation of sentences that is considered an element of the S-M interface. The 
existence of this interface, however, does not seem to have had anything to do with the 
rise of linguistic syntax or the merge operation. If anything, the externalisation of 
language was something that happened after the emergence of syntax (Reboul, 2017), 
and therefore a secondary function of language (see 2.1 and 2.2). On this view the 
communicative and social pressures may influence the S-M and C-I interfaces, and thus 
perhaps the shaping of features, but not the FL. 
SMT appears to argue that the FL is just the merge operation as this is the thing that 
describes UG (everything else is described by features on the lexicon) and what makes 
humans unique. This was what was referred to as the FLN in 2.2.3 (to distinguish from 
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the FLB) and was the very aspect that gave rise to recursive and hierarchical structures. 
With no further top-down instruction beyond merge, the FL is only responsible for 
creating recursive and hierarchical structures. Further, and as the SMT argues, recursive 
and hierarchical structures appear to do nothing obvious to help human communication 
(see 2.2.3). Hierarchical structure, for example, allows the creation of the sentence ‘Bill 
who was sad hit Bob who was angry’. Here, the phrases contain more information 
because those associated with Bob contain the information that he was angry; and the 
ones associated with Bill describe that he was sad. However, nothing in the FL helps 
define who was the hitter and who was the hittee (this will be wholly down to the features 
carried by ‘hit’). The sentence remains counterproductive to human communication as it 
offers no power in helping to disambiguate between the two possible meanings behind 
the utterance (either Bill hit Bob, or Bob hit Bill). In GB, however, X-Bar theory (as part of 
FL) took on some of this responsibility: mainly by ruling that every phrase has a head and 
compliment (see 5.2.1). I will come back to the discussion of hierarchical structure and 
communicative function in 5.3.2 – stage c).  
5.3 Evolution of the Faculty of Language 
5.3.1 Problems with SMT 
In chapter 1 I explained that I was committed to the idea that we were ‘linguistic 
creatures’ because theories advocating this point can explain a child’s ability to acquire 
language, UG, and its idiosyncratic nature (see 1.2.2). I also pointed out, however, that 
the approach had several issues with giving a satisfactory account of the emergence and 
evolution of FL (see 2.2). In this chapter, I have introduced  technical theories and issues 
around this question in the linguist’s goal to give an account of natural language that goes 
‘beyond explanatory adequacy’ (see 5.1.2). The argument is that it is better to reduce the 
number of descriptive devices needed to explain language—the goal of MP. In this 
section, I will clarify why I disagree with this. Later, in section 5.3.2, I will give an account 
of the evolution of FL that goes ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’ without the need to so 
dramatically reduce the number of descriptive devices and that also aligns with the larger 
account of the thesis. 
I explained above that SMT leaves much of the linguistic complexity down to ‘third-factor 
constraints’, and that the ‘features’ carried by the lexicon exist due to the conditions of 
the workspace, S-M and C-I interfaces, and the interaction between them. This theory of 
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language, however, continues to raise the questions: where, why and how? The very 
same questions I have been trying to answer throughout this thesis. To me, it seems that 
just minimalising the FL does not take the theory ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’. If 
anything, it leaves the theory of SMT as equally stuck and open to difficulties as the 
theories that preceded it. Ultimately, I see two overarching problems with SMT which I 
think should push one to agree with a more GB inspired approach to language, or, at 
least, perceive it as equal to the SMT approach.  
Firstly, that the features that describe the complexities of language exist because of third-
factor constraints and are not products of learning or natural evolution. This means their 
origin is simply down to the physical constraints that govern what has become the set-up 
of the human mind (see 2.2.3). This thought is closely tied to Chomsky’s scepticism with 
respect to natural selection, particularly when it comes to the evolution of complex 
organs like the spine or brain (Chomsky, 2015; Berwick and Chomsky, 2017). It is far from 
clear, however, that this takes us ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’. When it comes to how 
evolutionary processes shape FL, brains, or spines, all theories are left in the dark. In other 
words, anything Chomsky has to say against the process of natural selection and thoughts 
about primary functions can also be said about the emergence of third-factor constraints.  
The fundamental problem with evolutionary accounts of any natural phenomena isn’t 
our ‘need’ to find function and purpose for everything (and therefore risk telling ‘just-so 
stories’), it is simply that we lack the fossil record and a detailed evidential basis at all. 
We do not know about the environment, conditions, and evolutionary selection 
pressures that impacted humans at the time the FL emerged because no one was there 
to record it. This issue is as much a problem for a non-functional (or ‘non-selectionist’) 
account of language as it is for a functional or adaptive one.  Here, I would argue that GB 
is actually better off because of the efforts made to explain an evolutionary history (see 
further discussion in 5.3.2), rather than claiming that a single genetic mutation is 
responsible for language (see 2.2.3). 
Secondly,  the SMT’s argument that a single descriptive device gives a better account of 
language and language evolution than seven devices is problematic: a thought that  
supports Chomsky’s overall scepticism of natural selection. One wonders, however, if this 
is the case. On one reading, the explanatory weight that is required for describing 
language has simply been a move away from the device (or FL) that creates sentences, 
and onto the lexicon which the device manipulates.  This simply changes the focus of the 
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apparently difficult question of ‘how does the FL give rise to all the complexities in 
language?’ to ‘how does the lexicon give rise to all the complexities in language?’. From 
this angle, SMT is no better off than GB because they are both stuck with the same issue 
of explaining where complexity and diversity came from.  
Another way to look at it is to recognise that the shift between GB and SMT is not the 
same as the shift between PS and GB. GB was revolutionary because it removed the 
redundancy in PS, but it is not clear that this is the case with SMT and GB. Here, both 
theories may give a satisfactory explanatory account of language (interacting modules vs 
features on the lexicon), but neither is more preferable in so far as reducing redundancy 
is concerned. SMT has only simplified the shape of the FL, but it has not simplified 
language overall.  
Therefore, SMT does nothing particularly special in the claim that it goes ‘beyond 
explanatory adequacy’. In fact, its main argument that it is more sensible to reduce the 
number of descriptive devices brings no obvious solution to the question ‘why does 
language exist?’.  SMT is as empty as GB. It brings nothing more nor less, and both 
theories are somewhat ‘stuck’ at how to sensibly answer this question. It seems, 
however, that part of the problem for GB was that it lacked a sensible evolutionary story 
that described the emergence of seven interacting modules, and not its trouble with 
explaining language (in this I have argued SMT and GB are equal). What I hope to do here 
is give a sensible evolutionary story that seems to be lacking from the GB account, one 
that ties in with the larger picture of human communication evolution I have been 
advocating throughout this thesis.  
5.3.2 Evolution of GB Modules 
In chapter 4 I explained how I envision the overall process of language evolution, starting 
from group living and ending in the emergence of the FL. This involved describing the rise 
of natural language syntax as an effort between cultural and biological evolution. I 
described this process with the help of the ratchet effect which explains the accumulative 
nature of natural selection and gene-culture co-evolution (see 2.1.4 and 4.1.2). Here, a 
change in the biological object also enacts a change in the environment which involves a 
process of cultural evolution, and also enacts a change on selection pressures, which 
enacts a further change on the biological object (see 4.3). All of this was a response to 
the selection pressure to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ in communicative discourse. 
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In this theory, the FL also had a larger functional role in aiding cultural transmission. On 
this picture of language evolution, the GB approach to language fits. 
In this section, I aim to explain how the FL is made up of modules that were naturally 
selected to enhance human communication. As I mentioned before, the goal is to go 
‘beyond explanatory adequacy’, but as I argued this should not be about reducing the 
number of descriptive devices, but about making sense of the evolution of the FL in the 
larger picture of human evolution. In chapter 4 I presented a table which described the 
stages of language evolution, here, I present that table again but updated with the 
specifics that I aim to explore in this section. Stage 5, that was the rise of natural language 
syntax as underpinned by FL, is more finely defined through stages 5A-D (this is 
highlighted by italics): 
TABLE 2 - HUMAN AND FL EVOLUTION 
Stage Thing emerged Underlying 
Mechanism 
Selective Pressure 
1 Group living E.g. Tolerance of 
others 
E.g. Safety in numbers 
2 Mind-guessing Social cognitive 
mechanisms for group 
maintenance 
Social living and cheating 
detection 
3 Social Conventions and 
Culture 
Social cognition for 
cooperation   
Social Interaction 
4 Word-use (preceded by 
pointing and panto) 
Social 
interaction/social 
cognition 
Sharing information that is 
salient 
5A Theta-Words Social cognition + 
‘proto-theta-theory’ 
Sharing information that is 
not salient through theta-
roles 
5B Protolangauge ‘Proto-X-Bar theory’ Sharing information that is 
not salient through 
semantic relationships 
5C Hierarchical Structure X-Bar theory Access to phrases use, not 
just serial words order 
5D Further grammatical 
relationships 
All GB modules Sharing information that is 
not salient 
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The extra ‘sub-stages’ are inspired by an approach to language evolution that was 
suggested by Ray Jackendoff (1999, 2002; see also Fitch, 2010, p. 411). He argues: 
‘…grammar is not a single unified system, but a collection of simpler systems. 
Many of these systems are built up as refinements of pre-existing interfaces 
between components. Hence the evolution of the language capacity can be seen 
as deeply incremental, adding more and more little tricks to the cognitive 
repertoire available to the child faced with acquiring a language (Jackendoff, 
2002, p. 264). 
For Jackendoff, the evolution of language is a slow incremental process that starts with 
the call and conceptual abilities of primates and ends with modern language. See figure 
17 (extracted from Jackendoff, 2002, p. 238).  
 
FIGURE 17 - JACKENDOFF'S STAGES OF LANGUAGE EVOLUTION 
 
I have picked Jackendoff’s approach to help guide us through this section because, for 
the most part, I agree with it. Like myself, he argues that language has a communicative 
primary function and is the product of natural selection. However, where Jackendoff’s 
work goes deeply into both the syntax and semantics of linguistics, I am only able to make 
some suggestions about the evolution of a few of the GB modules and how they might 
interact.  My goal here, however, is not to give a precise account or to get bogged down 
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in linguistic technicalities, but to offer a fresh approach on the evolution of these modules 
with Jackendoff’s theory as a basis.  
My reader will remember that previous communicative based theories of the FL have 
been problematic due to their commitment to the code-model of communication (see 
2.2.2) and that my theory offers a new angle from the ostensive-inferential model that 
dissolved these problems (see 2.4.1). With that in mind, I will point out where I think my 
approach diverges from Jackendoff’s as I take us through the potential stages of FL 
evolution.  
Stage A: Theta-Words 
As with many theories of language evolution the emergence of words precedes the 
emergence of syntax, as syntax requires basic units to combine together in the first place. 
In Jackendoff’s theory, word-use evolves out of ‘pre-existing primate conceptual 
structure’54 to allow for the ‘use of symbols in a non-situation-specific fashion’. These are 
akin to expressions like ‘oops’, ‘tsk’, and ‘shh’ that are often used in English speaking 
cultures; and are the sort of ‘words’ that work as standalone meanings (Jackendoff, 1999, 
p. 273). This shift involves the important conversion from iconic to symbolic 
communication which I have already discussed in 3.3.1. Like Jackendoff, I agree that this 
is an important stage in the evolution of language, but not one to discuss here.  
From ‘use of symbols in a non-situation-specific fashion’ evolves the ‘use of an open, 
unlimited class of symbols’ alongside the ability to use the symbol or words in 
combination with one another (that is the ‘concatenation of symbols’). Jackendoff argues 
that this shift involves an adaption to store more words in long-term memory as well as 
an adaption to create new words with the evolutionary goal to increase vocabulary so 
humans can communicate about a wider variety of things. This also involves the 
‘development of a phonological system’ (a shift from ‘holistic words’ to words made out 
of smaller phonological units) that may involve changes to our vocal tract and the brain 
machinery that control it. I do not disagree with these adaptions in the early stages of 
language evolution, but argue that there is more to tell as word-use also requires the 
                                                        
54 Consideration of conceptual structure and the semantics of language is an extremely important 
part of Jackendoff’s theories of language, but something I do not have the time to explore here. 
It is something I briefly refer to in 1.3.1 when discussing word-meaning. 
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evolution of social cognitive abilities that allow humans to share mutual-knowledge in 
their communicative acts (see 2.3.2). It is only when this is established that humans can 
create, learn, engage with, and use words.  
A parallel trajectory in Jackendoff’s theory is the ability to  ‘concatenate’ or combine the 
words or symbols together in any one communicative act. If I am able to use the word 
‘duck’ in communication, then I am also able to use the words ‘duck’ and ‘egg’ in 
communication. I also agree with this and was something I discuss in detail in section 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2. I conclude, however, that although word-use is the first step toward a 
power to ‘make relevant what is not salient’, it also came with a set of limitations that set 
up the selective pressure that prompted the evolution of FL. This was because, at this 
stage, the only thing that disambiguated the meaning or reduced ‘pragmatic possibilities’ 
of multiple-word-use was the context in which they were uttered. The use of the words 
‘duck’ and ‘egg’ could refer to a duck egg, or a duck and an egg, or an egg that was near 
a duck—unless something in context (in the immediate environment or in mutual-
knowledge) could help point out which meaning the speaker intended.  
Jackendoff seems to agree with this general idea (see his quote in 3.3.2), but his focus 
and reason for developing to the next stage—the combination of words with semantic 
relationships—are quite different from mine. For Jackendoff, developing a further 
relationship between symbols (that goes beyond contextual cues) has something to do 
with clearly and precisely expressing one’s thoughts, whereas I argue it is about the 
function to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ (see 3.4.2 for further discussion of this 
difference). It is therefore here that I would postulate the evolution of the first GB 
module: theta-theory, or what I refer to as the emergence of ‘theta-words’.  
To make sense of this proposal I will start by briefly explaining theta-theory as we 
understand it in terms of modern language. As I mentioned in 5.1.2 a starting point for 
GB theory was to deal with the unpredictable behaviours of verbs that PS was struggling 
to explain. The successful suggestion was that the behaviour of a verb was partially 
stipulated by the lexicon as opposed to the machinery that combines the lexicon 
together. The lexical entry for ‘hits’, for example, requires two arguments (the one hitting 
and the one being hit), whereas ‘stumble’ only requires one (the one who stumbled). This 
set in motion the idea of a module known as ‘theta-theory’, which had the verbs 
designate a set of predefined ‘theta roles’ that influenced sentence construction (Lasnik 
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and Lohndal, 2010; Smith and Allott, 2016). This allowed that different verbs could 
generate sentences in different ways.  
Theta-roles not only define how many arguments a verb has but also their ‘thematic 
relations’: that is the sort of words or phrases these arguments should take. ‘Hit’, for 
example, requires an ‘agent’55 as an ‘initiator or doer of an action’ (Carnie, 2013, p. 229); 
and a ‘theme’ which are ‘entities that undergo actions’ (Carnie, 2013, p. 231). In ‘Bill hit 
Bob’, ‘Bill’ is the agent and ‘Bob’ the theme. In ‘Bill hit the table’, ‘the table’ is the theme. 
Here, both ‘the table’ and ‘Bob’ work as themes because they are both the sort of thing 
that can be acted upon. ‘The table hit Bob’, however, sounds odd because ‘the table’ 
does not work with the agent theta-role: it is not the sort of thing that initiates an action. 
‘Stumble’, on the other hand, only requires an agent. Theta-roles, therefore, constrain 
the form of the sentence by dictating the sort of words and phrases that can accompany 
the use of a verb  
I argue that a theta-theory module, or a ‘proto-theta-theory’ module, may well have a 
function in this early stage of language evolution, and could be a key starting point to 
making human communication capable of ‘making relevant what is not salient’. The 
suggestion aligns with the fact that theta-roles are often obvious in that they reflect the 
meaning of the verb. Both the verb ‘hit’ and the actual act of hitting require an agent and 
a recipient. The act of hitting cannot be an act of hitting unless someone is doing the 
hitting and something is there to be hit. In fact, the act of hitting doesn’t make sense if it 
is missing an ‘agent’ or ‘theme’. The same can be said for ‘stumbles’. The act of stumbling 
requires an agent or a ‘stumbler’, but it would be odd to suggest if stumbling had a theme. 
It does not make sense to say that Bob or the table was a direct target that underwent 
the action of stumbling.  
The very activity or meaning of the verb presumes a number of arguments (‘hit’ has two, 
‘stumble’ has one) and the sort of things those arguments must be (agent, theme, etc.). 
Theta-roles, thus, also have the capability of pointing a hearer towards something that is 
not immediately obvious, even if other words are unexpressed. I, for example, could utter 
the word ‘hit’ to a hearer in the presence of Bill who has a bruised face. The utterance, 
                                                        
55 Other thematic relations include ‘experiencers’, ‘goals’, ‘source’, ‘location’, and ‘beneficiary’ 
(Carnie, 2013, pp. 230–1). 
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along with its theta-roles, points the hearer toward what happened. It may not tell my 
hearer who did the hitting, but it does ‘prompt’ my hearer to infer that Bill was hit by 
someone (an agent) and therefore consider who that someone might be. This also 
informs them that Bill’s bruising was not the result of something like an accident, which 
the use of the word ‘stumble’ may have inferred.  
My thought is that a proto-theta-theory could evolve to maintain these ‘theta-words’ 
because they enhance human communication and are more effective than relying on 
memory or learning alone to ‘hold’ these forms in place. ‘Theta-words’ gain these forms 
because they directly reflect those activities and things in the world that are useful for a 
group of humans to talk about. Bringing this point back to the theory of natural selection, 
I suggest that the genetic variations that promote the use of these theta-words will be 
selected for because they respond to a selection pressure to ‘make relevant what is not 
salient’ (see 3.4). Humans that evolve ‘theta-roles’ or forms that are not helpful—that do 
not reflect their activities in the world—are less likely to be selected for. This process, 
therefore, counts for the initial emergence of the mental module that is to become theta-
theory.  
The main point of suggesting such a stage is to highlight a difference in my approach from 
Jackendoff’s. I would expect Jackendoff to argue that theta-theory would emerge after a 
syntactical relationship between words has been established because it would provide 
some function in bringing more precision and clarity to phrases which are evolving to 
express our thoughts. For Jackendoff, theta-theory has no function in this until verbs are 
already able to carry arguments in the form phrases. For me, however, it provides a way 
of expanding the functionality of words (in ‘making relevant what is not salient’) even 
prior to any systematic combination of them. 
Such a suggestion for the evolution of theta-theory needs further research as many 
questions are left open. Is it possible that the evolution of theta-roles takes place before 
the evolution of nouns, verbs, and adjectives? Or does the early development of proto-
theta-roles prompt the evolution of further syntactic categories? A similar thought, 
however, exists in the works of Sperber and Origgi when discussing the evolution of 
linguistic structure within a model of ostensive-inferential communication:  
a language faculty that leads to the internalisation of a grammar that attributes 
more structure to utterances than they superficially realise (that project onto 
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them "unexpressed constituents" for instance) may facilitate inferential 
comprehension (Origgi and Sperber, 2000). 
Stage B: Protolanguage 
Once word-use is established the next stage is to find a way of combining them.  Although 
Jackendoff and I express different opinions on the selection pressures that prompt the 
evolution of FL, I imagine the story is similar when we consider the evolution of the GB 
modules. In 3.4.1 I discussed ‘the use of symbol position to convey basic semantic 
relationships’. In that section, I used the ‘subject-first rule’ as an example of this as it 
demonstrated how a rule over symbol position had the power to disambiguate the 
meaning of multiple words like ‘Bob’, ‘Bill’, and ‘hit’. If ‘Bob’ is uttered before ‘Bill’, then 
it suggests that Bob is the subject, therefore Bob who did the hitting. In this section, I 
argue that using symbol position to convey semantic relationships reflects the function 
of X-Bar theory (which I introduced in 5.2.1), and therefore, at this stage (5B) the initial 
emergence of the X-Bar theory module. 
X-Bar theory defines the overall structure of phrases as having heads and compliments 
(as well as an optional specifier). At this early stage of FL evolution, one could suggest 
that this module starts to emerge as a ‘proto-X-Bar theory’ to cause an underlying 
structure that ensures words are, for example, ‘connected’ in a way that represents a 
‘head-like’ to ‘complement-like’ relationship. Thus, one word compliments the other. This 
means that when speakers and hearers use multiple words they also ‘pre-empt’ or 
‘expect’ them to share this sort of relationship. Under Jackendoff’s view, proto-X-bar 
offers a way for humans to more clearly share their thoughts (which presumably contains 
this sort of relationship), under my view it offers a way to infer meaning from multiple-
word-use beyond the contextual cues in which they are uttered.  
Again, such a suggestion leaves open many questions that I cannot address in detail. For 
example, if a ‘subject-first’ or ‘head-first’ rule evolved initially, then why is it we have 
languages that do not follow this rule? When does the parameter setting, that apparently 
defines this set up (see 5.2.1), come into play? What about the recursive and hierarchical 
nature of natural language syntax that seems so central to linguistic theory? Does that 
not pre-exist these semantic relationships? I will, however, briefly address this last 
question as it is central to the debate of this chapter.  
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The emergence of a ‘proto-X-bar theory’ supports the idea that a protolanguage pre-
exists the full languages that we see today. The primary difference between 
protolanguage and full language is that protolanguage lacks hierarchical phrase structure 
that is so definitive to our understanding of language (see 5.1.3). Jackendoff argues, 
however, that: 
one need not advance to full generative syntax, replete with recursive trees, in 
order to improve the [communicative] situation (Jackendoff, 1999, p. 275)  
This thought that a non-hierarchical language came first is controversial in the larger field 
of generative grammar. This should not come as a surprise when one considers the 
debate I explored above. The MP angle that the FL is made up of the single hierarchical 
phrase structure making operation: ‘merge’ (see 5.2.2) obviously clashes with this claim. 
The question seems to be: if a hierarchical phrase structure did not happen in the same 
instance the FL evolved to combine words, then when and how did it come about? This 
very question is worth keeping in mind as it highlights one of the contentions which keeps 
the field from unifying on a top-down or bottom-up view of linguistic theory (Dąbrowska, 
2015; Newmeyer, 2017). This is something I attempt to answer in the next stage of FL 
evolution (stage C).  
Despite this issue, there is evidence of a protolanguage stage in the evolutionary history 
of FL. Jackendoff argues that ‘living fossils’ of protolanguage are still observed in the 
modern day uses of language. For example, adult second language learners who are 
picking up a language without direct instruction have a strong tendency to follow a 
subject-first or ‘agent first’ rule. This ‘protolanguage’, known as ‘the basic variety’ is 
thought to reveal a subcomponent of UG (Klein and Perdue, 1997). Furthermore, a similar 
pattern is observed in the creations of pidgin and home sign languages (Muysken and 
Bickerton, 2006). 
Finally, before I discuss the emergence of hierarchical phrase structure I will also point 
out that, at this stage, there is an argument for the co-evolution of ‘proto-x-bar theory’ 
with ‘proto-theta-theory’(introduced in 5A). Although they are defined as separate 
systems, it could be that the proto-X-Bar (as a structure with heads and complements) 
was dependent on the existence of proto-theta-theory (as an innate expectation of how 
certain words will behave). If we keep the process of gene-culture co-evolution in mind 
we see that the suggestion is not that proto-X-Bar adapts to a mind that has a proto-
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theta-theory, but to an environment and culture that uses ‘theta-words’ in 
communication. Theta-words—which could become the sort of word that typically 
behaves as a head—would affect the cultural evolution of words as it introduces new 
ways in which words could be used as well as new words to create. It is then this 
environment that prompts the evolution of proto-X-Bar into combining these words for 
the further power ‘to make relevant what is not salient’. If this were the case then, at this 
stage, we could have a protolanguage which initiated linguistic structure by connecting 
words in a head-like to complement-like relationship in a way that is predefined by theta-
roles.  
Stage C: Hierarchical Structure 
According to Jackendoff, once protolanguage is established the next evolutionary step is 
the rise of hierarchical phrase structure. He suggests that the structure which inserted 
words into linear semantic relationships, evolved into a structure that inserted words into 
phrases with heads, so ‘the principles of word order to be expanded into principles of 
phrase order’ (Jackendoff, 1999, p. 277).  This would mean that the subject-first rule did 
not apply to word-order, but to the order of embedded phrases (see 5.1.3), thus ‘yielding 
a major increase in the complexity of conveyable messages’ (ibid). This move could be 
reflected in the evolution of the proto-X-Bar module to the full X-bar theory module (see 
description under stage B). The head-word, now, not only has a certain relationship with 
a complement-word but ‘heads’ an entire phrase and has relationships (as either head, 
complements, or specifiers) with other phrases. This shift meant one could utter 
something like ‘Bill who was angry hit Bob who was sad’ whilst still conveying that 
important semantic relationship between Bill and Bob, as well as semantic relationships 
at the level of the phrases that give more information beyond the main core of the 
sentence.  
The rise of hierarchical structure out of protolanguage, however, raises some interesting 
questions with regards to the primary function of FL. I mentioned in 1.2.1 and 2.2 that 
several theories of language evolution (including MP) tend to argue that hierarchy points 
toward a cognitive enhancing primary function, rather than a communicative one. 
Hierarchy, in general, seems to be at odds with the overall claims of the thesis that 
language has a communicative primary function. To this matter I have three possible 
responses. 
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My first response is to take into account Pinker and Jackendoff’s arguments that the FL 
evolved to aid humans in more clearly and precisely expressing their thoughts (see 3.1 
and 2.2.2). Here, hierarchical structure has a function in, as I already mentioned, ‘yielding 
a major increase in the complexity of conveyable messages’ (Jackendoff, 1999, p. 277). 
The rise of hierarchical structure reflects this well because it provides a means to express 
thoughts in a way that protolanguage could not. Although this clashes with my claim that 
the FL evolved to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ I do not deny that the expression of 
thoughts was a function of language, it just was not the fundamental driving point. I could 
argue, therefore, that at this particular stage of the evolution of FL the driving point was 
the function for clear and precise expression, and not to ‘make relevant what is not 
salient’.  
In this response, I would be quick to remind my reader to consider it within the larger 
picture I am presenting. The overall driving force and selection pressures that built the FL 
may, indeed, oscillate between more than one primary function, but that to ‘make 
relevant what was not salient’ would certainly be the most important factor. For a start, 
a selection pressure to convey clear and precise messages is less important when humans 
already have a good means of doing this (through pointing and panto - see 3.1).  
My second response is to give an argument where hierarchical structure does, indeed, 
provide a primary function to ‘make relevant what is not salient’. I will do this through 
assuming that human thought is defined by a connectionist theory of mind, and not a 
language of thought (see 1.3.2 for definitions). Protolanguage gave humans far more 
power and capability to communicate outside of contexts they were used to. Humans 
could do this because protolanguage made them more capable of ‘making relevant what 
was not salient’ in their communicative discourses, and therefore they did not need to so 
consistently rely on the immediate environment and mutual-knowledge to cooperate 
and work together. This meant that they could explore further regions outside of their 
usual comfort zone and conduct more tasks than they could with standalone word-use. 
Protolanguage also had a huge impact on the way in which humans can think, and 
therefore what humans can think and communicate about (remember, on the 
connectionist model language plays a big role in determining human thought).  
We can imagine, therefore, that this growth of human cooperation and culture meets a 
limitation at the same time as the evolution of the FL. It may be that the FL is saturated 
and can evolve no further in conveying useful semantic relationships despite the ongoing 
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selection pressure to ‘make relevant what is not salient’, to continue pushing the limits 
and growth of culture. Thus, natural selection is open to another solution, another 
evolutionary strategy. My thought here is that human culture and thought had grown so 
much in content and complexity, that a hierarchical rather than linear solution to 
underlying structures of multiple-word-use would be the next natural step in the 
evolution of the FL. Hierarchical structure is, therefore, selected due to its function to 
‘make relevant what is not salient’. 
My final response is to take seriously Chomsky’s scepticism about natural selection at 
least in explaining the evolution of hierarchical structures and agree with him that this 
innovation is down to one genetic change which is the product of third-factor constraints 
as opposed to a process of natural selection (see 2.2.3 and 5.2.1).  This would suggest, in 
an indirect way, that I agree, in part, with Chomsky and MP on the evolution of language. 
Although we disagree on the overall nature of the FL (modules vs a single operation) we 
would agree that a fundamental aspect of modern language is the product of a single 
genetic mutation that gave rise to binary branching. There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between these views that we should keep in mind. For Chomsky, a single 
genetic mutation seemed to transform the entire way the human mind worked, having a 
direct impact on human thought and human communication. For me, a single genetic 
mutation transforms the FL which has previously adapted the mind for protolanguage. 
For Chomsky, this is the whole story of the FL. For me, it is only part of a much bigger 
story that is dependent on the existence of the selection pressure ‘to make relevant what 
is not salient’.  
A continuation of this discussion requires the consideration of topics that go beyond the 
limits of this thesis, but I hope to have provided enough argumentation to show how it is 
that hierarchical structure, through the evolution of X-Bar theory, continues to serve a 
function to ‘make relevant what is not salient’, even if this is not directly associated with 
its primary function. To wrap these arguments up I refer to the final stage of language 
evolution which does continue the story of ‘making relevant what is not salient’ in a more 
direct manner. 
Stage D: Further grammatical relationships 
The final stage counts for many moves in the overall evolution of the FL, but in keeping 
with Jackendoff’s framework, they all suggest a very similar role; and that is to convey 
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further semantic relationships between linguistic units (similar in fashion to the 
suggestions in 5B). What is different here is that we are no longer working with linear-
word-orders, but a far more complex picture of phrases embedded within phrases.  
The rise of hierarchical structure and headedness surely enhance human communication 
and impacts the human environment. It, subsequently, introduces new challenges and 
pressures that need to be resolved to continue successful and efficient communication. 
Jackendoff suggests the rise of three further properties which, when operating together, 
gives rise to what we understand as modern language today (see page 176 and figure 17 
for reference). These are: 
• ‘grammatical categories’ (emergence of nouns, verbs, prepositions etc) 
• ‘symbols that explicitly encode abstract semantic relationships’  
• ‘systems of grammatical relationships to convey semantic relations’  
• ‘systems of inflections to convey semantic relationships’ 
I will not go into how these innovations relate to the modules of GB as this is a task that 
requires its own thesis, but what I hope to have demonstrated here is a theory of the 
evolution of FL that goes ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’ without having to minimise 
linguistic theory. The idea that the FL is made up of interacting modules fits comfortably 
into a thesis that advocates a view that language is about enhancing the cooperative and 
communicative capabilities of humans as hybrid creatures. Ultimately, I conclude that 
what we need for a theory that goes ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’ is a more holistic 
picture of human evolution and not the further isolation of language from language-users 
as the MP view suggests.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
6.1 Thesis Review 
In chapter 1 I explained that natural language remains the centre of much debate and 
controversy in linguistics, philosophy, and other fields that have an interest in this ability 
that is unique to the human species. The questions I have raised in this thesis not only 
concern the underlying nature of our linguistic abilities but also explore how and why 
they came into existence in the first place. 
The challenge and controversies start in the simple act of explaining what language is. In 
1.1 I explained that I am committed to a view that puts syntax—the arrangement of 
words and phrases to create well-formed sentences in a language—at the centre of our 
definition. This, in turn, encourages a commitment to the view that humans are ‘linguistic 
creatures’ and that our linguistic abilities are underpinned by an innate system known as 
the ‘faculty of language’ or FL. The FL is a stand-alone module that exists in the mind of 
all human beings and informs the acquisition of natural languages. Without it, we cannot 
expect to have created and built this complex phenomenon that is so important to us 
today.  
The thought that there is an FL is a contentious one in today’s debates in language, but 
in 1.2.1 I argue that this must be the case as it explains the circumstance for UG; how and 
why it is children are so capable of acquiring language in spite of their impoverished 
experience of it; and also, its idiosyncratic nature. What I do point out, however, is that 
theories of FL are lacking when it comes to describing its primary function and, in turn, 
the primary function of language—that is why and how it came into existence in the first 
place. Current theories appear to have problems within evolutionary, communication, or 
linguistic theory. One of my main claims, however, was that such theories of language 
were out of sync with the bigger picture of human evolution. In particular, they did not 
take into account human’s unique dependence on sociality and cooperation. Thus, the 
overall goal of the thesis was to give a more adequate account of FL that embraces a 
more integrated picture of human evolution. 
Doing this required looking into a view that is usually seen as opposing the thought that 
we are linguistic creatures. That is that we are cultural creatures (see 1.2.2). Here, 
language is wholly learnt from the environment, and not through any innate system that 
is specific to it. The cultural creature view is based upon the fact that we are essentially 
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social animals that depend on social interaction and cooperation for our survival. This 
informs our understanding of how humans communicate (upon the ostensive-inferential 
model, instead of the code-model), and has us reconsider what innate faculties or system 
are unique to humans. Here, we learn that the mechanisms that underpin social cognition 
and our ability to ‘mind-guess’ are essential for understanding human sociality. This way 
of thinking about humans does embrace our unique dependence on cooperation, and 
also explains how important culture is for humans. It is from this angle that I suggest that 
we start exploring the use and primary function of the FL. 
In section 1.3 I postulate the viewpoint that we are ‘hybrid creatures’, and that humans 
have both social cognitive mechanisms and the FL to thank for their ability to use 
language. Further still, I argue it is our being cultural creatures that prompts the 
emergence and evolution of the FL in the first place.  My thinking is to ask what new 
powers the FL brings to human communication; what is different between human 
communication with language and human communication without language? It is here I 
conclude that the FL gives us the power to refer to events and things that happen outside 
of current context, or to ‘make relevant what is not salient’. Since this power would bring 
so much to human social life I argue this is why it exists. This is the primary function of 
the FL. Our being linguistic creatures, therefore, supports and is part of our being cultural 
creatures.  The rest of the thesis (chapters 2-5) is dedicated to supporting this view point 
on language and dealing with any direct objections. 
Under this hybrid theory the existence of language depends both on processes of 
biological evolution and cultural evolution. The FL is a biological object and therefore 
needs to have evolved biologically, and language emerges within a picture where culture 
and cultural evolution is taking place. It is the goal of chapter 4 to tell this story in more 
detail, but in chapter 2 I explain how primary function is intertwined with the process of 
natural selection; and so, how biological and cultural objects are said to have primary 
functions. It is in this chapter I show how the hybrid creature view does not suffer from 
the sort of problems that other FL based views advocate, and I also expose the essential 
role that mind-guessing and social cognition has for language-use. For a start, the theory 
is more integrated with that bigger picture of human evolution, and we are in a better 
position where we can account for various evolutionary problems that seemed to plague 
pre-existing social views (see 2.2.2). These were the problems of continuity, freeloading, 
bootstrapping, and counterfunctionality. 
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With the more foundational details of language evolution set out in chapters 1 and 2, the 
rest of the thesis was dedicated to giving a richer picture and understanding of what the 
hybrid creature is. 
In chapter 3 I argued that the FL was responding to an evolutionary pressure caused by 
the communicative behaviours that existed before it. This started with a deeper 
understanding of the nature of human communication (through the relevance theory) 
and an exploration of the powers that pointing and pantomime, word-use, and language 
all bring to human communication. I conclude that language (that is word-use with 
syntax!) maintains and enhances the power to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ that 
was initiated by word-use by providing a way to deal with the risks and limitations it also 
brings to human communication. 
In chapter 4 I showed that the FL is the product of gene-culture co-evolution and how its 
primary function to ‘make relevant what is not salient’ has a larger function in 
fundamentally supporting human culture and sociality. Thus, there is an argument that 
natural language syntax is not a stand-alone or odd phenomenon of human evolutionary 
history but a necessary and integrated part of it. This chapter served to support my point 
that the evolution of language should be considered in the larger picture of human 
evolution, and therefore should ‘fit’ into the emergence and evolution of other parts 
essential to the human creature (including our dependence on social living and social 
cognitive capabilities).  
In chapter 5 I argue in support of a ‘government and binding’ (GB) approach to the FL. 
This is in response to the minimalist program (MP) which argues that it makes more 
evolutionary sense to opt for a picture of FL that requires fewer ‘descriptive devices’ as 
possible as it was embarrassing to have to try and explain the selection and evolution of 
each one. I argue, however, that this is precisely how we should understand the FL and 
that this is mirrored in in chapter 3 and 4, as well as the overall approach I advocate in 
this thesis. 
 
6.2 Further Work 
As an interdisciplinary effort, the options for further work on this research question are 
far-reaching. In this thesis alone, I have dipped into several different fields including 
linguistics (syntax and pragmatics in particular), evolutionary biology, evolutionary 
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psychology, and cognitive science. Since the work is stimulated from the research of 
several different fields my approach to language evolution is very much a ‘generalist’ 
account. This is a necessary factor for the questions of language evolution as no one field 
has a monopoly on the question  (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Fitch, 2010). It would be 
interesting and, perhaps helpful, however, to take the angle of language evolution into 
these fields and look at the theory from the point of view of a ‘specialist’. 
What would syntacticians make of the argument that syntax was designed (by natural 
selection) to enhance a form of communication on the ostensive-inferential model? Will 
this differ from the usual way of thinking about it as based on the code model? What 
would a pragmatist make of the argument that a biological system (the FL) is designed to 
make human communication more capable of referring to things that exist outside of the 
current context—of ‘making relevant what is not salient’? What would the evolutionary 
biologist say to the idea that the evolution of the human mind is heavily influenced by 
human culture, which is also a product of the biological evolution of the human mind? 
What would the evolutionary psychologist say to the thought that language syntax (as 
the FL) is ingrained as part of human psychology for similar reasons as social cognition? 
What would the cognitive scientists think of the claim that the human mind and language 
is the way they are because of their cooperative interaction with other human minds? 
Each question may the cause of controversy, but the generalist input into the specialist’s 
field could be a valuable perspective and resource for furthering the research and scope 
of that field. Furthermore, the specialist input on the generalist question is also valuable, 
not only because it keeps the research question grounded in evidence-based science, but 
because it guides a generalist toward a holistic theory that is streamlined by each 
respective field. One also hopes the generalist is able to get past those controversies and 
disputes that prevent some fields and research opinions from working together at all. 
Following this last point, there is also more research to be done on this question when it 
is compared and contrasted with the view that language is a wholly social and cultural 
phenomena that is learnt from our environment, and that nothing in our biological set-
up is specific to the domain of natural language syntax (Tomasello, 2014). The tensions 
between the biological and cultural based views on natural language syntax are often the 
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cause of quarrels and disputes as opposed to opportunities for collaborative work56. In 
this thesis, I have attempted to ‘break the barrier’ in one direction by suggesting that we 
take on the ‘hybrid creature’ account of human evolution as a way of enhancing and 
forwarding our understanding our being ‘linguistic creatures’. I did not, however, ‘break 
the barrier’ in the other direction, and argue for how our being hybrid creatures enhances 
or forwards our understanding of our being ‘cultural creatures’. I explain how and why 
the FL makes more sense when we take inspiration from the cultural creature account of 
human evolution, but I would have liked to explore further how our social and cultural 
tendencies make more sense when we take inspiration from the linguistic creature 
account of human evolution. The arguments of this thesis, therefore, work towards 
convincing advocates of a cultural creature view that there is FL underpinning our 
linguistic capacity.  
I tackled this point in only two ways. The first point was to simply argue that the FL is 
better placed to explain our language acquisition experiences and the idiosyncratic 
nature of language (see 1.2.1), but these points are less interesting as they have little to 
say about the evolution and primary function of language. The second point illuminates 
further details. I argued that the FL is designed not only to ‘make relevant what is not 
salient’, but to ultimately support human cooperation and cultural transmission—to 
make us better cultural creatures (see 1.3 and 4.3). I feel that, on this point, there is an 
opportunity for further research and line of argumentation that would be extremely 
interesting to explore: does a biologically based, but socially motivated, account of 
language (the hybrid creature) provide a better functional theory than the culturally 
based account (the cultural creature)? In other words, can a biological account of 
language (as designed by the more rigid process of natural selection) make more sense 
of a social linguistic function than the cultural account (as designed by the more flexible 
process of cultural evolution)?  
Finally, there is much more to say about the more philosophical topic of the relationship 
between language and thought. At various points in the thesis, I explore the role of 
                                                        
56 You only have to look as far as recent articles that have tag lines like: ‘I took on Noam Chomsky’s 
ideas about language and unleashed a decade of debate and ridicule. But is my argument wrong?’ 
(Everett, 2017); and at book titles like: The language myth: why language is not an instinct (Evans, 
2014), or articles titles like: The many errors of Vyvyan Evans ‘The Language Myth’ (Rey et al., 
2017) to get a flavour of the sort of tension I am referring to.  
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human thought in language, mostly as the source of linguistic meaning and semantics. I 
argue, as with many philosophers, that words are paired with a meaning that is based in 
some sort of mental representation or concept ‘in’ the human mind (see 1.3.2). There is, 
however, two ways in which I have explored mental representation: either as a unit in 
LOT (Fodor, 1975) or as a pattern formed by a connectionist network based upon the 
mind’s experience with the external world (Clarke, 2001). The idea that the syntactical 
rules that underpin LOT exist and interact alongside the ones that underpin natural 
language (as the FL) has been explored and researched in the past (Jackendoff, 2002; 
Pinker, 2005). Here, the tendency is to argue the LOT pre-exists the FL and that natural 
language gains its meaning from the conceptual structures that are already innately 
entrenched in our minds.  
What is there to say, however, if there is no pre-existing LOT, but there is an FL? What if 
the FL is selected for the reasons I have argued for here, and human thought is left to the 
whims of the connectionist network? Here, the shape of human thought is largely 
dependent upon its experience with the external world as well as with the social 
interactions with other humans (like with how social conventions and words are formed) 
and the shape of the FL as it is used through those social interactions. Here, we get a 
theory of thought that sounds almost Wittgenstenian (the idea that social interaction and 
language-use is the basis of human thought), but also heavily influenced by a syntax that 
is biological and designed by natural selection (and therefore not wholly formed by the 
movements of society). I do not think this way of looking at human thought has been 
postulated before, and so would also provide a very interesting (but perhaps deeply 
controversial) opportunity for further research. 
6.3 Final Words  
The greatest challenge of this thesis was the task of bringing together theories and ideas 
from fields and perspectives that are often diametrically opposed. Although I am aware 
that my philosophically novel account of language evolution will be subject to resistance 
(that is, the primary function of language is ‘to make relevant what is not salient’), I hope 
to have clearly conveyed the interdisciplinary effort and coherence of a hybrid creature 
view. This was the larger goal in this thesis that I believe I have been successful in. A 
theory which aims to provide an integrated account which takes seriously lessons from 
theories of evolution, linguistics, and human culture should be the goal of all theorists 
that are interested in this question. 
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It is in this final point that I think it is worth pointing out that one trained in philosophy, 
like myself, is well-positioned for the role of the generalist I mentioned above. Language 
evolution and other questions in the evolution and function of mind requires an approach 
which takes seriously specialist input from a variety of crucial fields and perspectives. 
Philosophers, as keen knowledge workers, have the skill to step back, observe, and 
analyse theories that can be unified and seek out those concepts that conflict and 
confuse.  Overall, there is a role for us not only in the philosophical questions that 
surround language, evolution, and mind (like describing the notion of ‘primary function’, 
‘language’, ’thought’, or ‘meaning), but also in the interdisciplinary research required to 
answer these questions in the first place. 
Overall, I hope any academic in the study of language evolution finds it as fun and 
rewarding as it is difficult and challenging. Any perspective or theory will have a horde of 
oppositions to overcome, but will, at least, guarantee an enlightening and inspiring 
experience as one continues to try and seek out and understand the essence of what 
makes us human. 
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